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Caste Instability
in
Moghul India

Leon Sinder

PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY
LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK CITY

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CASTE INSTABILITY
IN MOGHUL INDIA

Preface

Strenuous research works about culture change in India have been made and published by many scholars. But this work, keenly aware of the cultural impact of a differing social system upon India, indicates the common denominator of all societies and reveals the common trends of traditionally oriented-societies all over the world. As always, tradition and culture as a whole, from generation to generation trodden and paved, is hard to remold for the needs of humanity and by human desire and scientific approaches alone. It will be gradually developed, however, by the certain length of time. And from the historical point of view, microscopic and primary observation is many times inclined to express biased analysis, placing the great emphasis upon minor affairs as a clue to scientific generalization. But my friend, Dr Leon Sinder, who knows the cultural inertia and residue in the face of our contemporary mobile society, has endeavored to reach a most valuable conclusion and authoritative findings of India and, in such a manner, cast light on Korea.

As a historian, he looked into the vertical structure of the Indian society, taking her past into consideration, and as an anthropologist, he approached the horizontal aspect of human behavior with scrutiny as well. These, indeed, opened the thorough and provocative cross-sectional and inter-disciplinary scientific surveys which I admire as a colleague in the field of sociology. Those who are interested in various cultures and traditions as well as human behavior will accumulate their knowledge and interpretation of a given culture by understanding the Indian caste system which is so well enunciated by Dr. Sinder.

Seong Hi Yim, Ph D
Minister
Ministry of Public Information
Republic of Korea

Prologue

This is an illuminating and profound research work on the instability of caste in the Moghul period of India.

It seems to me that the importance of this study, even though its primary focus is India during a specific historical period, is its direct applicability to other Asian societies that have undergone drastic change under similar impetus. As such, it should serve as an index to casting light on social processes and social systems in East Asia, Southeast Asia and Korea.

Korean society and the Indian social system, herein described, shared many elements in common. Their reactions to external stimuli, particularly invasions, was strikingly similar. Buddhism in India and Buddhism in Korea, an Indian import via China, both reacted to expected, feared and actual Mongol invasions. The Moghuls are related peoples, by their own claims, to the Mongols who invaded Korea in the 13th century. The Buddhist reaction in India was paralleled by a similar one in Korea, of fear for its religious existence. In some ways the re-

action of the faith led to a temporary strengthening in both India and Korea. In Korea, for example, it resulted in the significant collection and publication of the Buddhist sutra, (The Tripitaka) Taijang-Kyung. Furthermore, Indian Buddhism fell under the invasion of Islam while, at the same time, Korean Buddhism gave way to the Confucianism of the Yi Dynasty.

The convergeness and parallelism of these two societies, based primarily on an overwhelming peasant productive system, is manifest from this detailed analysis. The "caste" system of Korea with its upper Yangbans and its bifurcation into Tongban and Soban can easily be identified with Brahmin and Ksatriya counterparts in the "classical" Hindu pattern. The deference paid these two upper elements, particularly based on ancient social patterning, is reflected in similar social systems throughout Eastern Asia. The changes in the life of the common people, in their orientation, attitudes, general class groupings during Yi dynasty Confucianism is echoed by similar emergences in India under the impact of Islam.

The reign of Emperor Akbar, the high point of this study, and its synthesizing tendencies is paralleled by the equally brilliant King Sejong of Korea. One must be struck by the fact that the comparative religious freedom allowed by these two monarchs led to a fluorescence, and eased social fluidity, in both societies. During the reign of Akbar, as the author emphasizes, social transition became easier and "class" levels less rigid. So, too, during Sejong's time when Buddhism, not suppressed, was revived.

Lastly the vitalization of both of these social systems and the potentialities for the emergence of more fluid social inter-group relations, was drastically curtailed by invasions from the outside. Militant expansionism, in the case of India from

England, France and Portugal and, in the case of Korea, from Japan and Russia, sounded a death knell to this potential fluidity.

Studies, such as this, are vitally needed to change the notions about many of the processes that characterized very old and relatively stable societies. Stability should not be confused with stagnation, relative immobility with general social immobility. The following is a specific study about Indian society but its applicability to Korea is direct and vital.

Leon Sinder, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Long Island University, Fulbright scholar, and visiting Professor at Chung-ang University is the author of, *Hinayana Buddhism in Thailand* (forthcoming early in 1964); *Some Aspects of Two Mongol Law Codes*, 1963; *Culture Change in Rural Korea*, 1961; *Excavations at Yakmok, Korea*, 1960; *Race Relations in America*, 1957. He is the editor of *Research Bulletin on Intergroup Relations*, an annual international publication.

Louise Yim, M.TH., D H L
President
Chung-ang University.

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Foreword

THE primary interest that motivated this study is an effort to show that caste, in the pre-European past, has been an ineffective hindrance in halting change in social relations in India. It is hoped that this study can be used and incorporated into the vast body of anthropological literature now emerging, whose general ideal is to explore the workings of other complex societies

The literature concerning India in general and caste, in particular, is so voluminous that an undertaking to show the fallacy of some of the concepts concerning both seems, at first glance, monumental. The problem becomes somewhat simpler, or seemingly so, when a specific time epoch, the Moslem-Moghul, is introduced. It becomes even more finely framed when the questions of the underlying philosophic dictums concerning caste are dispensed with in order to arrive at some conclusions on the role that caste actually played in ordering social relationships in Moslem-Moghul India. The aim, while still broad, therefore, becomes narrower in scope as the problem emerges.

In the literature itself certain convergences become almost immediately apparent. Most of the material is radically alike and all of it generally refers to the same original sources. These sources, particularly for the Moslem period, are the chronicles left by the various rulers. Elliot and Dawson, in a monumental eight volume series, seem to have gathered most of these chronicles and made them available for the Western world. Dynastic chronicles, while important, prove to be frustrating because the truthfulness of their statements, to put it mildly, is open to question. Chronicles, especially in translation by different authors from different languages, often tend to be contradictory.

While source material concerning dynastic feuds and court life is widely available, the rest of the life of the period is so neglected that it can be only reconstructed in patches. Moreland, the most voluminous writer concerning economic and social conditions of the Moslem-Moghul period, admits that, he too, owes all of his material to two authorities from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: Minhaj-ul-Siraj and Ziya Barni, whose work was completed by Shams-Afif. Most of the contemporary historians use the material from Barni extensively. We have, as yet, no sure way of knowing whether it, too, is accurate. In a similar vein, Vincent Smith claims that even the contemporary and supposedly primary source work of Ferishta was largely copied from another, little known, Persian work: *Tabakat-I-Masiri*.

Although the work from the Moslem point of view is large, Tod's *Annals of Rajastan* is almost the only compilation of data on the life of the period from the Indian viewpoint. Even though these annals are also dynastic history they are, nonetheless, treasure troves in an otherwise very bare larder of information from Indian sources concerning Rajput life. Their very uniqueness, however, makes them difficult to use as source material. There exists some

material concerning the immediate pre-Moslem period from Chinese sources, particularly the pilgrims Fa-Hsien, I-Ching and Hsüan Tsang. This material, although invaluable, must be used extremely cautiously. Many of the translations are in opposition and have different emphases. The original authors were usually in India for one basic purpose, to study Buddhism, and often are biased or neglect altogether to mention the life of the country outside of their particular field of interest.

From the works of medieval travelers from the West such as Ibn Batuta and Ferishta we have some glimpses of court life but few and rare fragments of social structure or peasant life. Marco Polo regrettably never traveled north of the Narbada River and consequently his penetrating views of conditions in South India are not paralleled by those in the North ,

The material concerning the social conditions during the Moghul period increased as European travelers went, with ever increasing frequency, to the court and throughout the countryside. The works of these writers must also be very carefully handled for it, too, is often contradictory. Some of these reports, however, particularly those of Bernier, have attained great credibility. These reports, whether accurate or not, are nonetheless of the utmost importance for as more and more material, particularly from Jesuit sources, becomes available, cross checking will be possible. This will result in the elimination of at least the most glaringly ethnocentric inaccuracies. It must always be borne in mind that contemporary reports may leave out more than they ever put in and give us a completely inaccurate picture because of their fragmentary nature. As late as 1917, Vincent Smith maintained that *not one* historian, contemporary or otherwise, had even mentioned the work of Tulsi Das, the father of a new Indian literature and vernacular. The impact of this individual on the life of Bengal

during the time of Akbar was profound.

As an anthropologist, I had to be aware of the fact that in using the source material so boundlessly provided by historians and economists, there might not be enough clues to the functioning of caste in the period. I turned, therefore, to other types of sources; particularly folk literature and poetry. In this material, I think there are many clues to the functioning of social relations in the Moslem-Moghul period. This material is as valuable as Chaucer or Piers Plowman have proven to be in giving clues to England's social system in its middle ages. I feel certain that as studies of complex societies increase, the anthropologist will have to use source material that the orthodox historian and economist will frown upon. In so doing he will unearth relationships that dynastic history or chronicles cannot possibly show.

There is a negative aspect to literary research, in attempting to reconstruct social relations in complex societies, that the anthropologist doing field work has heretofore not had to face. In field work the whole culture, so to speak, is spread out before the eyes and ears of the researcher. To anthropologists in this sort of situation, time, sensitivity and orientation are the sole determinants to the depth of his data. On the other hand, the added factor in literary research is the lack of sufficiently varied data in the libraries or other sources generally available to the scholar. Many of the publications that might shed light on the problem are local or private and seldom find their way to the United States. This handicap can be almost an insurmountable one for the scholar without special facilities. In this connection, I would like to thank the Taraknath Das Foundation Library for the extensive use I made of its excellent collection of data on India.

In any study that has pretensions to be scholarly, many debts are due to those who framed the writer's thought, professors under

whom he studied, colleagues with whom he discussed his work while it was in progress and friends who encouraged him to continue. Among all of these, there inevitably stand out those but for whose guidance and trust no work of learning would ever be attempted or completed. I owe a great deal to Professor Alfred L. Kroeber whose guidance at the very early stages of this work was decisive and under whom I had the privilege to study. Sincere thanks are due also to Professor Conrad Arensberg who spent many, many hours with me discussing, guiding and framing the physical format of this book. To the late Dr. Taraknath Das, whose personal friendship and affection I shall always cherish and whose numerous fatherly talks gave me a glimpse of some of the vast knowledge of India which he possessed, as well as to my wife, Mary Glenn, who read, heard read, and lived with this work and me for so many trying years, go my deepest affection

CHAPTER I

Introduction

THE word "caste" has become synonymous with the name of India. It is, according to Kroeber, "peculiarly Indian"¹ While some social anthropologists realize that caste, as a way of ordering human behavior, exists elsewhere² they, nonetheless, persist in dealing with it as a unique Indian phenomenon. Hutton maintained, "although social institutions that resemble caste in one respect or another are not difficult to find elsewhere . . . yet caste in its fullest sense, caste that is as we know it in India, is an exclusively Indian phenomenon. No comparable institution to be seen elsewhere has anything like the complexity, elaboration and rigidity of caste in India"³

Caste is constantly being used as the contrast for class. The implication of the word, beyond the supposed nature of its application within the system of Indian endogamy, has always been

that of relative stability. The caste system, caste behavior and caste sanctions have tended to define a relatively immobile social scene in which age-old patterns of societal interaction repeat themselves in almost unvarying regularity. Because of this, Indian village life has been reported as stable in a diachronic sense. Despite the fact that India has been invaded, in relatively modern times, by the Afghans, the Persians, the Mongols, the British, the French, the Portuguese, authorities generally repeat the assertion that the "invaders come and go but the villages remain the same." The fact that a village remained physically in the same place, since factors of proximity to water, access to transportation and good soil are a general human need, was taken to mean that social and physical stability were to be equated. Again and again, authorities repeat the assertion that.

they (the villages) seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down, revolution succeeds revolution, Hindu, Pathan, Mongol, Moghul, Maharatta, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn but the village community remains the same.⁴

It is as if the continued location of Damascus or Rome, no matter what else had occurred historically in the life of these two cities, meant that the nature of their existence and of their physical immobility was the same. For example, Elphinstone wrote.

A generation may pass away but the succeeding generation will return, The sons take the place of the fathers, the *same site* for the houses, the *same lands* will be reoccupied by the descendants of those who were driven, out when the village was depopulated . . . ⁵

Paralleling these types of statements concerning physical immobility are the ones concerning social immobility. Such an astute observer as Stanley Lane-Poole, nevertheless, wrote

The history of the Mohammedan period is therefore necessarily more a chronicle of Kings and courts and conquests than of organic or national growth. The vast mass of the people enjoy the doubtful happiness of having no history, since they show no development; apparently they are the same yesterday, today and forever.

Or

A history of the people is usually assumed in the present day to be more stimulating and instructive than the records of kings and courts; but, even if true, this can only be understood of Western peoples, of peoples who strive to go forward, or at least change. In the East, the people does not change, and there, far more than among more 'progressive races,' the "simple annals of the poor," however moving and pathetic, are indescribably trite and monotonous, compared with the lives of those more fortunate to whom much has been given in opportunity, wealth, power and knowledge.⁶

The repetition and combination of these two statements by almost all of the historians and social scientists dealing with caste, including the Indians themselves, attests to the strength of this misconception.⁷ Even when the dynamism of a new faith, Islam, with institutions new to Indian life, entered the sub-continent, the impression remained fixed. Vincent Smith wrote:

Mr. Lane-Poole is right. The Indian commonalty has no history that can be told. There has been practically no evolution of institutions, and when we read descriptions of Indian social conditions recorded by Megasthenes twenty-two centuries ago, we feel that his words are still applicable in the main to present conditions in India 'up-country', where the ancient structure of society and the habits of daily life have been very slightly affected by changes of government or by modern influences.⁸

In comparing "static" India with "dynamic" Europe, this same historian wrote:

In Europe we can watch with intense interest the slow overthrow of paganism by Christianity, the conflict between Roman and Teutonic ideals, the birth and decay of the feudal system, the growth of municipal autonomy, the development of representative government, and a hundred other political and social changes, which go down to the very roots of national life, and make the Europe of today fundamentally different from the Europe of Alexander the Great.⁹

Strong ethnocentricity, which deeply influenced Smith (as one example among many), caused him to ignore parallels in Indian History to the events that he used to show the dynamism of Europe. the overthrow of Hinduism by Buddhism, the overthrow of Buddhism by Brahminical Hinduism, the birth and decay of Rajput feudalism and the rise of Moghul central authority, the growth and decay of village and local national authority and of representative government in various areas of the sub-continent *even at the time of Megasthenes*, the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, the urban revolution taking place with the rise of Moghal cities.

Nineteenth century historians, as well as social scientists whose overriding interest was to develop and expound a philosophy of history,¹⁰ were using India as a primary example of a specific type of social system. They made the assumption that the existence of the philosophic concepts involved with caste and the persistence of certain types of human relationships were synonymous.¹¹ They can be understood on the grounds that, in using the best information then available to them, they were mistaking superficial, apparent and verbalized behavior as the true indicator of dynamic or non-dynamic living patterns.¹² I cannot understand, however, how scientists from newer disciplines, with a great deal of new

data and better methodological techniques could, nonetheless, follow in accepting the same assumptions as guided the scientist of the nineteenth century.¹³ Their arguments are not as to whether the concepts concerning caste are basically correct, but as to how the caste system had its genesis. Whether we are dealing with Risley's¹⁴ idea of the origin of caste in race differences, Senart's¹⁵ in its beginnings of Aryan vs. Dravidian idealism, Hocart's¹⁶ in its origin as ritual identification or Ghurye's¹⁷ idea of Brahmin ascendancy, all are united in accepting caste as synonymous with stability and immobility. Cox,¹⁸ while realizing that the classical ideas on Indian caste might need re-definition, seems somehow afraid to go where his own logic leads him. He allows, for example, for vertical mobility within a caste (as an historical axiom) but maintains that horizontal or vertical mobility between castes in India did not occur.¹⁹ Linton,²⁰ in formulating his own concepts of status and role, also maintained, using Indian caste as his example, that caste was so fixed a system that a member of any group could only leave his status "for a better position in his next incarnation if his work is properly done." Surely those social scientists working on the concept of caste as a general phenomenon know that no social system is so well integrated, so resilient and capable of infinite absorption of new elements of culture that it reworks all outside influences to fit within the pre-existing framework without major change in its own structure.²¹

Was the caste system, whatever its origin and whatever means it used to impinge itself on Indian urban and rural life, static during Moslem and Moghul times? Of course not! And yet, the ability to change drastically in form and content, as well as what caused these changes is the very thing that, it seems to me, is overlooked by most Indian specialists. Barber, for example, stated, "There has always been some fission among the castes of

India, because this is one way in which part of a caste can be socially-mobile by splitting off and setting itself up in more ritually pure roles and activities, which give higher social class position''²² This sort of concept categorically implies that there is actually no mobility beyond the group and that the mobility is to be found only in a comparative relationship with erstwhile caste status. Were one to accept this statement it would have to be agreed that mobility in the Indian sense was restricted to in-caste mobility and that endless segmentation would not radically alter the picture of a series of gradations that were separate and mutually exclusive. It would also seem apparent that the possibility of cross-caste relationship with increasing fluidity of *individual* members associating themselves with other individuals from other castes was an impossibility in India. It would also mean that the Warner concept²³ of internal mobility within a caste but the impossibility of mobility between castes were also in operation in India. However, it seems to me, that the Warner concept which "seems" so applicable in an area in which there are verbalized as well as actual physical differences²⁴ is historically not the sort of relationship which occurred in India. It is the contention of this book that while castes sometimes segmented on the basis of ritual purity, *it was not the only way or the most important way in which they segmented*. The other aspects of this segmentation, as this whole book will attempt to prove, had the force of causing not only in-caste mobility but inter-caste mobility, not only group to group mobility but individual mobility vis-a-vis one's old group and *any* new group of which the individual might become a member.

Caste function and caste nomenclature tend to become so confused that they are relatively useless as methodological tools. In attempting to categorize social patterns, as well as differing groups of people for further study, many anthropologists working

in the field of Indian studies have fallen into the trap of using older nomenclature systems to describe social conditions to which they have no application. Peoples who share names (Rajput, Brahmin, Chamar, for example) and who have no historical connection, no real religious linkage, no similar living patterns, differing patterns of social ranking and who may be separated by thousands of miles, are often lumped because of similar nomenclature; one, which as this study will bring out, they may have adopted for themselves.

There is no denying, however, that concepts of caste existed in Moghul India as one of the paramount framers of village and urban life. They supposedly gave a man a niche into which to fit with recognized rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis other individuals with whom he had to interact²⁵. But the idea that caste, in giving a man a notion of the social scheme into which he had been born and by the nominal persistence of certain institutions for thousands of years, is to be equated with staticity is erroneous.²⁶ Caste must be regarded as a nominal means of pigeonholing relationships for further classification which in time are non-caste based. It does *not* mean that caste is the sole principle in ordering relationships in society. It is, on the contrary, only descriptive of the control. Control of the system could be either dynamic or relatively static. Hutton early realized that this is so, for he asserted, ". . . it is probably significant of the true origin of the caste system that the ultimate *controlling* authority is *secular* and further that the secular authority visualized as responsible in the ancient Hindu authorities is the King"²⁷. The Brahmins, for example, were at the pinnacle of the nominal religious set of caste statuses and yet we know that there were many types of Brahmins, reflecting not their religious role as much as their social attainments.²⁸ Mukundaram,²⁹ a Bengali poet writing in the sixteenth

century, tells us of high Brahmins who served as advisors to the Rajahs while, at the same time, mentions Brahmins who were low caste (a contradiction in terms) and who went among poor people. Upon examination, the same pattern of upper and lower types can be found in all of the so-called fixed social levels that the caste system seemed so clearly to delineate. We must note, however, that even at a cursory glance, this system is far from a closed one. It seems to have had in-caste mobility, with recognized differences between members of specific groups, based upon concepts other than religion which, theoretically, sanctioned the existence of caste. The nominal aspect of this position is graphically borne out when we realize that lower class Brahmins are not just the lowest members of the highest caste, still at the peak of the social ladder, but are actually lower in social position and prestige than higher members of so-called lower castes. A wealthy Ksatriya or a Vasya would *consider himself* on a higher level and hesitate to marry a member of the lower Brahmins.

The operational aspect of caste, the actual duties and the actual role of members, plus its differing nominal aspect, can be seen in fluctuations to the adherence of the principle of caste. We know that from the fifth century B.C through the eighth century A.D., Buddhism and Jainism were often the paramount faiths in India, each carrying with it the negation of caste as the principal factor of human interaction.³⁰ At such times, the Brahmins, and in successive stages, the Ksatriyas, the Vaisyas, the Sudras, far from being at the pinnacle of society, were graded on levels whose criteria were non-religious and non-caste.³¹ The system, during these 1300 years, fluctuated between a seemingly closed one when Hindus were in power and an open one when they were not.³²

Nominal aspects of caste, those duties which are specified in the ideology, while not as dynamic as the operational ones, were

also undergoing change during the 1300 years between the fifth century B C. and the eighth century A D. Verbally adhered to duties of any member of the caste system and his actual duties were more often different than they were alike.³³ As will be pointed out in this paper, Brahmins were often agriculturalists, Chamars were not always leather workers, members of the Ksatriyas worked as menials, etc., all in operational pursuits, differing diametrically from the nominal aspects of their caste status. The fact that most villages in India seemed to have, for a very long period of time, a parallel relationship between the operational aspects of caste and the name of the caste to which they adhered does not abrogate this fact. Villages in India tend to have a single class or quasi-caste living under the domination of an individual, a family or a group of individuals representative of either extraneous power factors (crown appointed nobility) or of internal social position based on wealth (landholding). To use, therefore, the relative rigidity of cultural levels in rural areas as proof that villages were basically independent and stable and that caste was the basic principle in causing people to adhere to age-old beliefs may be just untrue. Marriot, for example, points to the existence of two opposite "schools" of thought concerning the isolative stability of villages vs. the village as part of the greater tradition of Indian life. He maintains that

Many anthropological students of social structure have insisted that traditional Indian villages, despite the great heterogeneity of their populations, may best be conceived by an extension of our models for conceiving primitive communities, as worlds in themselves. They have argued *convincingly* that up until the foreign or urban influences of thirty or fifty or one hundred and fifty years ago, (after the time encompassed in this study) little communities in Mysore, Kerala, Tanjore, and upland Orissa actually possessed clear structural defini-

tion, a high degree of economic self-sufficiency, political solidarity as against the outside world, and a sense of ritual integrity (Srinivas 1951:1051-55; Miller 1952:160, 163; Gough 1952:534; Bailey 1953:327-28). Beals tells us from Bangalore District that, "Until 1880 there was very little question as to the government's effect on the village. . . ." (1954:403). Srinivas characterizes the villages of pre-British India as having generally existed in a state of "isolation" from the rest of the world: each was a stable, self-subsistent whole, controlling its own affairs and yielding to the outside world only a land tax through cautious intermediaries (Srinivas 1951:1051).³⁴

Marriot goes on to state: "If each peasant community may best be conceived as a whole thing in itself, *then it and the great literary tradition of Indian civilization are likely to have but little relevance for each other.*"³⁵ However, in setting up categories of his own, in attempting to determine the social structure of a contemporary village, Marriot seems to reject the view of the village as an isolate and pulls it into the over-all tradition of Indian life. This can be graphically seen in the modern case of a Tanjore village in which, "The Brahmins of the Tanjore village of Kumbapettai, for example, appear to owe their wealth, their *secular power*, and much of their *effective ritual authority to a royal land grant* (Gough 1952:531)."³⁶ In other words caste status, *nominal and actual*, followed, as this book will point out, the concept of power, *not the other way around*. A tradition that was subject to the total fluctuations of the social structure and which must include the enormous impact of government. During the Moghul times this government of another faith, with differing attitudes toward peasant and urban life as well as land use, had a profound influence in village and urban life. Marriot's categories which tend to link the village with life outside of its immediate environs

(hence the urban areas and the administrative areas) are outlined in this way:

A third kind of link between the caste hierarchies of little communities and the great tradition of the greater community can be described only speculatively. This is the body of ritual usages by which the ranking of castes is managed in each place . . . It is difficult to imagine how such elaborate ritual usages capable of ranking so large a number of different castes could have come into being without something like deliberate contrivance, without some context in *centers more* sophisticated than those of the village households³⁷

In this same vein, he further maintains

If integration and continuity between little communities and civilization are evident in the *structural relations of village and state* in India, they are evident even more plainly in the organization of caste. The existence of an extensive system of castes, present in all villages and cutting across many villages, perhaps provides the ultimate in proofs of the ancient *insparability of the little communities of India from the greater community* which they collectively constitute.³⁸ . . . Whatever the hieratic, feudal, bureaucratic, or indigenous origins of unequal wealth and power as between higher and lower castes, some formality and fixity of lands and offices through the devices of a greater state *seems everywhere to underlie the order of caste ranking*³⁹

In making these statements, Marriot is aware of the fact that "we seem to have contradicted ourselves. We cannot say both that an Indian village is comparable with a primitive *isolate* and also that it is dependent upon and part of a system that is outside of itself." Although he attempts to resolve these "plausible but contradictory claims,"⁴⁰ it seems to me that both views cannot be correct. Either villages and their caste members are or were basically isolated or else they are or were in direct contact

It is my belief, therefore, that the work which follows is but a beginning in the attempts that must be made to reorient our thinking about the processes which tended either to stabilize or disrupt society in India. If it can prove its contention that caste in a specific historical epoch was as dynamic, as mobile, or as changeable as almost all of the other parts of a society undergoing change, then it should cast some doubts on the validity of studies using the concept of a relatively frozen social scene elsewhere. The anthropologist must realize that, in dealing with complex societies having long histories, he is faced with the problem of describing their integral parts in the light of the scientific and non-ethnocentric dictates of his science. These strictures are ones which historians, philosophers of history and other social scientists have, until recently, not heeded.⁴⁴ Perhaps faced with this problem we may emerge with a new series of concepts for use in comparing social forms of frozen historical moments which will have validity for study in other old and complex societies.

In this work, I shall try to show that social relations in India during Moghul times cannot be laid at the feet of a religious orientation based upon bounds which were fixed and which limited human interactions in all spheres of life.

It is highly recommended that the voluminous footnotes be read as part of the text. They are essential to an understanding of the concepts put forward in this book.

CHAPTER II

Historic Relations (Arab-Hindu)

THE closeness of India to the Arabian peninsula has aided in fostering trade between these two areas for a very long time. The trade, although two directional, seems to have been in possession of the Arabs. Arab traders began to settle in cities along the coast and to trade with the interior via the medium of South Indian merchants. It is important to note that trade, and its perennial cultural counterpart, was only with south India.¹ Tara Chand mentions the fact that, as early as the time of Agathacides² there were so many Arabs in the Malabar coast that the people had accepted the Arab religion. This "fact" is open to question. At any rate, the influence of Arabs in urban centers in the Malabar coast was disproportionate to their numbers. These traders were received in an hospitable fashion by local authorities and

were encouraged to carry on their commercial enterprises and permitted to practice their faith. Their growth in numbers and in wealth continued uninterrupted and, by 636 A.D.,³ trade had grown to such proportions that a whole Arab fleet appeared in South Indian waters. This fleet found a welcome from their countrymen who had become prosperous merchants along the coastal cities of Malabar.⁴ During the seventh century A.D. both Persian and Arab traders were settling in large numbers all along the coast of Western India, showing their intentions of remaining as a permanent part of the area by marrying local women.⁵ These towns became small seats of Muslim life, each with its own Mosque. The Hindu Rajahs encouraged this penetration for it gave them a ready and easily discernible area of taxation. It is important to note that these communities were not interested so much in proselytizing as in commerce and in wealth. The constant additions to their numbers was by peoples of Persian and Afghan origin, not by Hindu converts. It is important to note, too, that as late as the eleventh century the only mention of Moslems in India is in urban centers on the coast.⁶ These people, especially those in Gujerat, were highly respected and encouraged by local rajahs to such an extent that the monopoly of the whole eastern trade was soon in their hands.⁷ The phenomenal growth of the faith of the Prophet found these urban commercial nuclei as fertile ground upon which the seed of the new religion was to fall. Not only did they accept the faith but they immediately set about, in the zeal of their new conversion, to missionize their neighbors. Furthermore, they also tried to convert Hindu traders from the interior with whom they had been dealing for some 500 years. This missionary activity spread northward and eastward with the Malabar coast as its cultural center. South India, *not* north India, therefore, was the first to feel the dynamic im-

pact of the new faith and the first to have any sizeable numbers of Moslems within its urban-commercial centers⁸

The patterns of Moslem penetration into northern India⁹ did not follow the commercial one of the south. It was a war-like penetration in which armies imbued with the zeal of conquest were beginning to move toward the frontiers and the passes.¹⁰ We know that by 708 A D Mohammed Ibn Kasim¹¹ had penetrated through Sindh up into the Punjab. His way was guided and made simpler by the Buddhists¹² who, according to Stanley Lane-Poole, greeted "the invaders with shouts of joy."¹³ The campaign of Mohammed Ibn Kasim¹⁴ marks the beginning of a phase of penetration into Sindh and the Indus valley region. Sindh and Multan, however, were now annexed to the Arab Empire¹⁵. Unlike the Moslems traders in the South who were always enclosed within vast Hindu majorities, the Moslems in the North began either to found their own communities or to overrun preexisting coastal villages in large numbers.

Internal conditions in northern India, prior to Mahmud of Ghazni, were so chaotic that conquest and annexation by any strongly centralized power was inevitable.¹⁶ When the Empire of Harsa fell, the north which had been united under his strong hand broke up into a series of small principalities. Rajput clans encouraged and aided by Brahmins started to spread out from the Central Provinces toward the new frontier regions. The growth of these clans obliterated ancient tribes and reamalgamated and replaced them with new ones.¹⁷ Feudal institutions swept away the ancient councils and assemblies of the tribal kingdoms. Even the ancient seats of culture were displaced. Magada was no longer the cradle of Empire and Pataliputra was in ruins.¹⁸ The great university at Nalanda was in decline¹⁹. Power, residing in a fragmentary fashion in the various Rajput Kingdoms,

had shifted from eastern India, Bengal and Assam to western India (Gujerat and Punjab).²⁰ What had been the strongly Buddhistic Harsa Kingdom was quite different by the eleventh century. Buddhism and Saktism were now confined to Bengal while Jainism was found only in Gujerat and Rajputana. Hinduism was now the dominant cult in the north and the Brahmins were beginning their ascendancy in the social life of the area,²¹ a position which, although they were to share with the Moghul Moslems, they have not relinquished today. Although the growth of Rajput clans affected the relations between seats of power they did not affect, nearly so greatly, the relationships between any given seat of power and the villages within the confines of each feudal domain. Particularly full records of the administration of Parantaka I²² show, during the first half of the tenth century, the fabric of administration resting in a union of villages.²³ This union was so intricately enmeshed that destruction of any one of the individual members affected the unity and structure of all the rest. Village assemblies, under the Chola administration²⁴ for example, were elected by an elaborate machinery for casting lots and members held office for one year.²⁵ In this area each union of villages had its own treasury and enjoyed full control over its village lands, being empowered to sell land under certain specific contingencies. The village lands were regularly surveyed and the tax was levied on the basis of the *produced* crop, not the potential of production. The relations between villages were more frequent and of greater importance than the relation between village and town. Regularity or irregularity of contact between urban center and the village directly reflected the distance between the two. Because the urban center reflected the seat of power, the more distant the village from the center, the less were the effects of administrative decrees on village life. A village, or

a union of villages, oftentimes superseded the central administration because of the fairly homogeneous pattern of village proximity and power. The union possessed no coercive power, so that any given village could, in theory,²⁶ upset the working of the union. Power resided in the city which could sally out at almost any time, either to punish, to collect taxes, to collect booty, or to inspect the hinterland.²⁷ The flow of power was, therefore, one directional. This does not mean that urban centers always controlled the same hinterlands indefinitely or that each urban center was, like the Greek city state, a government unto itself. It does mean that there existed the typical pattern of a great city with its great lord which was more important than a smaller city with a Rajah of lesser prominence.²⁸ The caste structure of any given city reflected not only the usual²⁹ manifestations but gave direct emphasis to the position of the city itself in relation to other cities. The gradation of hierarchy varied from center to center in terms of the force and power that the center itself wielded.³⁰ The villages, on the other hand, especially those in village unions, reflected a caste structure based on institutions completely divorced from concepts of power.

Rajput feudal power, immediately prior to Mohammed Ghori's attacks and the end of a phase of feudalism in the north, reflected a new religious pattern just as the Rajputs and their associated clans themselves may have reflected a new class pattern. Tara Chand³¹ feels that the Brahmins, beginning their ascendancy over the Buddhists with the breakdown of Harsa's India, may have created the Rajput clans out of Scythians, Huns, Bhils and Gonds in order to bolster their bid for power. Inasmuch as these were to become suppressed groups under the Delhi Sultans and the Moghuls, it would mean a great period (if we could accept the author's theory) of class mobility in which whole peoples were

elevated.³² Caste-class patterns among these people would then be on a higher plane with the lowest of the classes or castes of new Rajputs taking precedence over the highest (with the exception of the Brahmins) of the castes in the local area in which they were created. It would also mean the emergence of Brahmins, both urban and rural, as the paramount religious group, consistently growing as the prestige and numbers of the Buddhists waned.³³

Urban commercial life was channelized in two directions: that of producing for the local court or for merchants to whom the city was a focal point for trade. The various trade guilds³⁴ found in almost any medieval Indian city, were ranked in terms of *the goods that they produced* with a graded ranking of humans following the social concept of the importance of the produced item.³⁵ It meant, perforce, that guilds of merchants from various urban areas could grade themselves in terms of rank with one another. Here again the size of the urban unit would seem to have played a prominent role in grading the larger the city, the greater the trade, the more important the guild.³⁶ There were at this time, as well as later, heterogeneous guilds through which intra-caste mobility functioned and which gave the possibility for intercaste mobility over a relatively long period of time.

The economic interaction of guilds and their paralleling social aspects were to increasingly bifurcate beginning with the growth of power of the Rajput clans. We read, for example, that during the reign of Harsa (606-647) "restrictions of caste as regards food and marriage were not, however, allowed to interfere with social intercourse between different castes in the cities."³⁷ From another source it can be noted that, "up to the seventh century foreigners were not looked down on and were fully absorbed, *caste was not rigid*, nor were the laboring and working classes treated with contempt and put under social dis-

abilities . . ."³⁸ In a group of friends and associates of Bana, a court poet,³⁹ are listed A Vandinas (poet) a Katyayanika (an ascetic widow *without caste*), a Jangalika (snake doctor), a betel bearer, a Kalada (goldsmith), a Hairika (a functionary of government), a Lekhaka (a scribe), a Chitrakit (a painter), a Pustakakrit (a notary), a Mardangika (a drummer), two musicians, a Sairandhri (a maid), Vamsikas (pipers), a Aksika (a dicer), a Kitava (a gamester), a Sailali (an actor), a Nortaki (a dancing girl), a Parasara Ascetic, a Digambara Jaina, a Saiva Ascetic, a metallurgist, a potter and a juggler⁴⁰ Not only do we see association between caste and casteless in this list but intercaste relations between various religious followers as well as the comparative freedom that women enjoyed in the social relations with men, a freedom which was to diminish constantly as the Delhi Sultans and Moghul influences increased.⁴¹

The social and economic interaction between urban and village centers was channelized into two specific streams,

- 1 in which the villages knew of the city as a religious and/or administrative area from whence power and taxation flowed, or
- 2 in which the trader lived who would go into the hinterlands to dispose of his merchandise either to smaller local merchants or directly to the individual village or villager.

Caste-class structure within the villages of northern India, whatever village type⁴² it happened to be, was not formulated in the same way as it was in the urban centers. There was no hereditary residuum of power, as manifested in the Rajah or nobility found in the city, the guild associative pattern was largely missing and there were no enclaves of Moslem believers as a kind of class pattern unto itself. Although there were castes within

villages, prior to Moslem rule, with some principle of control (either in a headman or assembly pattern) these were based upon factors which had nothing to do with wealth or possessions. The concept of a parallelism between caste and wealth, between the material aspects of life and social position which was becoming increasingly evident in the urban centers had no analogy to anything to be found in the rural area. Urban commercial life, at the close of the feudal period in Indian life, with its enormous possibilities for material gain and increased social prestige had found no echoes, as yet, in the villages. The village's life, until the advent of the Ghorī invasions and the ushering in of Muslim life into Hindustan, had an economic pattern whose interaction was basically level and uncomplicated ⁴³

CHAPTER III

The Delhi Sultans (1206-1388)

THE medieval phase of Indian life may be said to have ended with the coming of Muhammad Ghor. With its end began the second phase of the Moslem penetration in India and Indian life.¹

In 1175-76 Muhammad Ghor invaded India and, in a series of constant attacks, occupied (by 1187) the Punjab. Muhammad was a Turk whose armies represented a group of individuals unlike the merchants in the towns of south India. Muhammad did not have much difficulty in overcoming the Ghaznavid prince Khusran Malik and bringing under his control the Muslim dominated Punjab. However, in 1191 when he proceeded farther, the Hindu Kingdoms of the north made a stand at the battle of Talawari² and defeated the Moslems only to be reconquered in turn the following year. If there was a tendency for the Hindu or Budd-

hist villages in the area to accept the faith of the victor it was not in evidence³ When the Moslems marched into Bihar in 1197 that important seat of Buddhism was sacked, its libraries destroyed and its monks slaughtered.⁴ In the year 1199 Moslem troops reached Bengal and were in effective control of the whole area between Afghanistan and Bengal. After the area was conquered, the army had to settle down and undertake the more difficult task of administration. They became, perforce, a sedentary army from which the new rulers had to draw their administrators and men of law. The Moslem rulers, so unlike the colonies of merchants which had preceded them, settled in cities in the center of their vast holdings. This decision was made on the basis of military strategy so as to be able to dispatch troops to any peripheral area with the least loss of time. Whereas the Moslem merchant had been in a minority in a small enclave in coastal cities, the soldier found himself in a fairly populous city of Moslems in which he was not an isolate but wielded power over the Hindus around him. With the Delhi Sultans, therefore, a new Muslim type arose in north central India. This Muslim had to interact with, mold and be molded by, the Hindus of all classes in both the urban center and the rural community. He had to instigate and formulate policy that involved problems much beyond the purely economic ones of the merchant who had preceded him and the military ones which had heretofore involved him. Because of his dominant power role, he could give protection to Muslim missionaries and thus help the process of proselytizing more vigorously than before.⁵ His role brought him into contact with all aspects of Hindu life and placed him in a position in which his policies played a decisive role in the formulation of that life.

The policies of the Delhi Sultans varied with individual

rulers as well as with individual problems. Their attitudes, as reflected in administrative decrees, toward the Hindus in the town and in the villages led to changing social, religious and economic patterns as well as to the formulation of new caste-class associations

THE CITY

Introduction of the Moslem element as the dominant group found its first vital echoes in the large urban centers. Not only did the caste-class structure alter itself but the members fitting into the patterns were changed in type⁶. Functionally, the cities themselves either grew in importance or declined and with them grew or declined the guild-associative patterns that they housed⁷. The Crown, held by the Delhi Sultans, followed an old Hindu attitude in relation to the dwellers of the administrative center and toward the hinterland. Because the Delhi Sultans' ideas about monarchy were similar to the Hindu ones,⁸ the open darsan,⁹ which was to play so prominent a part in the Moghul Empire's life, was completely ignored. Although individual Sultans, like Sikandar Lodi,¹⁰ persecuted Hindus with great vigor, policies of state induced the sultans generally to act with tolerance¹¹. The focal point of missionary activity was mainly in the city, *not in* the village. The cities, although Moslem in power and influence, were nonetheless, still very cosmopolitan in flavor. Barani,¹² writing in the middle of the 14th century speaks of influential and opulent sections of Hindu society found in the capital city of Delhi. This is confirmed by the statement of a sultan of an earlier period, Jalal-u'd-din Firuz Khalji (1290-1296)¹³.

Desires of the Delhi Sultanate for luxury goods were to

intensify the activities of cities in that direction. The guild productive patterns were increased in numbers as the power and desires of the superimposed Moslem classes in the city grew.¹⁴ This did not mean the formation of new castes but augmentation of old ones by internal accretion as well as by recruitment from the countryside. Members of castes of similar degree in villages outside the power center could readily fit into a similar station in some new occupation in the city. There, however, was no indication of villagers flocking into towns except during times of absolute distress.¹⁵ The Delhi Sultans, unlike the Moghuls, did not encourage and foster widespread industrial activities in the towns. The existence of the towns and with them the whole paraphernalia of caste-class relationships were themselves precarious. During the reign of Mohammed Tughlaq¹⁶ it was decided by the administration to move the capital to Deogir in the Deccan. As a result, in the year 1329, practically the entire population was forcibly evacuated. The effects upon the caste-class structure of Deogir and of Delhi must have been dramatic. Castes, whose sole pretense to status was in the production of certain types of goods, were now coming into contact with members of other castes whose production of these same goods was for a consuming public of less social stature. The effect must have been to level the gap in status between the two guild patterns of these cities as they started to interact in the combined production of goods for the Sultanate. The castes of Deogir must have risen in status to meet the lowered level of those of Delhi. Delhi itself lost all pretense to being the seat of Empire.¹⁷ The merchants from Delhi whose status oftentimes was judged directly in relation to the importance of the city from which they came, also lost status. Movements, of which this is but one example, resulted in the rise and decline of cities as physical entities and had a

tremendous bearing upon the peasants in the villages that surrounded them.¹⁸ Moving Delhi, the one large market for the produce of the villages around it, meant a drastic change in the economic and social life of these villages. Cultivators either curtailed their production completely or followed the move of the city. Whichever road they chose, the effects on their status in home villages and/or new villages was marked.¹⁹

Cities, with their increased Moslem population, would seem to have been the natural places for Moslem-Hindu tensions, but this was not the case. Tensions existed between Moslems of various ethnic origins with Afghan and Persian Moslems often uniting against the newly arrived Moghul or central Asian Moslems. Under Ala-ud-Din some 30,000 to 40,000 "new Muslims" were slaughtered in an alleged conspiracy against the Crown.²⁰ These new arrivals, having no pretense to age within the country or national affiliation to the Afghan-Persian group, were in a precarious physical position, much like the Hindu majority, because of their national minority status.

The relations between Moslems and Hindus were marked, in cities, by a general attitude of "live and let live."²¹ The only active attempts at conversion were directed toward Brahmins who, it was felt, were on a social footing equal to the conquerors. The Ranas and Rajahs of Rajput clans of the hinterland, considered as old nobility, were also ranked by the Sultanate as on a par with the Moslem upper-class and a fit group from which to take women as wives.²²

Were the influences of the Delhi Sultans reckoned solely in terms of their impact on the city, one could justly say that beyond the superimposing of a new nobility, based upon new dynamic religious and dynastic concepts, and the beginnings of changes in the guild-associative groups, there was seemingly no

basic change from the older Hindu Rajah traditions. The cities, however, were but the focal point of an administrative effort directed at the countryside. It was the rural area that primarily interested the Delhi Sultans for, from it flowed the great wealth that made the cities powerful. The emphasis, therefore, was directed toward relations with the countryside and with the countryside's inhabitants.

THE HINTERLAND

The approach to villages by the administrative center was always in one direction, how to obtain the optimum amount of taxation with increase in production. Resistance to taxation either by the local Rajah or by peasants abandoning villages and fleeing into the jungle was widespread in the beginning of Muslim rule, when the control of the central government had been expanded. The element of a new people ruling the land, religiously different and having no cultural or sentimental ties²³ with the average villager, was very important in determining the strength of resistance to control from administrative centers. The Sultans, sometimes, tried to conciliate the peasantry through sympathetic policies. The villagers, nevertheless, maintained their tradition of fleeing before an invading army and in the areas affected by Mongol inroads such mobility was frequent.

It was with Ala-ud-Din, that a strenuous effort was made to affect the life of the villagers themselves. Not only was the power of the Moslem nobility reduced but the administration of the Hindu villages was subjected to a strongly centralized control in terms of crop output²⁴. The Hindu chiefs were put under strict control and their perquisites were drastically reduced.

Supply and demand were strongly channeled, in terms of prepared quotas, by the administrative center²⁵ After Ala-u'd-Din Khalji, the central authority weakened with a corresponding rise of corrupt methods including speculative farming by provincial governors²⁶ Ghyasuddin Tughlaq attempted to remedy this situation.

It is important to keep in mind, therefore, that until the time of Ghyasuddin Tughlaq, tampering with internal village structure had not taken place.²⁷ Mohammed Ibn Tughlaq raised the proportion of the state's demand on agricultural produce in the Doab, which led to widespread insurrection. The Sultan's methods of repression further incensed the peasants, who ran into the jungle. The fields were left untilled and the sultan being confronted with total loss of revenue, yielded to the temptation of employing tax farmers. This also did not help him and the area fell into the grip of a severe famine. This tax farmer could well have been a total stranger. At the village level, he or his agent, a non-resident, immediately became not only the peak of village structure²⁸ but introduced the new element of a subordination of personal village relationships to economic ones.²⁹ Bidding for farming and headman status was open to Hindus as well as to Moslems. Lower caste individuals, compared to the caste within the village over which they could become headman, could now rise in status by taking a chance. Barni³⁰ states that many took these chances as a way to escape their caste position but that most were unsuccessful. He gives an example of two lower class Ryots who, unable to make the payment they had contracted for, were put to death. Taxation, under this system of farming-out-for-revenue of whole areas proved oppressive, because the tax farmers were not interested in the welfare of the peasant, being intent on making as much money as they could

extort. Many of these farmers were not men of substance and having no previous knowledge of the yield of the area had indulged in unrealistic over bidding, hence their attempts to meet their obligations drove them into excesses. The only choice left a peasant unable to meet taxation was to flee, to disperse to an area of lower taxation, or to flee to the jungle.³¹ The jungle became the great leveler in this period of caste realignment. Upon re-emerging, the individual had the choice of integrating himself into a different village whose life patterns were oftentimes unlike his own or clearing virgin land and beginning a new village. In either case his status changed³²

It was during Moghul times that this flight, dispersal and emerge pattern reached its height and served, consequently, as a means of inter-village as well as intra village mobility. The oft repeated statement that the "townships remain the same" cannot remain valid in the face of this possibility for flight and dispersal.³³ When Mohammed Tughlaq returned from his experiment in moving Delhi, this fact was graphically borne out. Delhi suffered a serious famine because there were no inhabited villages around it to produce food. Moreland refers to this specific incident by stating:

It will be recalled that in this chronicler's language, the word "famine" usually refers primarily to the population of the city. There was clearly famine in Delhi when it was repopulated, because the country on which it depended for supplies was unproductive, but the failure to produce arose, not merely from the want of rain, but from the dispersal of the peasants, and that dispersal must be attributed solely to a series of administrative blunders.³⁴

The presence of this India-type "western-frontier" in possibilities for flight plus the actual flight of an enormous number of peasantry

altered relations in the villages of the north. Although these possibilities had existed before, and to some extent had been taken advantage of, the impetus to flight had not been as great. Because of Moslem taxation policies, however, the outlet by flight became increasingly operative. The repopulation of villages, abandoned by peasantry, was not always by the same people which had left them. Ibn Batuta³⁵ commenting on the *creation* of a hinterland for Delhi points out that Mohammed Tughlaq ordered the repopling of the villages surrounding his capital from *different provinces*. It is not clear, therefore, whether any specific internal unit was homogeneous or whether each village was made up of peoples of different areas. What emerges, however, is the fact that relationships between villages had to be reinterpreted in the light of new conditions.

The physical proximity of villages in the hinterland to the city, in terms of productive capacity as well as in their type of produce, was of the utmost importance. The role of the city as the absorber of all types of luxury goods and the constancy of its incessant demands, served to channelize the normal patterns of the cottage industry. The result was standardization of production³⁶. Hinterland producers living close to the urban centers changed their occupation to conform with demands. In so doing they changed those aspects of their status and role that depended upon occupation.

The intimate relationship between decisions in the administrative center and changes in village structure became most apparent under Firoz Shah³⁷. During his reign the payment through assignments of villages³⁸ to officers became the rule. Villages from which they were to draw their pay were assigned to troops of the royal army³⁹. Since the army was composed of both Moslems and Hindus,⁴⁰ the latter also received assignments. But since

most of the top army positions were held by Moslems, the largest share went to Moslems. This decentralization of the power of the state left a good deal of authority in the hands of the assignees. When the controlling agency of the capital grew too weak and anarchic conditions prevailed, judgments as to justice, taxation, religious liberty and proselytization now became the possession of this new class. Hinterland villages, therefore, had acquired a new overlord whose demands had to be met. He might demand higher proportions of the yield from the peasant, though he could not very much over step the traditional pattern.

Inasmuch as the Muslims were short of manpower, as is evidenced from the continued attempts to attract men from other Muslim countries, they manned the higher services and found little reason to settle in the villages. The court, as the dispenser of further favors, required their presence in the city. The upper classes, constituted of government officials and traders, whether Muslim or Hindu were, therefore, completely divorced from rural life.⁴¹

Theoretically, the presence of Jagiri holders should have meant little change in the life of the average village. The interaction between villager and Moslem officer should have been sporadic and only on a taxation level. Class structure on the village level, should not have been altered. This was not the case!

The officer class had to maintain itself and its retinue on a distinctly high level. The soldiers also maintained a high standard of living. The level was constant while the income from village taxation fluctuated. Thus, during times of lowered income, the officer class had to borrow money from other sources. The sources of credit were Hindu bankers, their wealth held as an appendage to an urban-mercantile fortune. They were only

too willing to advance loans. They also discounted documents from troopers serving in distant areas on the expected payment from the village revenue. This created another class of Hindu aristocracy in addition to the old chiefs and played an important part in ordering a new series of relationships between castes within the villages as well as between individuals within the various castes. Now there was visible evidence of a co-religionist whose status within the village reflected position, not in terms of religion, but in terms of economics.⁴²

The sultans, or their successors the Moghuls, depended mainly upon the revenue arising from the villages. However, as their own culture was strongly urban, the need for welding of urban-rural rule into one aspect of government became apparent.⁴³

From the death of Firoz Shah, during whose reign the assignment of villages to troopers reached its peak, until the invitation to Babur by the Sultan of Lahore to rule in Hindustan there ensued a period of fluctuating fortunes for the Delhi Sultans. The arrival of Timorlane⁴⁴ and the devastation he left behind him, further weakened the already crumbling Delhi Sultanate.⁴⁵ This gave the chance to the Rajputs, who formed into a confederacy and made a bid for a Rajput empire. Shaik Zain writing in this period, maintained that

there was not a single ruler of first rank in all these great countries like Delhi, Amjarat and Mondu, who was able to make head against him (Singraim Singh). The banners of the infidel flouted over 200 cities inhabited *by people of the faith*.⁴⁶

The Muslim dealings towards the Hindus was organized on the basis of caste, not religion, for instance the Brahmins as a priestly class were exempt from Jiziyah, the Rajputs found employment

in the Muslim countries, and some hereditary craftsmen were employed by the state.

CHAPTER IV

The Moghuls

THE Moghuls¹ unlike the Delhi Sultans were comparative strangers to India. Babur, the founder of the Moghul dynasty, was the first in the line of succession² which culminated in Aurengzeb and his mediocre successors that caused the breakup of the Empire. He was "the link between central Asia and India, between predatory hordes and imperial government, between Timorlane and Akbar."³

Babur's contact with India began in 1504 when he became lord of Kabul. Babur claimed that India should form a part of his domains, because his ancestor, Timur had formally annexed Hindustan ⁴ In Babur's memoirs⁵ he tells us that he "had always been bent on subduing Hindustan."⁶ He accomplished this feat, to a degree, by his defeat of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in 1526.

In 1527 Babur defeated the assembled armies of the Rajputs under Rana Sanga⁷ of Chitor and crushed all effective Hindu resistance. It is important to note that the Moghuls had to subdue their co-religionists before they encountered the Rajput armies. This schism between the Afghans and the Moghuls was to play a prominent role in the realignment of status patterns in urban centers.⁸

The early Moghuls under Babur did not consider Hindustan as their home. They considered themselves as residing abroad. In the memoirs of Babur he writes, of the country he had become ruler of, in this vein:

. . . the country and towns of Hindustan are extremely ugly. All its towns and lands have a uniform look. Its gardens have no walls, the greater part of a level plain . . . in many places the plain is covered by a thorny brushwood to such a degree that the people of the paraganas, relying on those forests, take shelter in them and trusting to their inaccessible situation often continue in a state of revolt, refusing to pay their taxes.⁹

It is obvious that the peasantry had not changed their tactics, in front of an advancing army or even from persecution they could flee into the jungle. In view of recurring Mongol invasions in the beginning, then the invasion of Timur and now the invasion of Babur, the occasions when the peasantry, indeed whole villages and towns would flee, were numerous and the situation did not alter very much until the Moghuls had reconquered the area after having been driven away by the Afghans. During the reigns of Sher Shah, Akbar, Jehangir and Shah Jehan there was peace, broken only by some campaigns which were mercenary. Under Aurengzib, however, the Deccan was in the grip of a war, the situation having already deteriorated under the impact of the Maharattas. Thus, considerable shifting of the peasant popula-

tion from their villages into the nearby jungles must have taken place. The only seeming sure place to escape the long arm of taxation as well as war was the jungle.

The problem of taxation and its collection received early attention because of its importance to government, Akbar's reforms greatly improved its working. In the light of his close contact with the administration of the rural area and the impact of revenue policies thereupon, it seems safe to say, however, that the tax collector served as one of the greatest mechanisms for caste-class mobility throughout the Moghul reign.

The Moghul awareness of the capacity and potentiality of urban dwellers to produce goods of high quality, as well as quantity, caused a definite policy in government to be instituted. This policy, reaching its culmination (as did almost everything else) during the reign of Akbar, saw the government delving deeply into commercial enterprise, especially in the manufacturing field. Babur's dislike of India's physical appearance and his longing for Kabul was somewhat mitigated by his recognition of the fact that

in Hindustan the populousness and decay, or total destruction of villages, nay of cities, is almost instantaneous. Large cities that have been inhabited for years (if the inhabitants take flight) in a single day or day and a half, are so completely abandoned that you scarcely discover a trace or mark of population . . . but . . . a convenience of Hindustan is that the workmen of every profession and trade are innumerable and without end.¹⁰

Since a great many of the former villagers seem to have been drifting into the urban centers then springing up, to form new classes and castes,¹¹ the concept of rigidity of social structure and in the caste-class associative patterns due to the stability of village

sites seems to have no validity in the light of this contemporary historical data.¹²

The antipathy between Moslems of Afghan and Moghul descent, antipathy that also would alter the class structure in the urban centers, appears almost immediately after the Moghul conquest. Babur noticed this antipathy at the time of his arrival in Agra by stating, "when I first arrived in Agra there was a strong mutual dislike and hostility between my people and the men of the place."¹³ This antipathy continued for about four decades in Delhi and for a longer period in outlying areas like Bengal. Jockeying for positions of influence among these co-religionists reflected, therefore, the fear that national origin would carry more weight than ability in the consuls of the Moghul. Since aristocratic status under the Delhi Sultans was bound up with imperial favor, the old Moslem nobility feared its supplantation by a new nobility of Moghul origin.¹⁴ The internal struggle among the conquerors, Afghan vs. Moghul, did not directly influence the change in caste or class status of the Hindus under their jurisdiction.¹⁵ The empire, however, in adjusting ruling power to the fact of administrative necessity, found that it could depend upon upper caste and upper class Hindus to aid it in the struggle against the old Moslem aristocratic elements.¹⁶

As these elements were slowly eliminated from positions of power, the Hindu upper classes rose in prestige and in position within the government, and with them rose the whole urban Hindu upper merchant group. This pattern culminated in Rajah Todar Mal's administration during the reign of Akbar.¹⁷ Even under Aurengzeb the process had not completely reversed itself and Hindus did not lose their position in the services to any appreciable degree in spite of the decrease in their influence.¹⁸

The median classes and castes in the urban centers also re-

flected altered conditions under the Moghuls. These conditions were to culminate in the growth of a new type of class-caste structure in the city with its emphasis upon commercial enterprise fostered by the Emperor.¹⁹ The impact of the coming of the Moghul was felt most greatly in the villages. The changes in inter-and intravillage relationships were enormous. Agrarian administration improved, classes realigned themselves to conform to a new concept of social and economic power and the caste system of the classical²⁰ type so changed that a whole new series of relationships emerged; relationships of man to man, man to villages, man to land and man to government.

THE VILLAGE

At the height of the Moghul Empire, just after the death of Akbar, Moreland estimates that India had 100,000,000 people²¹ most of whom lived in villages.²² These villages consisted of peasants, who owned their holdings and were not subject to landlords, except in some tributary areas where the old petty raja had a traditional hold over the peasants.²³ The peasant-owners formed a group of cultivators living in one place having in addition to their holdings, the use in common of the wasteland²⁴ around the village. This land, according to customary law operative since earliest times, could not be broken up, alienated or partitioned, except by the proper authorities.²⁵ The village was under the rather loose jurisdiction of a headman who was appointed in early times but whose title, by Moghul times, had oftentimes become hereditary.²⁶ The Patwari, or recorder whose duty it was to keep the village records, shared the administrative duties of the village and was rewarded, like the headman, with a holding. Artisans

were attached to the village as resident craftsmen but were not, like the European equivalent, paid by the job but by a fixed remuneration.²⁷ The presence of these artisans indicates an early migratory pattern of a certain occupational type²⁸ although it does not indicate the ultimate caste or class status that an artisan would assume in any village. During Moghul times the artisan's status was considerably altered due to demands that the Royal factories made for certain types of skilled labor.²⁹ These artisans were assigned free land as well as certain customary grain allowances. Therefore, as indispensable appendages to the Ryotwari village we find potters, blacksmiths, shoemakers, carpenters, washermen, sweepers, barbers, astrologers and doctors whose sole responsibility to the village was in service. This type of village generally contained only those cultivating holders who tilled the land themselves and who seldom employed tenants to till the land for them. For the sake of convenience, we shall apply the term *ryotwari* to these villages though it really came into use under the British.

Another type, the joint village, was found almost exclusively in northern India, particularly in the UP (Agra and Oudh), the Punjab and the North West Frontier³⁰. It is important to note that these are the areas which felt the Moslems and Moghul's conquest the heaviest and became the heart of the Moghul Empire. These villages had a common pattern of growth. A prosperous joint family of peasants would move out from a village where new land was no longer available and establish a new village after clearing the forest. The family owned the village and like other joint family property did not divide it. They invited some craftsmen and others to settle down in the new village. The adjoining waste was considered an integral part of the property and, unlike the Ryotwari village, was subject to the same procedures of use and disposal as the estate itself. Revenue payments were the col-

lective or joint responsibility of every member of the estate.³¹ There was no headman³² present since administrative responsibility was vested in the elders of the joint family. Even when the family broke up, joint management of village affairs was maintained through the heads of their respective houses, called the Panchayat³³. The Panchayat, generally elected a member from among themselves as its representative. They made the representative equivalent in rank to the headman in the Ryotwari villages but without having any of the headman's rights. This individual was responsible, as the person representing the estate, for the collective revenue of the village. The cultivators of holdings within the joint village were not separate units and the entire area of the village was owned by the founding individual or family having claims to be superior. This family, and other equivalent members of the Panchayat, rarely cultivated the land themselves. Later, with the growth of the Zamindari system in the eighteenth century, the land was often cultivated by a subordinate body of tenants who paid rent to the Panchayat.³⁴ The status of cultivating tenants thus, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be equated with that of the owner-cultivators in the Ryotwari villages.

The cultivators in the joint village could segment the lands assigned to them into many different types of outholdings all of which fell into four basic categories

1. Permanent tenure holders.
2. Fixed rate tenants.
3. Occupancy tenants—those who have lived on the land more than twelve years
4. Non-occupancy tenants—those who have lived on the land less than twelve years³⁵

There was, therefore, a tendency to pyramid status alignments in

joint villages which were missing in the Ryotwari ones. Both the village types had, as a very important member of their community, a resident who was later to grow to terrific proportions, the grain dealer and moneylender (often the same person was both).³⁶

The first type of village, the Ryotwari, was sure to be disrupted in a period of anarchy. Village relationships could change to the point where individually holding cultivators could become tenants on a corporate estate.³⁷ The second type, the joint village, could change only in that the village might get a new absentee owner to whom the four types of tenants must pay rent. An old landlord might even be left in nominal control but would be divested of his ownership of the estate.³⁸ In the eighteenth century, in all cases of the landlord or joint village there "... existed a ruling, conquering, and often non-agriculturist caste, who have taken the superior landlord position over an earlier existing village group of cultivators . . ."³⁹

The joint village generally meant the imposing of an absentee landlord class upon the original cultivators except in cases in which a successful chieftain had found land where "they have founded their own village in the virgin waste"⁴⁰ Since, in order to attract the necessary artisans, they would have to make concessions, there tended to be competition for skilled men between old and new villages. The basic difference then would be that workers of the very depressed or the lowest of the castes would flee from one landlord to another or from joint villages to Ryotwari ones or vice versa, and although their social status would not be changed, their economic position would be altered.⁴¹ In the conquest situation, therefore, change in status rather than in economic position characterize the Ryotwari village, but change in economic position as well as a *shift in status* faced the tenant holder of the joint village.

New villages set up in the virgin waste, prior to Moslem-Moghul invasions, did not generally take the form of the joint village. From vedic accounts, in an early day when there was an enormous amount of vacant land, there were only germs of the caste system in evidence.⁴² The Vedas represent the Aryans, the conquering Northerners, as tribes broken into clans under clan chieftains.⁴³

These chieftains, equivalent to headmen in the Ryotwari villages, were subordinate to local Rajahs who, in turn, were subordinate to great tribal assemblies. Formation of monarchies, and this is a very disputed point, may have been the effect of the usurpation of power by a great Rajah or Maharajah. Whatever the process may have been, we find, that by the time of the laws of Manu, principles of kingship firmly established in northern India.⁴⁴ The importance to our study of this fact is that concomitant with this emergent monarchy both the old rajah, as head of a family of clan chieftains of the oldest lineage, and the new kings came to receive a share of the produce of villages within the geographical confines of their powers. The royal share was a share of the village grain heap.⁴⁵ Produce which had previously been distributed in an intra-clan fashion was now distributed in both an intra-and an inter-clan one. It is important to note that the early monarchs and rajahs made no claim to be owners of the soil.⁴⁶ The system was not feudal in the sense that the kingdom was apportioned into fiefs, but it was rather an order of precedence in clan, ranks, rights and responsibilities. Under this type of system the existence of joint villages, with their gradation of ranks from the absentee landlord on down to a depressed class, seems to be ruled out. The village as a form of subordinate joint tenure was nowhere to be observed and nowhere mentioned in the early records. According to the laws of Manu, there is no

mention " . of anything like a joint village or an area of land held 'in common' " ⁴⁷ The Ryotwari village with its administration by an elective headman seems the only type of settlement which existed in early time. ⁴⁸ The introduction of the Panchayat and its representative seems to have been as a direct result of a conquest situation, in which old clan rights and responsibilities were superseded by the decentralization of power and in which the new village landlord was no longer bound by customary law or the laws of Manu ⁴⁹ Thus old rights of the clearer of the waste to the direct ownership of the waste he had cleared, perforce, would change drastically in the change from a Ryotwari village to a joint one.

Wasteland, or virgin land lying vacant, was still an important factor in the determination of village sites as well as in ordering caste-class affiliations during Moghul times ⁵⁰ Wastelands seem to have been huge and capable of absorbing a large population. Travelers in the Moghul Empire like Tavernier, ⁵¹ Bernier, ⁵² Manucci, ⁵³ De Laet, ⁵⁴ among many, constantly mention huge stretches of jungle that were "hunting paradises" ⁵⁵ in areas where there are now huge cities and cultivated holdings. The presence of waste land was to serve both as an outlet for peasantry, oppressed under local Rajahs or under the pressure of invasion, to escape into the jungle, and as an area in which it was possible to form new holdings. Thus, the formation of joint villages, also began to depend, to a large measure, on this vacant land. As the jungle was cleared, refugee peasantry and former urban dwellers, who were dislocated by an invasion, had either to emerge from the waste to become part of the new peasantry or to retreat further into the jungle. Of course, these peasants were disenfranchised and without Ryotwari rights ⁵⁶ In committing themselves to the jungle such peasants had cut ties with their ancestral holdings and

with their ancestral caste positions⁵⁷

Fleeing to the jungle and re-emergence was so prevalent in Moghul times, that visitors from Europe were more impressed by this one fact of life in the Empire of the Great Moghul than by any other. Tavernier, writing in 1676, says that "you may see in India whole provinces like deserts from whence the peasants have fled on account of the oppression of the governors"⁵⁸ In Bernier's account in 1656, we read: "... even a considerable proportion of the good land remains uncultivated from want of laborers, many of whom perish in consequence of the bad treatment they experience from the government . . . or, thus it happens that many of the peasantry driven to despair by so inexorable a tyranny abandon the country."⁵⁹ It seems apparent that with the decline of the Moghuls a distinct change was beginning to take place in village life, a change that caused a great series of internal movements which saw northern India become, predominantly, an area of joint village landlordism.⁶⁰

MOGHUL LAND POLICY

In this change, of course, the land policy of the provincial and other rulers who succeeded the Moghuls was completely different in spirit from that of previous regimes. The peasant of the Moghul times was a landowner with inalienable rights in the soil⁶¹ He was sure about the revenue that he had to pay. The anarchy of the eighteenth century changed all that. A new theory grew up that all land belonged to the King.⁶² The free land holder of previous years now held his land not by right but by sufferance⁶³ This re-definition of property rights vesting the land of the kingdom in the monarch, affected the peasants much

more than it affected the landlords, although they too were subject to the same law.⁶⁴ Instead of being liable only to the stated rules of royal authority above them for the collection of the King's grain share in taxation, the villages were now liable both to a government tax and to a landlord's collection.⁶⁵ This double collection and sometimes there were three or more levels of collection, became even harder to bear because payment-in-kind came to be replaced by payment in money.⁶⁶ The subsequent rise of a money-lender in each village was a direct result of this Moghul innovation.⁶⁷ Money-lenders emerged, not only as individuals within villages, but as a new social group whose rise was so favored by the change to money-payment that they continued to grow both in estate and esteem until today their ranks contain some of the most powerful family groups in all of India.

Change to payment in money affected the peasants even more greatly than has heretofore been supposed, since coinage⁶⁸ was demanded in payment, while for the most of the people, "there were still two kinds of small moneys other than official coinage *in basic use* in the Empire; there were bitter almonds and shells . . . Gujerat using almonds and Bijaypur and Galconda using coweries for money."⁶⁹ The peasant must now somehow or other meet the tax in coin.⁷⁰ As the coin was readily obtainable only in the urban areas, its use soon forced a greater interaction between the free peasant in his quasi-independent village and the urban dweller in his dependent city.⁷¹ Payment-in-coin reordered the relationship between headman and villager and served further to breakdown the independent Ryot.⁷² The headman, who had previously been responsible only for the accumulation in the village grain heap of the payment of the Rajah's tax share, now saw his duties usurped by the state's revenue collector.⁷³ Moreover, he himself now became subject to the same laws as his fel-

low Ryots ⁷⁴ Gradually his own position was destroyed. In the eighteenth century when the administration did not work satisfactorily, he had to turn to the same source as the rest of the village, the money-lender, for the coin with which to make both his own tax payment and the sums due from the village as a whole

The whole paraphernalia of village life was weakened ⁷⁵ Especially affected were those artisans that were attached to the village on an annual fee based on produce. At a blow, thus, since taxation hit the non-farming villagers such as blacksmith, barber, doctor, with a similar demand for money-in-coin, their ties to the village were immeasurably enfeebled. It will come as no surprise, therefore, to note that with the decline of the artisan group in the village we find them flocking in greater numbers into the bigger Moghul administrative centers. Indeed they were encouraged to do so by the government itself.⁷⁶ Coincidental with this development, perhaps as a direct result of it, we find that the village now becomes more dependent, not on the urban dweller alone, but on a market economy that is oftentimes so expansive in nature that it goes beyond the frontiers of the village's province or of the Empire. Since transportation was still fairly primitive the growing dependence on outside resources and a money economy undermined the peasants' self sufficiency. Bad government in the eighteenth century pushed him along the road to ruin and eventual tenancy ⁷⁷

The keystone of Moghul land policy was that as much land as it was possible should be cultivated. Cultivation was accelerated in a number of ways especially by concessions on bringing new land under cultivation and loans to the peasantry ⁷⁸ In any case, more and more pressure to farm was brought to bear on the peasantry.⁷⁹ The necessity for putting pressure on Ryots gives us

a clue to the apathy that was spreading throughout the ranks of free cultivators as more and more land was being turned over to proprietorship in landlord estates ⁸⁰ Land expansion was generally encouraged by district officers from the time of Akbar to that of Aurengzeb ⁸¹ One of the farmans (decrees) of Aurengzeb was explicit on the need of forcing peasants to farm the land. It stated:

At the beginning of the year, inform yourself so far as possible about the conditions of every peasant, and whether they are engaged in cultivation or abstaining from it. If they have the means to cultivate, ply them with inducements and encouragements, and show them any favor they may desire But if it be found that, in spite of having means to cultivate and of a favorable season, they are abstaining from cultivation, then you should urge and threaten them and make use of the force and the whip ⁸²

The effect of farmans of this type (from Akbar's time on) so expanded land under cultivation that croplands assumed a phenomenal rate of growth.⁸³ It did not, however, expand individual holdings, especially of Ryots, but curtailed and diminished them instead. The land under cultivation, of all types, was going into hands other than those of the independent Ryots. These hands were those of the Jagir and Zemindar absentee landlords ⁸⁴ The expansion in cultivation had to go beyond the Ganges-Jumna-Doab tracts, since these were already under cultivation, into the forests, where it caught up with the fleeing peasantry and forced their reemergence either as landless peasants (a completely new phenomenon) ⁸⁵ or as migrant laborers Measured in bighos of land the difference between soil under cultivation during Akbar's time and the time of Aurengzeb is astonishing ⁸⁶

Sarkars	Akbar	Aurengzeb
Allahabad	573	1553
Benares	36	453
Jaunpur	870	5451
Chunor	106	740
Ghazipur	288	1733
Karraha	477	1417
Oudh	2796	4383
Gorakhpur	244	5304
Bahraich	1823	2752
Khairabad	1987	6546

As is to be noted from this table, there was a comparatively lesser increase in the new lands brought under cultivation in the United Provinces than in any other of the listed regions. We know, however, that population density, even then, in the eastern districts of the United Provinces, had caused most of the available productive land to be farmed already. Pressure to produce more caused a change in the farming techniques in that area in which use of the soil was intensified.⁸⁷ The individual Ryot and tenant farmer's relation to land also changed in some ways comparable to those in the regions where vast tracts of wasteland were being brought under cultivation.⁸⁸

The pressure of the government to cultivate all possible lands was wedded to a fluctuating policy concerning the government's share of the village grain heap. The static proportions of the old laws of Manu now vacillated between one-fifth to one-third as it was computed in money payment.⁸⁹ The vacillation, too, had its effect on land cultivation and land usage. Since the cultivator could not tell beforehand the amount that would be demanded of him, he had a tendency to try to hold back cultivation for fear that a good crop would cause the government to raise its proportion of the yield.⁹⁰ Peasant life and peasant ways

began to reflect not peasant possessions or crop values, but a rather furtive fear of a tax rise.⁹¹ Although Ryots did not have much at any time, this fear caused a levelling of visible differences in the social strata of the village. Everyone: Ryot, artisan, and headman came to live alike, dress alike, eat alike. Yet this sameness of consumptive standards was not a reflection of the true social conditions in the village.⁹² Class and caste distinctions, thus were channeled away from conspicuous consumptive differences and away from patterns of external display.

We remember that alongside the policy of maximum land cultivation there existed the innovation in law whereby all land belonged to the Crown.⁹³ Noble holdings, whether hereditary from Moslem days or vested in newly created Moghul titles, were as much the possession of the King as any land held by the lowest Ryot.⁹⁴ The official policy of the Moghul state was that all titles and lands reverted to the Crown upon the death of any noble. Although we know that this law was often breeched so that titles and lands passed, in fact, to the children of the man who had earned them through royal favor or whim, its presence, nonetheless, caused an instability in the relation between Jagir holders and their lands.⁹⁵ Since the nobility well felt that their lands and all revenue from them and privileges therein would revert to the Crown upon their death, it behooved them to live off the land as well as possible during their own lifetime. An irresponsibility fostered by law grew out of this second aspect of land policy, the nobility living up to their maximum possible land revenues.⁹⁶ Often living in court cities in competition for royal favor with others, better endowed, forced many nobles to borrow in advance on expected yields. In so doing, many put themselves in the hands of creditors in the city who equally aware of the transient character of the collateral they held (the lands) were

equally given to getting back their loans as quickly as possible and by whatever devices possible⁹⁷

Court nobility and urban creditors alike, thus, pushed to get the Ryot to cultivate to the maximum of the land's potential yield. The upper rung of the social structure, thus, was soon aligned to village life, and set to exploiting it, at odds and in opposition to the world of the Ryot, not only in a material way but in a psychological one as well. Land nobles, knowing that lands were forfeit to the Crown, lived in a state of permanent high luxurious wasteful existence⁹⁸. Frugality only meant leaving more to the state⁹⁹. The ideal of a maximum life now was in sharp conflict with the ideal of the peasant's reluctance to show that he could afford even the obvious necessities of life. To do so meant only greater demands from a nobility caught in a vicious circle of court life, where one could never get enough to maintain oneself in the constantly accelerating rate of gift-exchange with the King¹⁰⁰.

The fundamentals of Moghul land policy thus tended to cancel themselves out¹⁰¹. On the one hand, pressures on the peasants to farm were cancelled by pressures on the nobility that forced them to take whatever surplus the peasant might produce¹⁰². Greater productivity meant only greater exploitation of the peasant. The peasant, in turn, was understandingly reluctant to farm and greater needs for revenue soon passed into forced farming. The latter bred a conflict and a cruelty that rent the fabric of an Indian social structure which had been, until this time, relatively benign. With this conflict the fabric of relationships of nobility to Crown, of peasant to nobility and of Crown to peasant changed into something which had not been experienced in the whole prior history of northern India.

CHAPTER V

Peasant Relations to Land

PEASANT relations to land, the determining factor of rural social status, generally cannot be discussed without reference to the revenue system and the type of government holding jurisdiction over the countryside in which the peasant lives. In India, however, the historical patterns of the origin of a holder's relationship to his land in the formation of villages was, prior to Moghul rule, so similar that they can be dealt with as though they were a unitary process.

A village was most often founded in the virgin waste.¹ A headman from an old village, or a cultivator striking out on his own, influenced a few families or individuals to try their luck with him. The originator of the venture, coming from a social status like that of the rest of the people, convinced of his wisdom in

his choice of the wasteland, rose immediately to the position of headman. Such mobility was apparently prevalent throughout India wherever land was at hand.² The families or individuals making up the party generally all brought their own oxen and plows with them and cleared their own plots without helping, more than cursorily, the others now being cleared. The headman was the common link between these freeholders and the mediator of their responsibilities to one another. These responsibilities generally involved the creation of a village center and the attraction to it of artisans whose services peasants would avail themselves of and to whom they would render payment in kind.³ The attraction of artisans depended upon a great many factors, the most important being the size and ability of the village to pay for services on a guaranteed annual basis. The status of the artisan, in relation to others of his kind, as well as the village, depended upon the type of work he was doing and the regard with which that occupation was held in the area as well as in the rest of the country.⁴ Artisan status was, however, generally improved by coming to a new village. One of the reasons for this improvement, was that an artisan settler would now become the oldest of his craft in the new village. A newcomer artisan thus was in a position to ask for, and often receive, in a situation of this sort, a greater part of the grain heap.⁵

Artisan relations with Ryots fluctuated in terms of personal contact with accessibility and the proved results of artisan craftsmanship as the determining factors. Artisan responsibility to the state, however, was extremely different from that of the Ryot. The cultivator was, in reality, the only taxpayer for, all taxes came out of the grain heap. This meant that the free cultivator, through the headman, was the only one in contact with the centralized power.⁶ The control and contact of the Crown was

with the Ryots collectively rather than with individual village members. The responsibilities of Ryots toward one another were thus emphasized, especially in the production of the common grain heap. Stress to produce was sponsored by the village rather than by the state. Since the Rajah's share, as well as the headman's, was determined by customary law, surplus production served to enrich the village as well as the Ryot.⁷

In founding the villages there were, even at an early stage in Indian history, kernels of relationship that could degenerate into tenancy holdings. The first clearers of virgin land, although nominally independent owners, were in a position of secondary importance to the originator of the scheme of clearing the waste or to their own old headman.⁸ Their position, as independent Ryots, seemed more secure than resident tenants who were brought with them to act as tenants on the new and virgin lands.⁹ The fact that new lands had to be looked for, however, implies that these villages could not keep either their tenants or themselves in their old holdings. Moreover, by moving, they often had to handle the plow¹⁰ and do the same type of work as their own tenants. If the move was unsuccessful and resulted in further poverty and decay of holdings, the independent Ryots could easily become, alongside of their former tenants, tenants of another and more successful Ryot.¹¹ The position in the social hierarchy of the peasant so affected would see a shortening of the gap between Ryots and tenants and a lengthening of the gap between former Ryots of a similar degree. This type of debased Ryot and old tenant could, under certain special circumstances,¹² move into virgin lands, cast off their servility, and begin to hold plots of land again. In so doing, the old Ryot-turned-tenant would become a new Ryot with a possibility for tenants of his own, while the old tenant would become a Ryot, independent for

the first time. There existed, however, a gap in status between the old Ryot who had regained his holdings and the old tenant, now a Ryot. This gap was based upon historical family connection and might be equated with the parallel institution of legitimacy in Feudal or even early Industrial Revolutionary Europe. There can be no doubt that this type of mobility between poor Ryot and poor tenant, in relation to each other as well as to the land, existed in pre-Moghul days. Mobility was strictly limited in an economic sense but not in a psychological one since the gap between land holding and land tenancy was very great. With the growth, during the anarchy in the latter Moghul times, of Jagir holdings and secondary landlordships plus the great emphasis on land clearance, this type of mobility ceased. Tenants could no longer become Ryots due to their own efforts, in terms of land clearance, or Ryots-turned-tenant revert to being Ryots again in the old ways. The method was now imposed from the top and stimulus to action was from the peak¹³ of the social pyramid, not the base. For the average villager it meant that loss of land, and the status of tenant, was an almost irrevocable turn in life. On the other hand the stimulus to land clearance and to revenue-farming¹⁴ caused a tremendous increase in the landlord class. This class represented not only the nobility and soldiers who were in possession of holdings due to Jagiri grants, but successful Ryots as well.¹⁵ Because of the importance being given to land clearance any Ryot could get, under specific circumstances, as much land as he wished to clear.¹⁶ Should he be successful he could, in theory, become a landlord with his own tenants. This Ryot-turned-landlord would, of course, rise in status within his village and perhaps within a series of neighboring villages. The growth of the Zemindar landlord of Bengal and the Tauluqdar landlord of Oudh are in part due to this pheno-

menon ¹⁷

The real picture that emerges is not, however, that of Ryot-turned-landlord but of a new series of landlords coming into the rural area from the urban one. This series, reaching its peak in British days, meant that individuals unacquainted with specific village problems subleased holdings to others who, in their turn, designated agents on the scene to collect rents. Thus, the direct, or nearly direct, relationship of the old Rajah with the village and the mitigating influences of customary law and inherited traditional behavior were replaced by an attitude of get-all-you-can-while-the gettings possible. The growth of the landlord system and the debasement of the Ryot to a large extent stems directly from the conditions resulting from a breakdown of authority in the eighteenth century.

MOGHUL REVENUE SYSTEM IN RELATION TO LAND

Land was regarded as the basic provider of life as well as the basis upon which the Moghul economy was built ¹⁸. There were always attempts to revalue, reassess, redistrict and remeasure lands in order to obtain the optimum amount of taxation that was possible. The state, particularly during the time of Akbar, was aware of the fact that production and the efficiency of revenue collection did not depend upon the relationship of the state to the village as a unit, but upon the individual cultivator. ¹⁹ The immediate effect of this attitude was to weaken the central structure of the village in direct proportion to the number of times that the individual cultivator was approached by the assessor and tax collector. The old and necessary cooperative relationship in

agents who, for their own share of the tax, collected from the Ryot directly. These agents, in turn, had other agents who were also paid a fee from the revenue collection²⁴ The necessary collection by the Jagirdars and their gradations of agents would, therefore, have to amount to a great deal more than the proportion fixed by the State in order to syphon off their own share of the collection. As greater demands were placed on the nobility because of internecine warfare, demands that had to be met, they in turn put the squeeze on their agents whose final victim was the Ryot. The process of a constantly accelerating exploitation of Ryots for revenue encouraged some villagers, risking debt-slavery, to ask for commissions as agents in the revenue collection²⁵ These men then became responsible for a fixed sum of money to the agents above them. We can see that they had, in this instance, completely usurped the power of the headman as the joint collector of the revenue. If circumstances were favorable, particularly as far as the weather was concerned, agents could rise dramatically in status and become wealthy. This system, therefore, with its gradation of collectors, was altering the social structure of village life as much as the emphasis on individual production. It was debasing the majority of Ryots to a point where they became either landless tenants or debtor slaves, while, at the same time, it allowed opportunistic and daring men to rise²⁶ to undreamed of heights of wealth and influence. The success of many of these agents, particularly in the central provinces, enabled their families to grow into proprietary positions which were ultimately recognized over the claims of the Ryots and headman as the indicator of the true proprietors of the village²⁷

One of the first results of the Moghul conquest was to displace and reduce the numbers of Rajahs "which then were

the great feature of the country."²⁸ Large groups of Hindu nobility fled with their followers into the jungle or into the land of a friendly, as yet unconquered, Rajah. As early as the reign of Akbar, many peasants under their displaced Rajah or Rajput chiefs began attempts to leave the status of bandit²⁹ which their flight had imposed upon them and to return to their holdings. These holdings, however, were now occupied by others. The villages involved had to buy off Rajput chiefs and to provide them and *their whole band* with grants of land called *giras*³⁰ The attitude of the central government to this process was favorable since re-established "bandit" groups implied stability and facilitated tax collection.

Desire for stability, and the clue to the amount of fluidity in population movements (from the jungle to the village as well as from the village to the jungle and from the village to another village) is given by noting the government's policy of granting *ghotwal* tenures³¹ These tenures were given to Rajputs, as well as to other local chiefs, who accepted the task of keeping the hill and jungle districts free from brigandage. Not only did this mean that Rajput bands were being resettled in areas of turmoil but that a split in the structure of Hindu to Hindu relations had taken place.

The preoccupation of the government with productive land, no matter who the producers were, led to the assumption of peasant status by many who belonged to menial castes.

Difficulties encountered in collecting revenue and lack of stability in land relations were especially prevalent in Central India. Local invasions by the Pindaris, and in Rohilkhand by the Rohillas, were among the chief reasons for this situation. The effect of these invasions was chiefly destructive and succeeded in depopulating whole villages³² Inhabitants fled to the jungle or,

once again, to a more powerful neighbor. All movement of this sort meant a loss in status both in terms of local relations with old neighbors and with new ones. The land policy of the new governments, despite all the fluctuations, was unified and pointed in only one direction—the extraction of optimum land revenue. Thus, human relations were subordinated to commercial ones. Building of dams, wells and tanks were all weighted in terms of their capacity for increasing the productivity of the land. If they were needed in a commercial sense, then the government, in the half of India ruled directly by them, would build and sponsor them. Sometimes they were intended primarily as an addition to human comfort³³ It must not be construed, however, that all necessary works were fostered by the government; sometimes pious persons built tanks, wells or bridges as an act of piety. This process, however, almost stopped when the government machinery broke down and anarchy made the accumulation of wealth impossible except in the hands of the new ruling class that grew up. Since the line of demarcation between human comfort and greater land utilization is often completely obliterated, the local villager, therefore, had to construct capital improvements, such as tanks, using his own resources and time. These improvements were then taken into consideration in the reassessment-for-revenue process. It was a circle in which improvement led to impoverishment and lack of improvement led in the same direction. Utilization of land, therefore, became part of the debasing process of the Ryot. A process which reached its culmination when the local village community was disintegrated and reamalgamated in another area with the concomitant loss of its customary rights and privileges³⁴ From this emerged a new social phenomenon—landless serfs.³⁵ Serfs which were to become the labor force on the growing Zemindari type estates throughout

the country. Growth of landless labor can be attributed to the economic decay that set in, ruining local industry and trade. It reached a culmination due to the early policies of the East India Company, whose misrule of Bengal during the eighteenth century was notorious. The system of "interest needs" emerged, under which goods which had been paid for from revenue in India were sold in Europe and the money thus obtained locally "invested". The resulting breakdown in the economy of India with the resultant impoverishment led to artisans giving up their possessions and swelling the ranks of the unemployed landless labor.

The Zemindaris of Bengal, because of the early excessive assessments of the government, fell into the hands of money-lenders and others, who sometimes started as renters. In Bengal, for example, we read from contemporary records that:

It was also a frequent practice with the renters to remove the inhabitants from fertile lands, in order to bestow them on their friends and favorites, and to oblige the Ryots to assist farmers in the tilling of their lands; and to furnish them gratuitously with laborers, bullocks, carts and straw.³⁶

Effects on the productivity of peasant labor of this sort of instability of holdings were disastrous. Fearing that fine producing land³⁷ would be noticed and expropriated they slowed down cultivation, diluting the effects of larger areas under agricultural use. Slowdowns in production, however, only served to accelerate the loss of independent status, because assessment was on real, not on the actual yield. The independent Ryot, punished both for not cultivating and for cultivating had a number of alternatives all leading in the direction of serfdom, loss of status and loss of customary rights and privileges. The instability of holdings with its consequent disruption of village structure and age-old

pattern of community interaction was reflected even in Bengali poetic literature, for we read:

. . . his holding was remeasured, wastelands were entered as arable and cultivable and hence assessable, and a higher rent was demanded of him. He had thus to leave his ancestral holding where the family had lived happily for generations ³⁸

The only outlet for a family caught in this cycle was to flee. Fleeing peasantry had, perhaps as much as any other single factor, the force of disrupting allegedly immutable caste relationships ³⁹ This disruption took on so many of the attributes of the social mobility of an open class system that the Indian caste system prevailing to date began to experience conditions tantamount to class relations in societies not marked by caste; class relations in which individual mobility became possible, although in a generally downward direction, and in which group mobility allowed whole areas to enter into a new series of social inter-relation ⁴⁰

CHAPTER VI

Mobility

IT is my opinion that the relative mobility of individuals in any complex social group or culture area gives, more than any other single factor, a distinctive stamp to the dynamism of relationships within that group. If mobility is relatively slow, fixed or almost non-existent, the relationships between individuals or even between groups of individuals, tend to become fixed in customary law and to lose their dynamism. The individuals become, in an instance of this sort, only vehicles for carrying out the fixed roles now set up by rigid inherited patterns of law and behavior. If the situation remains static and these roles fixed, the culture tends towards a caste or quasi-caste social structure. Then, perforce, the power to alter relationships within any group of people becomes extremely difficult. Furthermore, age and continued acceptance lead to unquestioned belief

in the justice of traditional patterns.¹

All of this does not presuppose, however, that group-to-group behavior need work in the same way since conquest situations or displacements due to natural causes may throw groups of varying pre-existent and customarily-held patterns together, either in conflict or in peace. In such a situation, even if the individual within a specific group is still held in the fetters of customary behavior towards other members of his own group, his whole group's behavioral patterns may be altering vis-a-vis the newly contacted other group. Although the individual's status within his own group may remain unaltered, his relative status to any given individual in the other contacted group may have completely altered.² Given enough time, attitudes which are held in relation to another group, perhaps now in a less favored position, begin to reflect on the relationships in the original group. Attitudes of superiority status, changes in mannerism, in dress, in self esteem and in total life habits become so altered that the individual in the group, either in a position of dominance or subservience, begins to change. In changing he alters his group which is composed of others now undergoing similar alterations, and finds himself back in relatively the same position as before the whole process started.³

Displacement and rearranging of groups of people in either a new series of group-to-group relationships or in the augmentation of an old way of social contact, is a very old process in India. The whole of northern India's contact with the south has been, since pre-Vedic times, this sort of relationship.⁴ Although some individuals within any group might have escaped the pattern of relationships set up in group-to-group contact, they were extremely rare. Alteration of conditions involving total societal interaction were on a group-to-group basis. An-

individual in the affected groups, the Vedic invaders and their conquered foe the Dravidian peoples, reflected only group mobility. If the individual were a member of the conquerors, *his status rose but only in relation to the conquered group, not to his own group*. This was true, of course, of groups of people now in the subservient position. If alterations in life patterns occurred, they were group alterations which reflected group attitudes toward certain types of labor, marriage forms, eating habits, etc.⁵ The lowest member in status of the conquering group, while still at the base position *within* his own group, nonetheless, now affected new ways of doing things which would otherwise mark him as part of the superior group.⁶ Once again, given enough time, the ways of newly acquired dynamic behavior, essentially in relation to the existing subservient group, would become caste patterned and non-dynamic. This was the general way of group mobility, with minute fragments of individual mobility in pre-Moghul India. The caste and quasi-caste patterning could be expected to remain fixed and unalterable unless a totally new group came into contact with the old group in any area. Individual mobility, severely restricted, could change but it usually went in only one direction.⁷

With the coming of the Muslims the pattern of group-to-group relations underwent a transformation. During the reign of Akbar, in particular, central government stressed the idea that it was not a Moslem one sitting on a subjugated and conquered mass of Hindus, but a unitary government whose concern was India as a whole. One of the results of this stand was to spur the mobility of individual Hindus, particularly those seeking administrative positions and those in the various handicrafts, whose services were now in demand in court cities.⁸ Although the numbers involved in these two categories varied to a tremend-

ous degree,⁹ the opening of this frontier of internal individual mobility and its importance cannot be negated.

The most important single aspect of mobility resulted from the policy of optimum cultivation. It allowed the migrating individual village and villager a number of choices¹⁰ the jungle, the domains of another Rajah, the city. All of these ending, inevitably, in diminished status. Existence of these possibilities served to rend the fabric of previously homogeneous and caste structured villages. Mobility, now an attribute of individual choice (forced, of course, by non-individually chosen circumstances) altered social patterns in a fashion unlike that of any other time in Indian history. The fact that an unprecedented accelerating migration was taking place cannot be denied.¹¹ The policy of granting as much land to anyone, Hindu or Moslem, who felt that he could make it pay was but one aspect of this internal upheaval.

Although the numbers of people involved in this individual migratory process was altogether new, there were old migratory patterns still at work in Moghul India. The North-west Frontier area, in general, and the area around the desert of Thar in particular, felt the impact of a new wave of migration. This was not a casual or temporary movement, as had characterized seasonal in-province or province-to-province migration, but a permanent migration in which total population displacement took place¹² Afghan migrants began pouring into the province of Katehr in such numbers that the Hindus were either driven out or debased in condition. The province, reflecting the new dominant group, was renamed Rohilkhand. This, too, was fostered by the desire of the central government to place on its frontiers co-religionists whose ties, in religion and in national origin, would make them more "reliable."¹³ Emphasis on reliability and regional stability

of co-religionists, completely unimportant during the reign of Akbar, assumed increasingly greater importance as the Moghul rulers became more enmeshed with their religion and as the pattern of individual and group mobility among Hindus speeded up.¹⁴

Migration and subsequent change in status became one of the outstanding facts of the life of this period. It was so obvious a characteristic of the age that it impressed all of the non-Asiatic observers travelling in the area. The movement, whether to the forest, to the city or to the domains of another Rajah, seemed to have been in but one direction—away from the village to somewhere else.¹⁵ We do not hear, as happened almost immediately after the breakup of the Moghul Empire, of a migration (except those engaged in off-seasonal labor)¹⁶ from the city back to the village. Bernier, perhaps the most astute and observant of the travellers in the Moghul Empire, comes back again and again to the migratory character of the peasants and the fluidity of their holdings.¹⁷ He observes that, "even a considerable portion of the good land remains untilled for want of laborers, many of whom perish in consequence of bad treatment they receive from the governors."¹⁸ Bernier maintained that the movements were a clue to, "a tyranny that drives the cultivator of the soil from his wretched house to some neighboring state, in hopes of finding milder treatment or to the army where he becomes the servant of a common horseman."¹⁹ The obvious occurrence represented is that of a cultivator losing status in one case and losing complete freedom in the other. Direction of migration, whether as serfs or servants attached to some lord in the city, predestined a change in the characteristic behavior of similar peoples. References are made to the "contemptuous attitude" of servants, who, attached to a lord or officer, began to ape their

master's characteristics.²⁰ These servants considered themselves superior to others, in similar circumstances, employed by a less important man.²¹ The origin of a depressed group within the cities, often without caste, who were the "bearers of burdens and the carriers of water,"²² aside from the caste groups to whom these professions had long been assigned, also struck these travelers.

The movements had the force of nullifying the optimum land usage policy placed in force by the Moghuls. Manucci noted that, "peasant abandoning of his holdings and frequent emigrations of the countries of the Indian Rajahs²³ who are accustomed to treat them more humanely caused the population of the territory of the Moghuls insensibly to diminish and the land to lie fallow and uncultivated."²⁴ It must be remembered that Jagirdar holdings and the amount of land from which they could get revenue were in direct relation to the amount of land cultivated and the amount of labor available for cultivation. Any ryot instability, served to cut rent collections by a considerable amount. As their rent collections dwindled the government of "... the provinces were compelled to reduce their army establishments which encouraged *all kinds of people* from such agricultural-military castes and tribes, such as the Jats (Western U. P.), Mewatis (South-western Delhi), Bias and Rajputs (Oudh), and Ujjanias (South Bihar) to feudal chiefs and nobles, in carving out estates and villages for themselves. Thus began the *expropriation of the village communities* by warlike and landlord families, tribes and castes which often resulted in the displacement of entire rural populations"²⁵ It is to be noted that groups like the Bhardwajs of Oudh and Eastern U. P., who had their influential centers in Unao, Fyzabad, Rae Bareilly and Mirzapur were displaced by Mohammedan-Moghuls and Rajputs, often driven to

the forest, and finally reduced to a *depressed caste* in U. P. and toward the close of Moghul rule, expelled to Bihar²⁶

Akbar's particular awareness of the process of "flee and re-emerge" caused him to demand a census in the twenty-fifth year of his reign²⁷ This census was not aimed so much at determining the numbers of people in the various provinces as it was an attempt to fix population in a specific area; an area in which social relations could stabilize themselves so that authority would be easy to re-establish. Officers of the kingdom were "not to allow anyone to reside in an area who was not engaged in some business or occupation and were to inquire as to the arrival and departure of Ryots and clever men."²⁸ It seems fairly obvious, therefore, that while internal migration was speeding up, various groups of peoples were either rising in caste status or becoming completely casteless as their group lost the imperial favor or the power to keep their holdings. The effect of migration and flight was felt by rural and urban areas alike. This pattern need not have been a quantitative one, although great numbers of people must have been involved,²⁹ to have a vast cumulative effect on the social structure of the village and the city. It is definitely apparent that social relations within both the country and the city, vis-a-vis each other, had undergone a decided change from anything previously found in north Indian history.³⁰ Moreover, it is equally true that individual members of the body whole of any given village or urban center had not only changed in being but had changed in outlook. Change which reflects on the whole structured series of social relations to one's neighbors, to one's old caste and to the government under which the individual now found himself.³¹

It is in the light of the shifting dynamic physical situation of the period and the continued attempt by government to stabil-

ize it, only to stimulate it anew, that one must view the relations within groups and between individuals in both the village and the city.

THE VILLAGE UNDER THE MOGHULS

Before the coming of Islam in general, and the Moghuls in particular, it was comparatively uncomplicated to speak of Indian villages. They were basically of two types: headman ruled or panchayat administered. Although the headman village seemed to outnumber the panchayat by far there was, at least on the surface, very little visible difference between them. Methods of crop sharing, land ownership and land tenure differed from village to village, especially as pertains to the structure of social and plowing relationships³² in newly founded villages, but there was a superficial similarity that was striking. The common grain heap, whether in Ryotwari or jointly-held villages served as the common denominator of relationships in either case. With the growth of Jagir holdings under the Moghuls, this pattern changed drastically. The village often became neither headman or panchayat in type but something altogether different from either. This difference reflected not so much an innovation in village type as a trend in emphasis away from individually and separately held land tenures to landlord held estates.³³ This trend in emphasis would often take a village in a direct move from a Ryotwari one in type to a Zemindari Kalis one in type.

The village types all differed in a varying series of social relations within their own framework. They were, however, unitary enough in their class structures³⁴ so that the non-cultivating owners among them demanded an altering of customary patterns

of behavior to fit a new economic pattern³⁵

As a consequence, villages began to change, in terms of emphasis, on an individual to individual as well as on a class to class basis. Although they were multitudinous in type and number they resolved themselves into eight main categories:

1. *The Ryotwari Village*, with its emphasis on separate and individual holdings and with the importance of its headman³⁶ as the collector and dispenser of the grain heap which was giving way, because of the Moghuls, Jagirs and the growth of landlordism, to the
2. *Zemindari Kulis Village*, which was an estate type in which one man held the land either as an outright grant³⁷ or because he had bought the village or had it forfeited to him due to nonpayment of a loan by one of the original Jagirdars. It is important to note that these sole owners were a new phenomenon in northern India, especially at the time of the later Moghuls. A new sole owner might be a wealthy merchant urban dweller come out to the land to live and to own but not to cultivate. His new land use was a direct reversal of the pattern of the urban-dwelling rural-land-owning Jagirdar who had been completely outside of the social structure of the village on the estate and partook only parasitically in its economic life³⁸

This type of village continued to grow in an accelerated fashion until it became, in certain areas,³⁹ the most important part of the social and economic life of the area

3. Older in type and receiving a new emphasis under the Moghul was another landlord village, the *Zemindari Mushtarka*. This village type with its panchayat was generally headed by a single individual⁴⁰ chosen by equal holders of land. It reflected the old jointly held type of village of social equals

but, even here, there was a tendency toward the piling on of power in the direction of the largest or most powerful holder.⁴¹ The panchayat was becoming not so much an independent body of co-holders of equal voice as a rubber-stamp body passing on existing ideas that the largest and most powerful holder had already put in force. In this development the Panchayat followed the loss of power of the Headman in the Ryotwari village. Moghul tax administrators further weakened this type by constantly bypassing the panchayat in dealing with the village.⁴²

There were numerous villages partitioned and held on the basis of *ancestral shares*⁴³ These ancestral shares reflected tracing of common descent to an original founder in the virgin waste or a holder through some other means. In the Eta district of the northwest, for example, " . . . mention is made of a number of villages owned by the descendants of five brothers, Kachwaha Rajputs, they had gained the favor of the emperor Akbar . . . each received a grant of a village."⁴⁴ Such grants, theoretically for the lifetime of a specific individual, tended to lead to full proprietorship in which descendants formed a joint or a co-sharing community of proprietors. It seems fairly obvious that the end of this particular village-founding process would result in a landlord village of equal share holders. This process, however, was subject almost immediately to the same stresses that beset the Ryotwari village, namely. distance or proximity to the founder or grantee tended to place greater or less importance on the holder of the co-share.⁴⁵ Although the principle of the social equality of co-holders was given lip-service, it really only existed as a device for ordering social relationships in those areas in which ancestral descent was recent and

easily reckoned and which retained a strong memory of the founder or the original holder. The fact was that villages held on a co-sharing basis, in existence prior to Moghul rule, were moving in the direction of disharmony. Essentially individuals were emerging as either more or less important than they had started out on the original co-sharing basis. If a village of this type were granted either to a Jagirdar or farmed out, the imposing of a new holder could completely disrupt the principle of ancestral descent and substitute for it a series of arbitrary caste or class identifications.⁴⁶ It should be borne in mind, however, that since caste and class have a psychological basis for some of their categories,⁴⁷ the weakening of any co-share did not always mean an immediate loss of *visible status*. Baden-Powell noted that, "It is curious to notice how completely, in the course of a few generations, the descendant of a former Raja, or Rao, is assimilated to the peasant grade, even if he is still able to keep his hands from the defilement of the plough. But though to alien eyes he is a mere peasant-proprietor, or village co-sharer, in his own eyes and also those of his neighbors, his high caste and descent are still his own; and that makes all the difference".⁴⁸ Having sunk to a lower grade, the former holder could, in a situation of total village displacement, be separated from his neighbors and become, in the eyes of the Moghul and his new neighbor, completely a member of the peasant group. This village type, subject to resurrection by re-partitioning and a new holder, who in turn would now become the ancestor through whom descent would be followed,⁴⁹ was a precarious one from a social-structural point of view. It tended to break down with any new stresses imposed on it from the central authority.

- 5 *The purely tribal village* represented a group effort in an early stage of sharing. If the village were old, the tribal character may have started to break down into any of the seven other categories delineated here. During later Moghul times, when peoples like the Rohillas, Jats or Rajputs were displaced, to reform and resettle in areas outside of their original habitat, no partition took place.⁵⁰ The village was held in common and governed in common through a tribal head. Sharing was on the basis of family holdings with the village being regarded as the joint property of all the families.

Ties to the village and to one another were not based on land holding or land use but on customary tribal law. In the face of extra-village and extra-tribal stresses the values inherent in a common tribal heritage were reinforced. The progressive breakdown of a tribal village, due to either time and individually gained familial success was often abruptly cancelled out by the disintegration of other village types and their attempt to settle populations of a different ethnic character in the tribal area.⁵¹ We see, therefore, two forces at work in a tribal village, at that time, one leading to strength and the other to dissolution the cohesive factor of tribal heritage vs. the Moghul policy of dealing with the individual cultivator

- 6 Some villages were held together on the basis of *shares in well, plows and capital animal investment, i.e., bullocks*.⁵² The holdings were always divided and individual. These villages could have been in a transitional stage between Ryotwari and Zemindari Mushtarka. Although this need not necessarily be true the usurping by an individual of the responsibility that held these villages together could take away

their *raison d'être*. Since allotment was on the basis of the original investment (for example, how many bullocks were given by an owner to plow the land when the village was formed) the claims to shares in the land were fixed and could, in their very inflexibility, lead to disruption. With the impact of the coming of the Moghuls and their press to put as much land as possible into production, the original investors share was often superseded by a new investor, i.e., new arrival having more bullocks to contribute to the plowing.⁵³ The position of the old status holder within the community would, therefore, be destroyed. Individual ownership and division of land led from a Ryotwari type inevitably in the direction of compounding landholding within one or a few hands.⁵⁴

7. There were *modified Ryotwari types* in which individual holders, unlike the completely individualized Ryotwari village, still retained some idea of corporate feeling. These villages were perhaps strongest in their social stability since individual land ownership had not, as yet, abrogated the idea of common ancestral identity or common family ties. The impetus to changes in status due to new land holding did not disrupt the social relationships of these villages as much as those in which economic status was beginning to supersede customary modes of behavior. Land-holding in the case of these villages seemed to go hand-in-hand with use. Consequently, the appearance of serf and landless labor, growing in ever increasing numbers on the Zemindari estates, was here lacking.⁵⁵
8. The last major type, although there are variations of all the aforementioned ones, is the village in which the *partition of shares is incomplete*.⁵⁶ These villages were transitional, and

I venture to guess, were by far the outstanding type in the early Moslem and Moghul periods.⁵⁷ They reflected the general social instability of the times. These villages were generally in the position of an incomplete partitioning of ancestral shares in which shares, formerly completely distributed, were forced to be redistributed due to loss of status or displacement. Villages of this type often reflected the imposition of a new law code of inheritance due to changes of centralized control or the effects of becoming part of a Jagir grant not bound by ancestral shares or principles.⁵⁸ As such, the realignment of land shares and their concomitant effect on social prestige would reflect no internal relations but only those relations which were governed by outside circumstances. These villages were either of the *imperfect Pattidari type*⁵⁹ in which the ancestral principle of sharing was paramount or the *imperfect Bhiachara type*⁶⁰ in which the position principle of sharing was paramount.

It is of the utmost importance to emphasize that almost all of these village types could exist in a large Jagir holding⁶¹ A system of law, or management, which approached them as though they were all alike would, consequently, effect them all in diverse ways. Even so detailed a study as Baden-Powell's states that no one had ever surveyed or taken population statistics on the number of any of these village types. It would, perforce, mean that in dealing with any given village type we would be creating a hypothetical one around which minute variations would revolve.⁶² The salient fact of life, reflecting the altering dynamic intra-village relationships would, nonetheless, be almost identical in each case. The presence or absence of a segment of the society would find echoes in all the villages, either through changing patterns of individual relationships or to an alteration in ideas

affecting social and economic life. These ideas, either preceding or following expected actual change, would give us clues to the new forces at work in the late seventeenth century. It is obvious that the freezing of any specific village type, in historical retrospect, is of dubious worth since it would present a totally unreal synthesis. The general dynamism of any one of the village types, however, gives clues to the expected emergence of certain social and economic forces that were to become pan-Indian in scope.

CHAPTER VII

Landlordism

CHANGES in village types during Moghul times, due to changes in the principle of sharing, did not presuppose the existence of a purely communal village in which sharing was completely equal. All sharing was of a non-democratic¹ nature and depended on one's place in the table of descent from either the founder, the founding principle or the acquirer. This table of descent was, however, constantly subject to alternation and showed trends toward realignment, based on new conditions favoring landlords.² Because the trend, during later Moghul times, seemed to be from one of a purely headman village toward one in which there was a paramount landlord, upper echelons or segments in the village were changing almost as rapidly as the lower ones.³ Consequently, the change in village type always meant a change in the social and economic structure of the village.

For example, when a Pattidari village was divided it generally fell into major and minor segments with primary divisions into two villages of different faiths. Conversion of any village of this type meant that it broke into two Tarf, one of which became wholly Moslem, the other Hindu.⁴ This new phenomenon was encountered in increasing degree during Moghul times and presupposed an alteration on both halves of the village. A village going through this process would see one half changing wholly to conform to a new faith while the other broke off to live by itself.

The formation of a class of great landlords existing apart from village and rural life, while at the same time being an integral part of it, was another result of the decline of the Moghul Empire.⁵ Landlords were created in a great many ways reflecting, first and foremost, the impact of the growth of new semi-independent dynasties on old dominant families in the Hindu social structure. When these families lost their dominions in the fertile region of the northwest they generally split up. One part of the split group would leave the ancestral area while the other would remain subject to the new dynasty and often in its service. Service to a state in the seventeenth century always meant possibilities of receiving lordships over a village, even one's ancestral one. Lordship carried with it a complete abrogation of the table of descent from first clearer because the landlord generally had no relation with his village and villagers beyond his assigned and usurped rights.⁶ Thus, with an increase in lordism the older basis of social interaction was laid aside. The principle, or lip service to the principle, of first clearer or founder as portrayed by Manu was deemed, however, so important a part of the modus-operandi of social control that the new landlords began to fit themselves into *old nominal categories*.⁷

A quick appraisal of a village might, consequently, cause the observer to think that the village had remained the same when in reality it had changed completely and *was only physically the same*. In the Punjab, for example, it was noticed "the landlord class always claiming superiority as the descendants of the 'original founders' banian-ganw"⁸ even though these landlords were newcomers, newcomers whose presence reflected altered conditions and a dynamic blow to the caste patterns in existence prior to their arrival.

Basing its revenue system upon maximum land usage induced the government to encourage peasant holders to assume ownership of land vacated by others or lands newly opened to cultivation. Were they to be successful, and generally they were not, their position would be strengthened sufficiently to enable them to take on the same land the next year or to expand their present holdings. New upper segments of village social structure were being created by this revenue system. In the eighteenth century the growth of the Zemindari landlord of Bengal and the Taluqdari landlord of Oudh largely reflects the social mobility of successful peasants and returned-to-the-land disposed Rajah families. Having once become a landlord, however, the peasant was not in an assured position for, the very dynamic processes which had created him tended to destroy him.⁹

Landlord segments of any village had a much more intimate relationship with the urban center near them than did any other part of the village. After the reign of Aurengzeg there was a marked tendency for wealthier members of the court and urban upper castes to invest in land¹⁰. By becoming landlords of estates, they thus entered into the rural caste pattern while still members of the urban class one¹¹. The pressure of the Moghul drive toward optimum land yield, in terms of revenue, served as a

means to social mobility of these land owners. These landlords must be contrasted with the Jagdari holders of earlier Moghul times. The Jagirdar, although holding a similar position to landlords in regard to his village and villagers was, by Moghul law¹² a transient possessor in contrast with the permanent Zemindari holder of the land. Many a Jagir could and did become a Zemindari when the central government weakened, but it cannot change the view that the two types of holding, in relation to the villages held by them, implied a basic difference in attitude and approach.

Differences in attitude¹³ between Jagir holders and Zemindar holders were so marked that they caused a fantastic amount of shifting of displaced peasant labor, during times of famine¹⁴ or other stresses, in the direction of the Zemindari estates. This shifting peasant population contributed to the growing breakdown in those villages which were still Ryotwari. A steadily diminishing supply of available labor occurred.¹⁵

Trends toward landlordship were accelerated not only by a renewed concept of the value of living on and off the land but by desires of transient grantee holders to pass on fiefs to their children. Incursions of various peoples from outside the immediate area of Moghul control also added to the landlord group. The Rohillas, for example, by raiding onto western and central India obliterated a great many of the old proprietary and customary rights to land ownership¹⁶. They were rewarded, as a means of pacifying them, with landlord estates of their own. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the displacement of villagers and their consequent appearance in other sections of northern India also caused changes in the social interaction of villages outside the immediate area of Rohilla incursions. In Bareilly, for example, it was noted that of 3326 estates, 2611 were Zemindari¹⁷. The

breakdown of the independent village and villager and his transformation into a peasant-serf, without holdings or customary rights, was here well on the way to being complete.

In whatever fashion landlords were created, their presence at the pinnacle of the rural social structure represented a different sort of mobility, not encountered heretofore, in Indian history. The mobility was not of a group, as in the case of the Rohillas, but had aspects of individual mobility as in the case of the peasant holder who took on himself the responsibility for a crop return in pre-assessed land yield.

Relations between landlords and villagers and landlords and urban dwellers did not follow the same sort of standards as those that were prevalent earlier. Landlords were now often of non-agricultural castes and had to employ tenant farmers to till their land. The tenant farmer, oftentimes the remnant of an "older family group which had gone to the wall"¹⁸ contrasted sharply with the new landlord group.

The ties of the Zemindari group and the Jagirdar group were, at first, strongly urban rather than suburban. The court with its power focus drew the attention of these groups, for the type of life carried on there was to their liking. Even in this sort of a relationship, however, there was a tendency toward a schism between landlords who held Zemindari estates and those whose Jagirs ran for their lifetime. This schism indicated that those holding temporary Jagirdars had constantly to keep on the right side of the power source by deeds or by gifts. The impermanence of holdings also fostered a continuously increasing extravagance on the part of the Jagirdars with the concomitant impoverishment of their estates and holdings. Jagir management of estates was in all but rare cases left to others while the owner lived in the city.¹⁹ The contact between Jagirdar and his tenant farmer

was, consequently, almost non-existent. His influence was felt but it was subject to the interpretation of the estate manager. The Zemindari holder, although tied to the power source in the urban center, nonetheless, had greater contact with his tenant farmer. In so far as the necessity of proximity to the power center was less, he spent more time on his holdings than did the Jagirdar. The Zemindari-holding, reflecting an increased social mobility in the ownership of land, also placed restraints upon the owner in terms of extravagances or waste. Because land ownership and the right to exploit vacant lands were predicated on the pre-assessed value of land yield, a Zemindar could, unlike the Jagirdar, grow in size and power through increased efficiency in the production of his crop. The motivations, therefore, which guided the Jagirdar and those which guided the Zemindar were completely different. But, the resultant pressures of living completely off the produce of the land, oftentimes brought the village in both of these ownership types in the same direction, toward ruin.²⁰

The position of the Jagirdar was static²¹ while that of the Zemindar was expansive and subject to growth. It was the staticness and expansiveness of these two alternative positions, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that most affected peasant movement causing a significant increase in the amount of serf and landless labor. Peasants tended to move away from their customary and ancestral lands to concentrate on the estates of the Zemindar landlords. The increase of serf labor, landless labor, transient labor and tenant labor caused a significant change in the social relations of landlord to peasant as well as peasant to peasant. Competition between transient labor, serf labor and tenant labor worked to the decided advantage of the Zemindar and served to demean all other holders to a common denominator

which, in the long run,²² amounted to outright serfdom or bondage²³ Serfdom, however, did not seem to have, except in very rare cases, the connotation that it was an intermediate step to outright slavery. Although the distinction is a fine one, there existed a different attitude (adhered to by both the landlord and serf) as to the sort of people who were "fit for enslavement"²⁴

In a great many instances the Jagirdar, aware of the fact that there was no hereditary peerage in Islam and that private ownership of property was not recognized, broke away by outright acts of rebellion against the central authority. Instances of this sort were also prevalent during the earlier period of the Delhi Sultanate. Professor Qureshi remarked, "the relations between the central government and the provinces did not depend so much on *legal definitions* as on *political reality* . . ."²⁵ Effects of these rebellions were to equate Moslem Omrahs with Hindu Rajput nobility, who were also in a similar state of rebellion, as well as to deed appointive lands to children upon the death of the *assigned* holder. In Bengal, Murshid Quli Khan, who ruled by *appointment* from 1707 to 1727, left his throne to his son-in-law. In the Deccan, Nazim Al-Mulk Asaf Jan, himself appointed in 1713, left his throne to his son²⁶ The instances of Jagirdars becoming, in effect, Zemindars and permanent nobility, became increasingly prevalent as Moghul central authority diminished and as the Maratha invasions from the south started to disrupt the Empire's frontiers²⁷

The appearance of the Zemindari and Jagirdari landlord in appreciable numbers in suburban and village areas at the same time as independent village ryots and headman declined coincided with the growth of a new class of people. This class, in evidence in Indian history as peripheral to village life, became the focus of a new orientation based on money. They were the money lenders.²⁸

CHAPTER VIII

Money Lenders

THE money lender has existed alongside of the other three components of the basic ryot village¹ since recorded history began in India. His function was to advance such cash and credit as was necessary to the special socio-religious aspects of communal life² rather than to the economic functions of the community. His role in the economy only assumed importance when he served as the repository of the village grain heap or as the local vendor of general merchandise. His position within the general social structure lay only in the hold he had on the Ryots who were in his debt and not in any assigned or achieved status. Whatever right and privileges he enjoyed within any village generally came from his primary function, as grain merchant³ and not from the secondary one of lending money. As an individual his relation to another money lender in any other village was determined not by

his function as an issuer of cash or credit, but by his relative position in the family and caste relationships uniting his caste in the two villages. There was no extension of credit among money lenders in several villages and any institution of extra village credit resembling a national system of banking was non-existent.⁴ The villager had his share in the grain heap and with frugality could bypass the credit institution inherent in the money lender's presence. He could try to do the same in his socio-religious functions which called for some cash. The position, therefore, of the money lender during Moghul rule, although intrenched and of long duration, was a relatively minor one within the functioning of a village. With the decline of the Moghuls, however, the whole position of the money lender in the village changed.⁵ The change was in an altered relationship of the grain heap to money in which the socio-religious functions of the money lender gave way to the vastly and inherently more powerful ones of village economics.⁶

As has been noted before, one of the earliest edicts arising out of the rule of Akbar was a reassessment of the land and the promulgation of the idea that taxes were now to be paid in money rather than in grain.⁷ At that time the peasant, however, had the option of paying in kind.⁸ During the anarchy of the eighteenth century, however, the intermediaries who established themselves were often hiding their wealth and only money could be hoarded. Besides a raid either by the Marattas or the Pundaris, Jats or Sikhs could take away all that the peasant possessed. Now he needed credit to sustain himself. In almost every village the only member who possessed some cash was the money-lender⁹ In as much as taxation, unlike the religious aspects of communal village life, is not subject to individual manipulation or postponement the Ryot had finally, and inevitably, to turn to the money-

lender in order to meet his tax payments.¹⁰ The immediate effect of this move was to elevate the money-lender to new importance in the village's life while, at the same time, binding the previously independent village with a money economy manipulated by the state. Fluctuation in the value of money, because of its continued debasement in the eighteenth century, which had previously never concerned the village now became of paramount importance.¹¹ The share of grain assigned to the state was a fixed number subject to no outside fluctuation. Fluctuation of money,¹² however, could vary so much that the grain heap, pledged for security to the credit institution within the village, might not in its *entirety* suffice to cover the debt or a suddenly devalued coinage.¹³ Villages in general, therefore, and money-lenders in particular became tied to the over-all economy and reflected conditions taking place in non-related areas. This change was, once again, to depress the average ryot and to elevate specific individuals within the village to heights that the socio-religious functions of money could not have caused. The money-lender, if successful in the collection of debts¹⁴ could now become a great landowner or invest his funds in commercial ventures that promised a greater return. Rural-urban ties became strengthened as the increasing effect of urban merchants now buying land became felt. There emerged a group of families¹⁵ (they were to play a greater role after the anarchy had given place to British rule) as a sort of incipient monied *upper class* whose caste status was secondary to their position within the hierarchy of finance. The mode of life of the average village money-lender was one, however, in which he remained within the village and rose in importance as debt increased. Although the position of money-lender reflected increased individual mobility within a village, obligation to stabilizing a migrant population, in order to assure payment of

debt, served to mitigate any effect that this mobility might have had on the total mobility of the village. It is pointed out, in instance after instance,¹⁶ that guards were often stationed around the periphery of a village in order to prevent a loss in the labor supply and a loss, by flight, in the collection of debts and interest. Thus, his desire for keeping Ryots stable in an area caused the money-lender, himself an interacting member of the village community, to align himself with the state, the Jagirdar and/or Zemindar. He served, therefore, as a bridge between Ryot and Ruler.¹⁷ It must be noted that the growth of the money-lender, although a resultant of its policies, was an anathema to the state itself. Under the Moghuls the Crown had been the main banker and attempted, through judicious loans to keep the money-lender from dominating and strangling the economic life of the village.¹⁸ The smaller states of the eighteenth century still monopolized the flow and value of currency; without, however, the compensatory feature of an easily accessible credit system to the Ryot, and this accelerated the growth in status and power of the money-lender. The sole restraint placed on the money-lender, which broke down under the legalistic mechanism of the right to collect debts by force, was the state's apathy toward the recovery of loans.¹⁹ Monopoly in the banking field, being as narrowly confined as it was, made the money-lender a necessity in the village. A necessity which served to unite, both economically and psychologically, the general economy of the village with the economy of the centralized urban area closest to the village. Economic ties became dominated by demands for production of certain crops while psychological ties were fostered by examples of what a villager, having made some cash in an urban area,²⁰ could do in the village. Upward mobility of certain individuals within a village, therefore, contrasted with the general downward mobility

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of the average villager.²¹

Loss of freedom of the so-called independent village and Ryot within that village was both an internal and an external process. Internally growing debtor bondage accounted for part while an externally greater and greater amount of Zemind type landlord holding accounted for the other.²²

CHAPTER IX

Rural Nobility

THE growth of a class of owners intermediate between the old ruling nobility and the increasingly dependent ryot was also of paramount importance for, it affected rural social control during the Moghul reign. Rural nobility, which had been at the pinnacle of the social hierarchy prior to the Moghul conquest, was reduced to being either a servant of the state, since Moghul power allowed no independent aristocracy,¹ or an enemy of the state.² In either case the status pattern represented one of diminishing rank and power. Nobility, particularly favored Rajput clans, could maintain some semblance of position by joining the royal service or by offering females in marriage in order to ally themselves with the central power. The imperial service of Akbar contained over 30% Indian troops drawn almost entirely from Rajput clans.³

Service itself meant that the rights and obligations of rural Rajput aristocracy were being obliterated by a series of new loyalties directed toward the Crown. Furthermore, the very physical act of being incorporated into royal service meant a transfer of thousands of Rajput clansmen from ancestral areas, in which their rights and obligations were strictly defined by customary law, to new areas in which they were strangers. Their presence in these areas, as royal troops, placed them outside the framework of the normally functioning local society. The army itself served as a mechanism for further scrambling the caste and status patterns of the old nobility by allowing, through means other than birth, individuals to rise or fall from power.¹ Humayun's slave, for example, died at the head of two thousand horses, an unheard of possibility under the rigidly defined formalized patterns of the army prior to the Moslem rule.⁵

Those among the nobility who chose to become enemies of the state had to flee to the jungle or other inaccessible areas with their bands. In such cases, they had to decide either to remain as outlaws or attempt to regain their holdings. The vast increase and tremendous counter measures to brigandage after the Moghul conquest attest to the fact that a great many of the older nobility, constantly increased by numbers of fleeing Ryots,⁶ stayed in the jungle and fought the Crown. Their composition, essentially as bands of robbers, meant a democratization and a levelling of social status. When these bands emerged under the Girasiya⁷ system in Gujerat and began to settle in and around older villages their previous status patterns had undergone diametric changes. Old nobility, as well as old Ryots, were both strangers in a new area and the gap between them, augmented by band life, was considerably lessened. The nobility who had chosen to run and fight were, by this very act, diminishing their caste position in the eyes

of the general populace. Even so astute and fair a recorder as Pant states that "large tract of forests provided hiding places for bad classes"⁸ thereby giving us clues to the general attitude toward nobility and Ryots who were living in or were in the process of emerging from the jungle. There seems to have been no attempt to distinguish between those groups which were hereditary brigands and newly fleeing Ryots and older nobility.⁹ Caste being, to a large degree, acceptance of status patterns of an ascribed type,¹⁰ the jungle became the common denominator and leveller of all prior status and caste positions. We are aware of the fact that although nobility emerged in the Girasiya system, as nobility, their status suffered and diminished considerably vis-a-vis other nobility which had not fled but had somehow worked out a pattern of symbiotic relationship with the new power.

The growth of a monied economy and payment to the Crown of money also served to undermine the position of the old nobility. From a basically feudalistic pattern of equal status among equals the nobleman now became subordinated to the Crown and to the nobility closest to the Crown. The fact, that this nobility was often of another faith, hostile to the whole concept of relationships between ryot and Hindu nobility, served to diminish the social status of the nobility yet further. Although there was no complete breaking down of caste barriers between old ryot and old nobleman, the new role broke the spirit of any collective will on the part of the older nobility to act in concert with other nobility much the same as the growth of landlordism later forced the role of headman¹¹ on every villager and broke down the collective spirit of the village. Rebellion against this diminishing role of rural nobility would have seemed the natural outcome of government instituted by the Moghul Crown¹² but, aside from a few individual attempts at beginning new Hindu rural dynasties, the old nobility accepted the overlordship of the Crown.¹³

CHAPTER X

Slavery: Debt and Captive

WHAT emerges from our study so far is that there were factors at work which were breaking down the old series of caste relationships in the villages. These factors were intimately associated, for (1) as the landlord class and the individual village money-lender grew in power, (2) the old nobility, the ryot and the headman constantly diminished in power. Mobility in the village was the dominant characteristic with the vast majority of older ryot holders moving in a steadily accelerating status curve downhill toward serfdom and slavery. Added to the picture of classes in rural India, therefore, is a vastly increased group in numbers, almost entirely newly created by the advent of the Jagirdar and Zemindar system the freeman made slave.¹

Slavery in the classical sense implies that human beings are regarded as commodities that may be sold or bought as chattel

goods. Individuals of this type were present in India prior to the coming of the Moghuls and increased in numbers after the advent of the Moghuls. They were generally of two types: (1) conquered groups of people, or (2) those internal groups which were considered fit for enslavement. The implication inherent in the status of group 1 was that they were the spoils of war and, following an historic process, had no reason to complain of their lot. Although slaves, their position was much higher than those "fit for enslavement."² With the coming of the Moghuls the groups of classical slaves were increased in number. They were now drawn, for the most part, from the free ryots and not from the already depressed aboriginal peoples. Moreland writes, "as regards Indian slaves the status was hereditary under both systems of law (Hindu and Moslem). Capture was recognized by both Hindu and Moslem law and in India under the Moghul This recognition led to serious abuses for it became the fashion to raid a village or group of villages without any obvious justification and carry off the inhabitants as slaves"³ It seems that the reordering of customary relationships, with the introduction of the system of Jagir grants, made the whole fabric of freeman to nobleman looser and that ryots suffered, to the point of losing their freedom, as a consequence. Della Valle,⁴ notes the increase of freeman become slaves when he observes that Goa (controlled by the Catholic Portuguese) was a city of slaves in which social status was not so much determined by caste as by the number of slaves and servitors one possessed.⁵ Goa was, however, an extreme example because it had been captured by force and the population enslaved en masse. The complete downward mobility of caste members into classical slavery is also typified in the writing of Abul Fazl when he praises Akbar, not for having stopped the creation of slavery, but for lessening it. In as much as Akbar's

peripheral areas were in constant revolt⁶ the number of ryots made slaves can be elucidated by this statement, "it has been the custom of royal troops in their victories and campaigns in India to forcibly sell or keep in slavery the wives, children and dependents of the natives."⁷ The conqueror, in his great mercy, decided in the seventh year of his reign to "leave the wives and the children alone and to sell into slavery only the adult males"⁸

Certain areas of the kingdom became centers in which great numbers of slaves were gathered. John Marshall⁹ estimated that in Patna alone 91,000 to 103,000 people, most of which were slaves, died of starvation in a famine *month*. Perhaps these figures should be subjected to further scrutiny but the numbers of starving slaves must have been great enough to warrant almost any exaggeration.¹⁰

Despite the apparent increase in the numbers of classical slaves their impact on urban and rural social structure was not as greatly felt as was the factor of debtor slavery brought on by the deterioration in the position of the ryot and the loss of the role of the headman in the grain pile. As the state's emphasis on maximum grain production grew the ryot was encouraged to plant on lands which, with fertilization methods then in existence, were sub-level in productive capacity¹¹. True, if the ryot were successful, and he had some chance of so becoming,¹² he could then move out of his position into the strata above. Most ryots, however, caught in a web of emphasis on individual rather than collective responsibility for taxation, were unsuccessful.¹³ This was especially true of marginal farmers who were quickly reduced to debtors. As such, there were but few alternatives open to these former free ryots. They could, by getting past the police around and in the village, flee to become landless labor on some Zemindar's estate or sell themselves and/or members of their

families into "temporary" slavery."¹⁴ In accordance with law, a mother and father, pressed by debtors or hunger, could sell a child into slavery. Afterwards, if they had the means, they could buy it back. Women and children were sold in order to pay tribute demands while non-Mohammedan debtors in Bengal, of either sex, were sold for the same reason.¹⁵ J. N. Das Gupta, in his classic work on sixteenth-century Bengal, describes a landlord who, having risen *as an individual from being a free ryot of a fractured ryotwar village*, miscalculated in the amount of land he put under cultivation and found himself unable to meet his obligations under the system of pre-assessed taxation: "Ramchandra Khan was remiss in paying the Government dues, upon which the Mohammedan Wazir came to the village, bound him, his wife and children hand and foot, and looted the village for three days. After that he took away Ramchandras and his family as prisoners. In consequence the village remained a waste for a long time"¹⁶

Various taxes levied on Hindus particularly served to drain away any savings that might have been put away by the free Ryot for his ceremonial and religious life. Since, for a very long time, the money-lender had supplied the small amounts of capital needed in this field, the tendency was to go to him and borrow further. The ryot, therefore, already overburdened by the money payment and the fluctuation of cesses and levies¹⁷ (particularly during the time of Jahangir) went further into debt and eventually into debtor slavery for marriages, births and deaths. Marriage debts became so burdensome that, according to Moreland, children of debtors remained to work, as indentured serfs, the estates of money-lenders or Zemindars from whose *father* the borrowing had taken place. In a story told by Jauhar¹⁸ peasants living near Lahore were *accustomed* to giving their wives and children in pledge to the bankers for money advanced on account of revenue

collections

The tendency toward debt slavery was especially marked as the free village ryot community disintegrated and reamalgamated in other areas without its customary rights and privileges¹⁹ Reamalgamation generally grouped landless serfs from former "outlaw" bands. The first crises in the pattern of payment of revenue or of special taxes saw these villages slip over the line into debt slavery. As upward mobility of certain groups in the towns and in the cities increased, debt slavery increased also. According to Elliot and Dawson, the Kroris would go into the country and "sell the children of the ryots and scatter them abroad"²⁰ in order to meet tax payments. In as much as the Krori²¹ represented a newly created group in the towns the enslavement of free villagers meant the elevation of this urban group

CHAPTER XI

The Urban Centers: Cities and Towns

WHILE the villages were changing internally the urban centers, too, began to feel the impact of a new emphasis in government. This emphasis served to realign their human elements for the Moghuls, like the Delhi Sultans, were urban dwellers.¹ They emphasized, however, beyond anything visualized by the Delhi Sultans, the city as a place of industrial production rather than as a trade center for goods produced largely in the hinterland. It should be noted here that the "seventeenth century saw India as the agricultural mother of *Asia and the industrial workshop of the world.*"² There arose two distinct center types: those like Benares which remained completely Hindu in flavor and those like Delhi which became, despite their vast Hindu majorities, Moghul in flavor. The ancient Hindu cities were not, however, as important

(never having regained their earlier historical status) as the new cities founded by the Crown in its role as chief banker and manufacturer. Cities which reflected the impress and impact of Moghul rules most strongly were to become centers of mobility. In their inception they differed markedly from the Hindu village in the numbers of their populace, in the fact that they were administrative centers and in the emphasis of their existence.³ Although most contemporary historians⁴ saw only a reflection of the village in the city, the dynamism that led to the complete breakdown of feudal, caste-like, European urban life was also present here. The guilds (which prepared the urban centers of Europe and of Asia for the breakup of feudal patterns of labor, and the guild-associative patterns which had within them the kernels of the coming capitalistic revolution were also present in Moghul cities.⁵ The Crown was the prime producer as well as patron of manufacturing of luxury articles.⁶ The merchant-artisan, as a competitor with Crown, therefore, had absolutely no recourse in case of arbitrary seizure (except the hartal⁷) and was in a more precarious position than his European counterpart.⁸ The presence of the Crown, as part of the work and production pattern (in terms of taxation) of the village paralleled its position as part of the production pattern of the urban areas and tied the village and the city more closely together than previously in Indian history.

The "fair" cities⁹ of early India and of coeval Europe were essentially different from the dynamic productive cities of Moghul India. The position of the Crown and its emphasis on commercial and luxury production accelerated the deterioration of older city-to-city relationships as well as those internal caste relationships which depended on ancient commercial patterns. Villages, especially those whose proximity to urban centers made emana-

tions radiating out of the city strong, altered not only their social structure but the whole fabric of their productive life and concept of values to attune to the city.¹⁰

One of the best physical descriptions of a Moghul city gives us clues to its class structuring. J N Das Gupta, following the outline of the poetry of Mukundaram,¹¹ writes

Leaving the city of Kalinga, the ryots of all castes settled in the city of the Bir (the hunter of the story) with their household goods. Accepting the pan (betel) of the Bir, in token of their consent to the agreement, the Mussalmans settled there, the Western end of the town being assigned to them as their abode. Then came the Moghuls, Pathans, Kazis mounted on horses, and the Bir gave them rent free lands for their houses . . . They always adhere to their own ways¹² . . . By making the Rosa Nemaj some *become* Gold (Moghul), while by *accepting the occupation* of a weaver one becomes a Jolha¹³ Those who drive pack bullocks call themselves Mockheri¹⁴

The very act of moving, from the village to the city, from city to city, or from religion to religion, implied that a choice could be made that would put Hindus and others outside the profession or the status to which they had previously been assigned. There was a tendency, however, to move upon arrival in the urban center into the fourfold caste-class structure (as outlined in footnote 12) and to assume a status pattern of prescribed behavior. Nonetheless, the lumping in this four level pattern meant throwing together great groups of erstwhile independent ryots who had been separated by minute differences

It should not be forgotten that India remained primarily a land of villages so that the physical structuring of cities reflected the psychological orientation of former villagers. Cities became conglomerates of various villages. The villagers did not, unless

they were individual office seekers, desire to go to the city to live. They were "pushed by necessity to the city and not pulled by desire."¹⁵ The deterioration of the internal structure of the headman village and its replacement by a landlord village or an estate accelerated this process. Urged on by the Moghul court and the emperor, as chief industrial producer in the realm, the city received a constantly growing share of the finest artisans of the village.¹⁶ The results were to depress the local cottage industries and the village as an independent economic unit.

Although the city reflected the fact that it was the residuum of Moghul, and therefore nominally Moslem, power, we note early that all Moslems were not traders or members of the government. The general poverty of the mass of Moslems (generally newly converted Hindus), described as highly devotional Shiites, was such that they could not "afford a red carpet and have to be satisfied with a red mat (for prayer)."¹⁷ The conglomerate character of the town and its tendency toward self-segregation is apparent in a description of the Hindu quarter in a city in Bengal. In this quarter were areas that split into a number of divisions:

One quarter being called Kulastan (the Bradralog quarter) where live the Rarhi Brahmins and the Barendra Brahmins, with their temples and tols (educational institutions). Here also live the unlettered Brahmins. They officiate as priests, and teach the rituals of worship (payment of these people was in kind and not in coin). . . . The Ghatak Brahmins by abuses (reading of genealogies). People who do not secure their good will by presents are abused at public gatherings until such presents come (a form of blackmail based on magic).¹⁸

It is to be noted that all of these people who *considered themselves*¹⁹ as Brahmins, whether at the highest or at the lowest levels, nonetheless, lived together or in close proximity and

segregated themselves from the urban community proper except for specific functions. The lower classes followed the same pattern of separation and, it is important to note, only in the artisan-shopkeeper-middle class-caste groups was intergroup social intercourse frequent

The lower classes (Hakul Gopes) in " . whose fields all kinds of wealth grow (evidently there was a continuous attempt to stay tied to the land by a settlement pattern in which the lower classes tried to live on the edge or in the immediate environs of a town and still be a part of it). Each of them has his home filled with pulses of sorts, linseed, mustard, wheat, cotton and molasses"²⁰ Among these lower-class groups were to be found the service castes such as the blacksmith, the Tambuli (betel-sellers), the potters, the Sankha Banias (makers of cowrie shell and other ornaments), the Gonda Banias (the small peddlers), spicers, braziers, goldsmiths, the list is almost endless. The movement to the city of these service groups meant an almost definite downgrading of their position in the urban class hierarchy. Whereas they were artisans who might have been important in the village, once they joined the ranks of debased city groups they were reduced in artisan status as well as in relative position toward former free village ryots²¹

Outside of the town, but intimately associated with it and dependent on it for all of their daily life, were the depressed groups. These groups were the base of the social pyramid of the city. There were known by various names: Kols, Karengas, Maharattas. They lived by hiring themselves out for a month on a system of service or contract labor. Mukerjee calls these depressed castes²² and differentiates between them and low castes whose status was generally occupationally determined²³ and not subject to fluctuations between servile labor and outright slavery.

completely new to concepts of government heretofore in existence in India.³⁰ Commencing with the Empire of Akbar there was great encouragement, both in government workshops and in private merchant groups and in larger artisan shops for the production of Kashmiri shawls.³¹ The Crown started the production in Lahore as a state sponsored industry. In fact, government was so anxious to get into production and to keep it at a high level that it impressed labor from the villages, as well as from the artisan classes already in the city, for its workshops. The status of the artisan rose and fell as the excellence of his work was appraised. This, too, became a means to climbing in the emergent ranks of the social hierarchy through occupational specialization.³² Pant notes this highly significant indication of the trend toward occupational status based on skill by stating "the moment an artisan or a manufacturer acquired fame for his skill he would be transferred to government workshops."³³ For a well-to-do manufacturer the transition would be a bitter pill to swallow and often amounted to outright confiscation but the reverse seemed to be more often the case in which a poor artisan, theoretically doomed to an ascribed status, rose out of his group by the sheer excellence of his workmanship.³⁴ The role of the Crown in this pattern is strongly reminiscent of that of the Church and nobility in Renaissance Europe in the encouragement of genius.³⁵

State-sponsored industry, particularly after Akbar, drew a great many groups of artisans, of low degree in their own area, to the courts and to seats of the nobility. The manufacture of carpets was undertaken by the state and assigned to Moslem weavers³⁶ who organized themselves into producing guilds which served, particularly through the weapon of the Hartal,³⁷ as a means of extracting more differential treatment than any individual

weaver had, heretofore, enjoyed Kashmiri weavers, and their guild organizations, with the encouragement of Akbar began to set up an incipient middle class pattern throughout Kashmir, Lahore, Delhi, Amritsar and Ludhiana.

The importance of the Crown as the sponsoring agent and encourager of industry, is again apparent when we note that during the period of the decline of the later Moghuls the incipiently powerful middle classes died because of the lack of royal patronage.³⁸ They reappeared only in a vastly altered, now stratified form in the emerging factory cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Cawnpore, Madras, Amendabad, Nagpur and Jamsedphur³⁹ But these towns had a new British mercantilist master whose attitude toward a rising Indian middle class was completely negative⁴⁰

Bolstering the growth of the middle classes and artisan groups was the enormous amount of capital in gold and silver⁴¹ available for their services. This capital was constantly being put back into the trade carried on by the middle classes who, in this way, created a stronger position for themselves and for the artisan who might need financing Mukerjee points out, and it is often overlooked, that when the East India Company (during the time of the later Moghuls) forced capital out of India, investments instead of going back into trade went into land, effectively killing any chances that the strongly nascent middle class might have had to grow in the area. The impact on the still existent free ryot was direct because it depressed his holdings (now being sought by urban merchants), and made him the further subject of speculation by absentee urban holders⁴²

The government encouragement of these new middle classes was not due to any altruistic motives but rather to the overwhelming desire, a desire expressed in all phases of Indian life, for luxury goods. The patronage of the courts, therefore, gave an

enormous impetus and stimulus to production of these articles⁴³ Even the merchant not directly involved in luxury production, however, benefited indirectly from its existence. There was an increase in town and class wealth and a demand by the growing middle classes for some of their own produce⁴⁴ Within the towns, beginning to cluster in increasing numbers in and around the large cities, the former concept of cottage industry as a time filler for the time when cultivation was not possible, gave way to a local economy in which every household was a luxury producing unit⁴⁵ These units of production more than mirrored the impetus to industry for, as Abul Fazl observed, "there are more than 1000 workshops (in Kashmiri silk shawls alone) in the town"⁴⁶

There was an increase in the size, number and type of goods so produced as the Crown began to expand into industries that were old in their own areas but were suffering from a long stagnation of industrial inertia In so doing, the Crown was directly responsible for the creation of a new merchant middle class as well as giving ground for the seeds of an industrial set-up in the laborers recruited for the Crown's own industries Silk weaving, for example, which before the Moghuls had been highly localized in Cambay, Gujerat, Ahmanabad and Pattan, was expanded because Akbar "decided to improve the industry and to spread it out"⁴⁷ It becomes increasingly obvious that Imperial patronage led both to a tremendous growth in such industry and to the concomitant growth of specializing villages engaged in it. Many examples of imperial patronage's effect in altering life in large areas of northern India can be found but they are best exemplified by well know cases in Lahore. the making of shawls from hair, the use of wools in luxury production, the growth of huge industrial cotton complexes It can also be seen in the

specialized weaving industries of Menton, Sukkor and Tatta. All of which contributed to make the *industrial* position of India paramount in the world and the growth of the strength and position of her middle and artisan classes.⁴⁸

CHAPTER XII

Wage and Servile Labor

BY encouraging the growth of artisan and guild groups in cities the Crown, although recognizing the primacy of the peasant in the life of the country, contributed to the degeneration of his position¹ The existence of more attractive employment in the cities meant that a constant flocking into new areas, with its attendant turnover of former stable social relations, was taking place The city was receiving, in this pattern, an increasingly larger number of displaced peasants now turned wage laborers. It is the prevalence of these shifting populations that caused Bernier to erroneously observe that "in Delhi there is no middle estate"² In fact, one of the salient characteristics of this shifting population is the instability of caste relationship due to the growth of servile labor Palsaert, in his work on Jahangir, observed that "there are three classes of people who are indeed nominally

free but whose status differs little from voluntary slavery workmen, peons or servants and small shopkeepers''³ Workmen, he maintained, suffered the scourge of low-wages as well as oppression by the governors, the nobles, the Diwans, the Kotwals, the Bakhshi and other royal officers. The workmen, in large part former peasants, were subject to seizure at the whim of any of the multitudinous officials in the administrative center.⁴ We get no picture of a caste system of rights and responsibilities either at the top or at the bottom of the social pyramid, rather the arbitrary rule of power. Palsaert further noted that "if any of these (the officials listed above) wants a workman, the man is not asked if he is willing to come, but is seized in the house or in the street, well beaten if he should raise an objection, and in the evening paid half his wages, or nothing at all."⁵ The picture that emerges is that despite the relative brutalization of workmen there is a definite difference between wage and servile labor, and that wage labor is now a recognized part of the social system and must normally be reimbursed, even if badly.⁶ The workmen, although placed by Palsaert on the level of voluntary slavery⁷ enjoyed a much higher status than the peons or servants who were "exceedingly numerous in this country, for everyone be he mounted soldier, merchant or king's official, keeps as many servitors as his circumstances permit. Outside they serve for display, continually running before their master's horse, inside they do all the work of the house"⁸ These peons or servants were for the most part former free ryots who having lost their holdings were now demoted to servant status.

The growth of servile classes, with their concomitant loss in status, was reported by Moreland thus "the amount of labor expanded in the performance of personal services is, if I am not mistaken, one of the outstanding economic facts of the age of

Akbar.”⁹ These economic facts had echoes, however, that reverberated beyond the purely economic and served to further scramble the assertedly stable relationships of the caste system. Palsaert, for example, notes that “most of the great lords reckon 40 days to the month and pay from 3 to 4 rupees for the period while wages are often left several months in arrears and then paid in worn out clothes or other things. *If, however, the master holds office or power, the servants are arrogant, oppressing the innocent and swimming in the strength of the master's greatness.*”¹⁰ What emerges from these observations, indeed, is that caste separateness had been further bridged by fortuitous good fortune brought by the conquering Moghul master. Such luck raised up a servant type who considered himself superior to his former free and similar caste fellow, also turned servant, but lost in the ill luck of penury and poverty.

The emergence of a clear difference between servile and wage labor¹¹ does not presuppose a hierarchical ordering of their position in which wage labor outranked servile labor. It does mean, however, that the former ryots coming into the city either to stay permanently or to work temporarily were, within a short time, split into groups which shared occupational similarity but had status differences. These status differences meant mobility either up or down and former castes were, in this way, bifurcated. At the most, such once unitary groups were completely realigned so that two castes emerged from a previous one. If we recall that servile labor could only under very favorable conditions return to the land and to freedom, it meant that an apparent loss in status had taken place in almost all of the new servile or wage labor groups whatever their relative final position vis-a-vis each other.

Coupled with Bernier's observation that free ryots, in order

to escape oppression (arbitrary confiscation and excessive taxation), "migrate to the town and to the camps."¹² we see the pattern emerge of diminishing free ryot groups in the country adding to growing landless peasant groups in the cities and on the landlord estates.

Demands for labor by government and by the emerging middle classes in the cities clashed with demands for labor by the Jagirdar and the Zemindar. At times there were temporary advantages to being "bid-for" by both the government and by the jagir owner but eventually the government, to whom the Jagirdar owed the land, won out. The Jagirdar was then forced to attempt to impress other, still free, labor into his service.¹³ Moghul centralized control could brook no rivalry from either quarter. The nobility, although on a stratospheric plane of life as compared to the serf, nonetheless, was equally defenseless as far as their relation to the Crown was concerned.¹⁴

If the only factor to be considered in the rise of Moghul power was the economic one there is no doubt that the Crown would ultimately have become the greatest single producer in the country and with its economic power there would have emerged a bureaucratic regime pressing to keep production as high as possible. Land might still have been, under this system, the prime base of economic wealth but the funneling of more and more free ryot held land into great estates would have continued until land was under the actual control of landlords and only under the nominal control of the government¹⁵

The middle groups in the country and in the city, rising in power, might have risen still further in status and power as the free village ryot became less and less of a factor in the towns and as unorganized village production gave way, more and more, to organized city production¹⁶

Eventually economic factors alone might have served to depress the majority of the Indian class-caste structure to a uniformly miserable dead level and to raise a newly emergent middle class and landed nobility to hitherto undreamed of social heights.

Economic factors, however, were by far not the sole force at work in Moghul India. Other forces resulting from the Moghul conquest emerged to challenge the economic forces that were ripping the old caste-associative pattern of Indian society apart. These other forces often served to cancel out the diminution of Hindu status caused by economic factors. By far the most important of these was the impact of an egalitarian religion, Islam, on urban and rural life.

CHAPTER XIII

Religion

SIR Herbert Risley, in his monumental work on caste, wrote, "Islam, whether regarded as a religious system or as a theory of things, is in every respect the antithesis of Hinduism. Its ideal is strenuous action rather than hypnotic contemplation; it allots a man a single life and bids him live and make the best of it, its practical spirit knows nothing of a series of lives, of transmigrations, of Karma (sic), of the weariness of existence which weighs upon the Indian mind."¹ Despite this philosophical difference we know that even before the coming of the Moghuls there were factors at work which tended to bridge the seemingly irreducible frontiers that separated the two religions.

Urban Moslems, for example, borrowed mathematical concepts from the Hindus² as well as other scientific lore. In turn,

urban Hindus borrowed a great many of the neo-hellenistic and Greek concepts that the Moslems had absorbed from the West. Hindu medicine borrowed the knowledge of the use of metallic acids and of other processes of nitrochemistry. Moreover, architectural forms started to alter, particularly in the thirteenth century,³ and Hindu palaces, temples and cenotophs were no longer being built in the classical and "pure" styles of the preceding periods but began to employ Muslim elements of architecture. Perhaps of even greater importance was the revival, under Moslem impact, of the old Manu ideal of universal King or Emperor as against the existing plurality of feudalistic states.⁴ The idea of a King-Emperor tended to counter the feudal break-up of northern India even before actual contact was made on the field of battle. It is significant to note that Muslim rulers (the Delhi Sultans) used Hindu troops in their wars of consolidation.⁵ These facts, however, standing alone, do not give a coherent picture of the impact that a basically egalitarian faith made on Hindu caste institutions. We must look in another direction for this impact.

As has been pointed out earlier in this book, Moslem influences were to be found in the cities of south India as early as the eighth century. These influences were, however, limited in scope because the Moslem sought converts largely among their class equals.⁶ The paucity in their numbers, after 1200 years of Moslem influence in that area of India, attests to the fact that the egalitarian faith was only conferred on a relative few.⁷ On the other hand, when we view Sindh the effects of conquest, both dynastic and religious, seem immediately apparent. Here, in this overwhelmingly Moslem province, we begin to discern some of the facts that, once having penetrated into central India, served to smash the erstwhile concepts of caste. One of these factors,

perhaps the decisive one in the early phases of Moslem penetration, was the bitterness that the Buddhists felt at being gradually driven out of Hindustan into the peripheral areas of the country. It is a matter of record that Buddhists in Sindh welcomed the conquering armies of Moslems through whom, they hoped, they could re-establish their religious hegemony and ascendancy in northern India⁸ The Buddhists little understood the nature of the Moslem movements into India⁹ They glossed over the fact that these penetrations were not for material conquest alone but carried with them the correlary concept of religious conquest By the time the Buddhist hierarchy awoke to the fact that these invasions were no ordinary ones, the province seems to have been converted¹⁰ This seemingly simple process of conquest and conversion poses, however, a number of serious questions.

1. Did the people of Sind embrace Islam because they were enthralled with the idea of casteless equality?
- 2 Did they acquiesce to the will of a more powerful ruler who happened to be a Muslim? Or
- 3 Were they replaced by others from outside who were Muslims before they came to India?

If we can answer the first two questions positively, then the 500 years or more¹¹ encompassing the reign of the Delhi Sultans and the subsequent penetration of Mohammedan tenets into the life of villages becomes simple to understand. One might argue that the religion was just more appealing than the old caste bound faith and so, those who knew about it, embraced it But it is obvious that such an argument is a most naive abstraction and completely unreal. Answers to these questions also must lie in another direction.

Buddhism, as one of its cardinal tenets, has the concept of

a rejection of caste. Sindh province, Gujerat, and Rajastan were areas that saw Buddhist beliefs in existence long after they had been expelled from the rest of the subcontinent.¹² There was also some spill over of the Buddhist faith into Afghanistan. In accepting the new religious tenets on caste the inhabitants of Sindh were already predisposed to accept a casteless faith. It would be an enormously difficult task, therefore, to prove whether Islam gained its adherents from Hinduism or from Buddhism. We can suppose, however, that in this part of India, especially in Sind, Hinduism was still struggling for the minds of the inhabitants and that Mohammedanism did not have the same difficulty in converting as it would encounter in the central plains region. We cannot trace the effects of Islam on village structure very clearly either

We cannot ignore the importance of the institution of Hamsaya¹³ as a cause of religious change in the tribal areas of the North West. This is an institution in which individuals and whole tribal units associated themselves with dominant Moslem groups and, in the course of time, took on their benefactors' and protectors' name as well as religion.¹⁴ It is exceedingly difficult to judge, by hindsight, the motivation of the great mass of Hamsaya associated groups. Judging, however, by the later events in the Hindu-Ganges plains it becomes clearer that conversion followed association over a period of time. This conversion was perhaps not so much based upon religious belief as upon social expediency in which the dominant position of the new religion, and the apparent advantages it held, outweighed the traditions of the centuries of older affiliations.¹⁵ Groups of people and individuals who were in a physically transitional phase, i.e., moving away from their original groups, changed their faith in large numbers through association with the conquering hordes

pouring in from the west. The phenomenon is not a new one in the history of contact between peoples. It is, however, a new factor in the history of India because it marked the first time a monotheistic faith, pledged to exclusiveness in its hold on adherents, came in force into the sub-continent¹⁶ Theoretically, the Hamsaya-associated groups should have had to reject old ways in toto to be considered members of the new faith. Such rejection would automatically doom the principle of caste and break up the old socially structured groups based upon that socio-religious system. The emergence of new groups, therefore, would see a different base of interaction between members, sanctioned not by old ways of religion or of the older moral precepts, but by the new power structure. A hierarchy would develop, and perhaps so developed in Sind, in which religion and power were used to bolster the new class patterns¹⁷

There is no single reason, even so important a one as physical conquest, however, that can be given for a widespread acceptance of the faith of the Prophet in Sind. Certainly proximity, both geographic and historic, to the center of the growing faith is to be considered, as is the naivete of the Buddhist clergy, but even these do not give us all the answers¹⁸ The changes in Sind, which moves from a prior Hindu and Buddhist adherence to an almost exclusively Moslem one, difficult as they are to explain, are, nonetheless, relatively easy to understand when we are confronted with the complexity of changes that occurred in the plains. Here we do not meet the long history of association of Hamsaya groups or the effect of geographical approximation. What we do find, however, is a much more important series of movements affecting dramatically the course of Indian caste patterns and ultimately the whole outlook of northern India.

HISTORIC CONVERSION

Mahmud made twelve separate expeditions into the country beyond Punjab, plundering temples, breaking idols and taking a great many Hindu captives back to Ghazni as slaves.¹⁹ The impact on individual Hindu villages was sometimes complete obliteration but the effect of the impact on social structure or religion in any of the areas in contact with the early conquerors was little different from that of the contemporaneous internal dynastic upheavals. The external conquest of Mahmud mirrored the internal religious upheavals then taking place in Hindustan.²⁰ Just before these external conquests the struggle for dominance in northern India between Buddhism and Hinduism had completely ended and the dominant Brahmins were beginning their ascendancy in the life of the country.²¹ Tara Chand seems to feel that this is perhaps the most important single fact in the creation of medieval India's class picture.²² Sethi, Saran and Bhandari,²³ agree with Tara Chand. In two separate statements they maintain, "By this time (800-1200 A. D.) the Hindu society was thoroughly in the grip of change and the Hindu outlook on life and religion was fundamentally transformed, a fact which has generally been overlooked and of which the far reaching effects have never been appreciated" and "the new Puranic Brahminism condemned large sections of the Hindu people to a mean and degraded status and led to a fragmentation and devitalization of the whole social organism."²⁴ The growing dominance of the Rajput clans (old and new) with their claims to caste superiority stems directly from the impetus given their numbers by the growth of the Brahmin hegemony. Non-Hindu tribes from the frontier areas of Rajputana, Marwar, Gujerat and the Punjab were claiming ancestors among old noble Hindu families and, by association,

adopting the fiction of a common origin through a common ancestor.²⁵ The growth of *Hinduism*, paradoxically enough, in the eleventh century would seem, therefore, to owe a debt to the penetration by the Moslems under Mahmud, for whatever Buddhism escaped destruction was now confined to Bengal (as was Sakhtiism).²⁶ The Jains of Gujerat and of Rajputana also found themselves directly in the path of the growing power both of the Moslems and of the Hindu Rajput clans. The Jains, too, were thus eliminated as a possible competitive religious force.²⁷

The lack of some centralized control and general state of feudalism that prevailed following the attacks of Mahmud of Ghazni allowed the Rajput clans in the west, with its counterpart of Brahmin ascendancy, to consolidate itself along local lines.²⁸ Village life, when not completely disrupted by dynastic feuds, seemed to indicate a growth in the strength of Brahminical Hinduism.²⁹ Various Rajahs were beginning, however, to invite Moslems as scholars and as traders into their kingdoms to trade and to compete for religious paramountcy with the Brahmins. The strength of Hinduism, during this period of Rajput dominance, seemed to be growing in competition with Islam rather than diminishing. Village assemblies and union of village assemblies flourished, exercising considerable power over their own affairs, building temples and giving no visible evidence of weakening before the onslaught of the new faith.³⁰ There is a clue, however, in this activity as to who might align themselves with Moslem power once it should overcome a local dominant Rajput Rajah, for forced labor (in the construction of temples, in irrigation works or in building roads) was seriously disaffected.³¹

Mahmud made his permanent residence, and with it the seat of power, at Ghazni. To him India was still a treasure house of wealth and slaves. His death, in 1030, meant that his harass-

sing attacks and the expansion of his strong dynastic empire, of another faith, was no longer in the way of a consolidation of the Rajputs in the region between the Indus and Ganges rivers. The Rajputs of Ajmir, of Delhi, particularly of Kanouj, fell almost immediately to fighting for paramount place among the states then existent in central India³² It is important to note the warring pattern here, a pattern that repeated itself constantly in Indian history. It is known that the Rajput kingdoms acknowledged familial and tribal lines cutting across their rivalries and feuds Rajput concepts of chivalry, of the duties and treatment of women,³³ of the importance of Brahmin Hinduism in the life of the country, grew in strength in the area during the 150 years that an active Moslem power was missing from the sub-continent Mahmud of Ghazni may indeed have destroyed the last vestiges of the strength of the Buddhists in Sind and of the Jains in Gujerat³⁴ but because he did not, at the same time, push the faith of the prophet too strenuously into his conquests, he allowed a consolidation of Hinduism. When caste stability is dealt with, remembering it to have been sanctioned by a revived Hindu religious faith,³⁵ the period of Hindu consolidation, aided by Moslem pressure, in the life of Hindustan is of vital import.³⁶

In 1175 Mohammed of Ghor, who also kept his court in Afghanistan, determined to reconquer India.³⁷ With this end in view he invaded Gujerat. In this province the Rajput Rajahs had so recovered their strength that in three years of constant war Mohammed of Ghori did not succeed in completely smashing them.³⁸ In 1187, continuing his wars, Ghori occupied the Punjab. The drive into the Punjab and consolidation of the province by Mohammed so stirred the feudal Rajahs that, in 1191, all the Hindu kingdoms of the north formed a war confederacy and made a stand at Talawari. The Moslems were defeated and the tide toward con-

quest was temporarily stemmed. This battle marks the high water point of Rajput and Brahmin ascendancy in medieval India.³⁹

Even in victory, however the defects of the increased role of Brahmin Hinduism and the renewed emphasis on caste were evident in the fighting operations. Certain castes, for example, would not fight alongside of others, nor were they expected to.⁴⁰ Only a relative few were combatants in the full sense of the word.⁴¹ The Moslems had no such impediments and all men fought as equals. Their resiliency allowed Ghor to return, within the year, to defeat decisively a huge army of Rajputs at the second battle of Talawari. Whereas the Rajputs were crushed as a dynastic and political force the effects of their religious and social system were, nonetheless, augmented and proliferated by the elimination of the competing forces of Buddhism and Jainism. This was especially marked when, in 1197, one of Mohammed Ghor's generals conquered Bihar and destroyed the last seat of Buddhism in northern India.⁴² In sacking Buddhist libraries and in annihilating thousands of Buddhist monks, he created a religious vacuum in Bihar and in Bengal which the Hindus filled. Thus he strengthened Hinduism's religious hold on the area while weakening its political hold.

Mohammed Ghor, like Mahmud Ghazni, made his home in Afghanistan but, unlike Ghazni, he considered India an integral part of the Empire. Mahmud had appointed, as viceroy of the Punjab, an Hindu slave, Tilak, again testifying to the almost meteoric rise a man might make once conversion had taken place.⁴³ Upon the assassination of Mohammed in 1206 by an Isma'ili fanatic, Qutub-ud-Din, the first Sultan of Delhi, It is with the Ilburi dynasty and sporadic nature between power began. The Moslems in India,⁴⁴ to stay and ;

the first Sultan of Delhi, acts of a more than cursoria and the ruling Moslems in India, some were as to take booty

contact with Indian life and their influence on it dates from this time.⁴⁵

The Delhi Sultans, ⁴⁶ according to the work of Ibn Hasan, had "an affinity for the people" including non-believers as well as members of the faith.⁴⁷ They determined, almost from the beginning, to rule in all of Hindustan, the area between the Indus and the Bramaputra rivers, with a uniform system of government and a uniform set of laws.⁴⁸ Their attempts to carry out this ideal meant, perforce, the smashing of all the local kingdoms and the substitution of Moslem governors.⁴⁹ The smashing of political and dynastic power was, however, all that they wanted to achieve for "no effort was made by any of the early Muslim dynasty or monarch to establish *direct* contact between the crown and the people."⁵⁰ Little seemed to be happening, therefore, that would influence all aspects of the social structure. The social institutions set and/or promulgated by the Rajas tended to continue to exist. The continuance of institutions, however, *did not mean* that caste patterns, which had been but relatively recently established by the ascendancy of the Brahmins, were to remain static or intact. In fact, the impact of the Moslem conquest caused a whole new series of caste changes and made movement between castes exceedingly fluid.⁵¹ Rajahs were being created out of successful merchants or peasants as older Rajahs and other families fell upon hard times.⁵² According to Baden-Powell, ". . . when the Rajas came into conflict with the Muhammadan power, and were dispossessed or reduced to subordinate positions, we find cases where they raised money by selling 'births' (land grants) . . . Exactly the same thing happened when powerful families settled in the villages, raised their position, either with the Raja's tacit consent, or merely by usurpation."⁵³ It seems paradoxical, but it is nonetheless historically accurate to state, that while the physical area of Hindu religious penetration had in-

creased, the strength of its caste-bound principles had diminished ⁵⁴

The attitudes of the ruling Moslem group toward upper castes were completely different from their attitudes toward lower and median castes ⁵⁵ They realized that stability was a factor which led to ease of governing They also recognized that a great many of their own nobility had a history and a tradition which was younger than the nobility which they had conquered. Partly out of their desire to enlist the support of Rajahs and old nobility and partly out of a desire to associate themselves with "very old nobility" the Moslem upper echelon (nobility and officers of high rank) began to take wives from the ranks of conquered Rajput groups ⁵⁶ These wives, coming out of a tradition of relative equality between the sexes, were generally firm believers in the efficacy of their Hindu faith They served to minimize, therefore, the strength of the Moslem beliefs of their husbands while, at the same time, holding on to their own They became the factor for devitalizing one of the drives toward conversion in the upper classes ⁵⁷

Lower classes and castes, particularly in the villages, were in a completely different position, as regards conversion, from that of the upper classes. They could accept the new conquerors in the same light as their old Rajahs and philosophically tighten their belts against a tighter squeeze on the common grain heap or they could accept the many advantages (particularly in the form of remittance from taxation) that being a member of the new faith entailed These appendages to a religion, already attractive on its own, served to swerve a great many individuals, as well as whole segments of villages, into the Islamic faith Conversion in the north, unlike that found in the south, was aimed at the lower echelons of society and huge groups of these, in contrast

to individual noble conversions, accepted the faith⁵⁸ Although acceptance of Islam by any villages or villager did not necessarily mean physical separation (ofttimes a village was divided into a Moslem and a Hindu *tarf* (section)), it did mean almost immediate psychological separation, especially as the Moslem half rose in power in relation to its Hindu counterpart Elphinstone noted this fact when he observed. "it is possible that among the Burdoorarscs any *Mussulman* would assume a superiority over a Hindu of equal rank"⁵⁹

The clue to the changes in social structure taking place among the villagers is shown once again by L S S O'Malley who points out that the impetus to conversion was not so much in knowing the content of Moslem law or creed as in accommodating oneself to the realities of Moslem power.⁶⁰ Baden-Powell points out that by the time of the Moghul impact,⁶¹ the strongest element of Moslems in agriculture were the ". . . tribes and families already settled Jat, Gujar, Rajput, and others *who adopted the Moslem creed*. But neither the original Mohammedan invaders . . . nor the local converts, though often fiercely religious, had any knowledge of Mohammedan law."⁶² Since Muslim law, in vogue in India, was Hanafi law, which forbids acceptance of the testimony of an unbeliever against a member of the Faith, land litigation would be settled by default in favor of a member of the Moslem creed.⁶³

The drive toward converting the villagers and lower classes within urban centers, although successful in certain areas, was impeded by the fact that the Delhi Sultans were, for the most part, themselves indifferent Moslems. They felt an irresistible attraction toward Union with the nobility of the conquered area. Consequently while Ala-ud-Din was on the one hand aiding and abetting the breakdown of caste laws and caste patterns in the

villages, he was marrying a Hindu queen and aligning himself with Rajput nobility against members of his own retinue. The King, in fact, surrounded himself with Hindus newly converted to Islam, a factor in government that was to become vastly more important under the Moghuls⁶⁴ These favorites of his were at odds with the Afghan followers of the other Delhi Sultans Ala-ud-Din's daughter married a converted Hindu, Malik Kufur, while another Hindu convert led the Hindu revolt against the Crown in 1316. Wheeler states that Nasir-ud-Din Khusraw was proclaimed Sultan "under a Mohammedan name and slaughtered every male of the royal house while his *Hindu* followers set up idols in the Mosques and seated themselves on Koreans"⁶⁵ Whether this version of the revolts in Delhi, in 1316, is fanciful or not, the arrival of the Tughlaks made them the saviors of Islam.

Impetus to the dismemberment of caste patterns in the villages was slowed down by an extraneous series of events. By the time of Ala-ud-Din, Moslem Moghuls who had until then been on the frontiers of the empire began to penetrate into the Indus-Ganges region. Antipathy between Afghan and Moghul Muslims caused the Pathans to line up with the Hindu element in opposition to their co-religionists. Ala-ud-Din so detested these "new Muslims" that, under the flimsiest of pretexts, he had 40,000 killed in retaliation for a conspiracy to usurp the power of the Crown⁶⁶ We see, therefore, that mutual antipathy between Moslems caused the convertive forces to slow down.

The House of Tughlaq, coming to power on the heels of a Moslemized-Hindu revolt in Delhi were ardent Muslims. Muhammad Ibn Tughlaq was a learned but highly impractical person. His reforms were well conceived but they ignored the psychology of the people. He was ruthless in implementing his

reforms without any consideration for the feelings of the people the result was widespread disaffection and then open rebellion. Ultimately the administrative machinery broke down. Pressed by his financial difficulties which were enhanced by a famine in the area around Delhi, he encouraged speculative farming by Hindu and Moslem alike. The farmers could be Hindus *of any caste*, with predetermined revenue contracts.

All of these forces together: the movement of major administrative centers, the grinding down of the independent chiefs, the missionary attempts at conversion while, at the same time, trying to build a feeling of unity between Hindu and Moslem against Moghul, the turning over of hundreds of villages for revenue contracts,⁶⁷ resulted in an inevitable chaos in the social system.⁶⁸ Anarchy in turn, of course from the religious point of view, relieved the pressure on the chieftans and the nobles. Nobility, in particular, began to reassert itself in the old feudalistic pattern of local stability, within a circumspect area, based largely upon new emergent caste-class patterns reflecting the shifting of religious, economic and dynastic loyalties.⁶⁹

THE MOGHULS IN RELIGION

The Moghuls, coming into the sub-continent from a tradition of Mohammedanism that had, as its immediate precursor, the naturalistic worship of the Mongol steppes with its democratic character, were indifferent Moslems at the beginning.⁷⁰ It is during the reign of these "indifferent Moslems" that the integral strength of a great many Hindu villages, in their reliance on the sanctions encompassed in their beliefs, broke down. This was due to many factors, varying in different parts of the empire

All the factors, however, reflected one central theme, abandonment of these sanctions for an attempt to synthesize the caste-oriented Hindu beliefs to the casteless Moslem ones⁷¹ As early Moghuls were independent religious thinkers such a synthesis could, without doubt, be attempted. There were varying movements, particularly in Bengal, that caught the imagination of millions of believers in both the Hindu and the Moslem fold⁷² One of these movements culminated in Guru Nanuk's Sikhism while another manifested itself as the divine faith, the Dīn Ilahī, of Akbar the Great It is only with the passing of Akbar and the re-emergence of the orthodoxy of Shah Jahan and Aurengzeb that the vitality of these movements seems, in an obvious way, to have been sapped⁷³ Their influences, however, particularly in Bengal, so altered the religious pattern of Hinduism that it would not be historically accurate to say that either Hinduism or Islam remained the same after their occurrence.

The Moghuls inherited, from the Delhi Sultans, their religious policies The Moghuls did not levy jizya for the greater part of their rule, it was abolished by Akbar in the beginning of his reign in 1575 and was reimposed by Aurengzeb in 1678 Under Akbar attempts at synthesis were already apparent Bengal, for example, which was cut into small segments in which the domains of a Hindu chief ruling Hindus and a Mohammedan chief ruling Moslems and Hindus, reflected graphically this breakdown of caste separateness.⁷⁴ In this province the Bhakti movement flowered. Its salient characteristic was the use of provincial languages, understood by both Hindu and Moslem, to discuss religion and brotherhood⁷⁵ The most famous saint of the time, Chaitanya, a Hindu, was preaching to vast multitudes, not conversion in either direction but synthesis *under one casteless faith*.⁷⁶ The strength of these movements and their influences on

caste dominated rural and urban centers was such that "We are told that the Mohammedan ruler of Gaur on hearing of the multitudes who flocked round Chaitanya as his disciples declared that he is truly an apostle whom crowds follow of their own accord impelled by no selfish considerations. Hence let Kazis and Mohammedans practice no hostility toward the Vaishnavas. Let Chaitanya teach and preach whatever he likes. Let him have the perfect *liberty of proselytizing*"⁷⁷

Commencing with the reign of Akbar, the push toward conversion was slowed considerably but the pull toward it was strengthened. It is probably axiomatic that suppression strengthens beliefs that, once weekly held, become enormously important when attacked. We have no truly accurate records but I venture to guess that the sixteenth century religious revolution that swept all of India, manifesting itself in the Bhakti, Sikh, Divine Faith and other provincial religious movements, was due to the very spirit of tolerance that had come to prevail.⁷⁸

Movements were afoot, among the Moslems as well, to purge Islam of its orthodoxy in order to attract more followers to the faith. Some of these movements found great numbers of adherents in new Hindu converts and in the old Moslem communities.⁷⁹

Not all of the movements were successful but even those that were failures, notably Kibir's attempted rapprochement between Islam and Vedanta, paved the way for successful movements based on cautions learned from their mistakes.⁸⁰

As evidence of the approach to synthesis we even have spill over into the purely administrative aspects of government, for Akbar's closest advisor, Rajah Todar Mal, caused a revolution in the relationship of Hindus to government, and hence in their relative status, by "compelling Hindus to learn Persian," so

qualifying his countrymen for more responsible employment under a Mohammedan government.⁸¹

The administrative aspect of Akbar's government that most affected Hindus in their religious beliefs was the remission, in the eighth year of his reign, of the Karmi (tax on pilgrims) ⁸² Abul Fazl⁸³ points out that this suppressive measure, which had only served to strengthen in-caste ties and weaken attempts that had previously been made at religious rapprochement, was "an old and standing custom for rulers of Hindustan to exact contributions according to their respective means from the pilgrims who visited holy shrines. This tax was considered in his majesty's judgment inequity and exactment and he condemned and remitted it" ⁸⁴ The process of allowing free worship, while at the same time encouraging a rapprochement between the egalitarian faith of Islam and the Manu-based principles of Hinduism, was once again followed in the ninth year when the Jizya (poll tax on infidels) was remitted ⁸⁵ Land was also made available, without regard to faith, to scholars falling into four classes ⁸⁶

- 1 Inquirers after wisdom who have withdrawn from worldly occupation
- 2 Such as practice self-denial and have withdrawn from the world of man.
- 3 The poor and physically weak.
4. Those of gentle family and of gentle birth.

All four of these categories were particularly designed to help Hindu ascetics and those Brahmins who, due to the policy of land exploitation and conquest, might have lost their subsistence. Criminal law became standardized to cover, in the same provisions, Moslems and Hindus alike ⁸⁷

The synthesizing tendencies of the sixteenth century reached

their climax and were perhaps epitomized by the emergence of Akbar's faith, Din Ilahi, with Akbar as its spiritual fountainhead.⁸⁸ Other authorities saw it in this way, "Akbar by a bold stroke converted a communal theocracy which the Islamic state was into a *Universal National Theocracy*."⁸⁹

RELIGIOUS RAPPROACHMENT

There has been a tendency for historians to deprecate the importance of Akbar's synthesizing faith because of the shortness of its duration and the relative paucity of its adherents.⁹⁰ I think, however, that its emergence is highly symptomatic of the tendency of the time, even in remote areas of northern India, and as such it is a very significant and important development.⁹¹ Akbar's long cherished project, a religion of universal adherence without the encumbrances of caste, was avowed publicly for the first time in 1582.⁹² Akbar is quoted as saying, "For an Empire ruled by one head it was a bad thing to have the members divided among themselves and at variance with one another . . . We ought, therefore, to bring them all into one, but in such a fashion that they should be both 'one' and 'all'; with the great advantage of not losing what is good in any one religion, while gaining whatever is better in another. In that way, honor would be rendered to God, peace would be given to the peoples, and security to the Empire."⁹³ An official account of Din Ilahi is given by Fazl in his *Ain-I-Akbari*, in which he explains the Emperor's right to paramountcy in religion by his very status as Emperor. He maintained that people "will naturally look to their King, on account of the high position which he occupies . . . independent of men, the ray of divine wisdom, which banishes from his heart everything that

is conflicting. A King will therefore sometimes observe the harmony in a multitude of things, or sometimes, reversely, a multitude of things in that which is apparently one, for he sits on the throne of distinction and is thus equally removed from joy and sorrow.”⁹⁴ This rather poetic estimate, notwithstanding, it shows us the strength of those elements of the faith derived from Hinduism and which played an increasingly greater role during the fifty years of Akbar’s reign. Law, based upon these precepts, soon applied over a wider stretch of India than any time since Asoka.⁹⁵ The new law so based began to affect village as well as urban India. Part of this new law is alleged by some writers to have held:

- a. No new mosques were to be built. No old ones were to be repaired.
- b. Slaughter of cows was forbidden and became a capital offense.
- c. Abstinence from meat for more than one hundred days a year was commended.
- d. Beards were to be shaved.
- e. Gold and silk dresses were to be obligatory at public prayers. (This worked to the detriment of Muslims, who are expressly forbidden to wear these things at prayer.)
- f. The fast of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca were forbidden.
- g. Suttee was prohibited.
- h. Child marriage was prohibited.

The rather sweeping nature of these changes, affecting both Hindus and Moslems, coupled with the reorganization of land taking place under Rajah Todar Mal’s directive, served to erase a great

many differences between Hindu and Moslem and made the transition from one to the other easier. The peaks of differences that had heretofore divided villages into separate segments based on religion alone, i.e., those which had been converted and those which had not, leveled enormously. Mobility in this sense, even though it might have meant a return to some of the aspects of the traditional Hindu caste behavior, was enormously enlarged. The oscillation of this movement served to stratify new converts in such a way that they resembled the old life patterns from which they had come.⁹⁶ Resemblance, however, is always but a fragment of the original caste structured picture. It broke, by the very idea of conversion, the monopoly that caste had enjoyed for the multitudes that followed it.

The rapprochement that started with Akbar's religious reforms affected all the other aspects of life. Sir Herbert Risley reported that "almost everywhere in India a tendency has been observed on the part of converts from Hinduism to group themselves according to the castes to which they originally belonged."⁹⁷ If this were true in Moghul times, theoretically it should have brought about a twofold division in society, between clean and unclean people, in which rapprochement and similarity of behavior would have existed between structured Hindus and quasi-caste structured new Moslems. As such the synthesizing tendencies, in Akbar's reforms, would have been the means by which Moslem social change would have lost much of its egalitarian dynamism to Hindu staticness. That this is not true⁹⁸ is almost immediately apparent in Risley's own observations when he noted that "traditional caste names should follow occupation but it is shown that 80% of the Ahirs of Bihar are engaged in agriculture, that of Bengal Brahmins only 17% and of Bihar Brahmins only 8% are engaged in religious functions, that not more than 8% of the

Chamars in Bihar live by working leather and that 2/3 of the Kayasths in Bengal are agriculturalists"⁹⁹ It becomes apparent, therefore, that even people who retained old caste names were now no longer acting in old caste ways and that the static hold of an ascribed life had largely begun to fall away¹⁰⁰

The synthesizing tendency in religion also manifested itself in the creation, with the active encouragement of the Crown, of groups whose position could be raised by marriage outside the caste system. One example was the newly emerged Khas of Nepal, who came to claim a higher status *within* the caste system even though they were offsprings of mixed marriages. Their mixture from *outside* the traditional system should have lowered their prestige. But the Khas, the result of interbreeding between Mongol women and Brahmin men, implied a dynamic reversal of the usual course by which the conqueror takes women from among the conquered while reserving his own for himself¹⁰¹

The bridge in religion that Akbar attempted to establish showed such strength that a contemporary of his son, Jahangir, reports eye witness accounts of Hindus and Moslems attending local saints' shrines together, saints that were of either of the two faiths¹⁰² Bernier reported that during the times of an eclipse, Moslems would give alms to Brahmins in propitiation of Hindu Gods¹⁰³ Hindus, too, had so relaxed some of the basic strictures of caste that "another man, Malapant, who was married to a low caste girl, whose caste was not discovered till after the marriage and the husband did not abandon her"¹⁰⁴ In the changing social pattern we must remember that influences on people who did not change their religion were, nonetheless, profound. This is particularly true, as the example points out, if cross-caste marriages were now allowed. Permissive attitudes toward behavior do not mean, of necessity, general social acceptance (and certainly it is

not claimed that all of urban and rural India was partaking in cross-caste marriages) but they do mean that an avenue had been opened through which escape from, or mitigation of, conditions arising from ascribed caste behavior was now possible.¹⁰⁵

The profound changes that occurred when an individual or a village, partially or in toto, accepted the faith of the Prophet were somewhat mitigated by the synthesizing tendencies of the sixteenth century.¹⁰⁶ It is as though once having swung the pendulum from Hinduism to Islam, the return swing went only part of the way to restoring the original scheme of things. Once again, I maintain that this see-saw pattern is indicative of fluid and class oriented societies. The neo-Muslims of Bihar, for example, tended to group themselves into a number of quasi-castes claiming varying degrees of status.¹⁰⁷ Even in their attempt to re-establish some grounds for achieved status, however, we see the dynamism of change in conversion. Among the Naysa in North Bengal individuals *considered themselves* as Ajlaf or low-caste while these same converted Naysa in East Bengal now considered themselves upper class individuals.¹⁰⁸ Many low caste converts, coming from villages whose basis of life was agriculture, began to consider it degrading to do menial work or to work with the plow.¹⁰⁹ They aped, in this way the *nomminative status* of the Brahmins, showing that psychologically they had risen through the whole caste system, from the bottom to the top.¹¹⁰ The strength of belief in the ability of one to alter life's chances, via the path of conversion, is graphically illustrated by an old proverb: "last year I was a Joloha,¹¹¹ now I am a Shekh,¹¹² next year if prices should rise I shall become a Saiyad."¹¹³ The cynicism of this proverb indictaes changes which had taken place in the formally structured system. Factors of economics, were now considered to have precedence over ancestrally-derived status.¹¹⁴

- The difference in the pattern of urban-rural religious development was never so apparent as during the period of rapprochement coeval with Akbar.¹¹⁵ The cities were now, more than ever before, the center of Moghul administrative power. They were not only the focus of a new emphasis upon state production but the areas in which saints, such as Chaitanya and Kibir had preached. For peasants flocking into the urban centers, the very act of moving into an area in which many different types of people lived eating new, perhaps forbidden food, marrying women outside of the framework of the village, meant an alteration of tradition and a growth of iconoclasm. It follows, then, that ideals found in the synthesis in religion and in the amalgamation with the Moghul powers were very appealing. Among the members of the lower echelons in the cities, therefore, a revolution was already taking place in which caste, although still playing an important role, lost its dominant position in determining the life of the individual ¹¹⁶ We can gather, from all the evidence, that lower caste Hindus, Hindus turned Moslem, Hindus turned Sikh, Hindus turned Divine Monotheists, lower class Moslems, were all living side by side in the town¹¹⁷ and often participating in ceremonies that were, theoretically, outside the realm of their belief. The division of society into strata based solely upon religion, such as had occurred in the rural areas, seemed to be missing in the urban centers. In fact, we find numerous references in the work of both Bernier and Manucci and others, to stories of sexual contact between Moslems and Hindus, male and female, on both sides ¹¹⁸

Among the upper classes in the urban centers, particularly those having relations with the Crown, synthesis, whether real or feigned, seemed to have taken hold dramatically. Caste principles were bridged constantly, particularly as regards marriage, since Moghul noblemen favored Kashmiri women and Akbar favored

the Rajputs as a group ¹¹⁹

Hindus were pressed into the service of the Crown both as Hindus and as new-Muslims. When Akbar espoused his Divine Monotheism both Moslems and Hindus signed oaths joining the new and imperially favored creed ¹²⁰ This does not imply that defections from Hinduism and Mohammedanism were total but the bounds separating the two were lessened considerably. Among upper caste Hindus, in theory the fountainhead of religion, caste strictures began to be taken less seriously with the resultant mixing of families via marriage, economic union and cross-caste relations

Abul Fazl stresses the pull the court had on all classes. In a list of 1,000 names of performers at the court many names of Hindus are to be found with the title Khan added, indicating that an artist at a Mohammedan court often found it convenient and profitable to conform or convert to Islam ¹²¹ This list does not include women ¹²²

The pull of the throne, with the obvious advantages of being part of the power center, was not as strong during Akbar's time as before or after him ¹²³ The tendency for synthesis in religion so imbued this period that upper class status, with the exception of the time of divine monotheism, was dependent on factors other than religion. There were no particular losses in status, therefore, if upper caste Hindus remained nominally Hindus, not fanatic in their adherence to their faith. There was added status as families or individuals became more intimately involved with the throne but, prestige and honor were still accorded to old Hindu nobility and upper caste families even in their relationships with Moslems. Lower castes and nobility in the urban centers, although gravitating toward the power source, nonetheless, did not materially alter their status as compared to the altered status of new Moslems in the rural centers,

THE VILLAGES: RELIGIOUS DETERIORATION

The rural centers, upon whom Rajah Todar Mal's land reassessment and payment in money fell most heavily, were less pulled than pushed to alter their faith. The attitude of all the Sultans prior to Akbar had split numerous villages into two dissident factions: Hindus and New Moslems. Evidence from sources such as Elphinstone, Manucci and Nikitin¹²⁴ shows that new Moslems were considering themselves on a level higher than the caste out of which they stemmed.¹²⁵ Since traditional village life has less of the innate dynamism than that which characterizes an urban center, the shock on old patterns of life of a division within a village, oftentimes within a family, must have been enormous. The synthesizing tendencies of the sixteenth century, therefore, found many villages, which had been leaning toward or converted to Islam, attempting to re-intrench older ideals.¹²⁶ The transition to a stage in which either of the faiths could be mutually reconcilable was, therefore, not as simple as in the town. Forces other than religion, primarily ideas involved with social status, were involved.¹²⁷ Chatterji, for example, tells us about elephant and bullock keepers¹²⁸ who, doing the exact same work in the same village, would have nothing to do with one another. In fact, groups of new Moslems considered themselves superior to the Hindus with whom they worked.¹²⁹ The evidence, however, that religious change in the villages was due more to conviction than to expediency seems rather strong. There would seem to be no particular reason, certainly during Akbar's time, for a non-religious village to split on the basis of anything but conviction. Paradoxically then, urban-rural relations, instead of increasing in mutual understanding, decreased enormously.¹³⁰ Urban Hindus and Moslems witnessed an increased rapproche-

ment in their religious life while, at the same time, villagers were leaving one faith to take up the convictions of another one. The villages were to suffer less, therefore, when following Akbar, the Moghul Crown returned with a vehemence and a vengeance to religious bigotry and anti-Hinduism of the strictest type.¹³¹ It was this transition, from the reign of Akbar to Jahangir, Shan Jehan and Aurengzeb, that caused observers such as Bernier to remark that the "Musselman treat Hindus in the towns and in the paraganas much the same as Turks treat Christians in their realms"¹³²

The cities of Akbar's time resembled the cities of ancient India for, they were the focus of a great religious drive. Their relationship to the village, however, was much closer at this time than the ancient Hindu city, which was mainly coastal. The Moselm and Moghul placed his city in the center of the country, amidst thousands of villages, as the administrative center. It is, therefore, the merger of these two foci, administrative and religious, plus the physical position of the city itself, which so affected village life. The ancient Hindu cities and the cities of British India, coastally located and aloof from their hinterland, could not play the similar role altering the social structure of villages as did the Moghul cities.¹³³

Once again, it must be emphasized, with the death of Akbar, the city lost half of its focus and returned to being primarily an administrative center. The administrative center might, by law or force of law, impinge itself on the religious life of the village¹³⁴ but the drive and direction emanating from the urban center, from Delhi to Gaur, was now gone. The social structure of the village, therefore, having begun to alter under the tolerant and benevolent stimulus of Akbar changed again to conform to the orthodoxy of the later Moghuls.¹³⁵ The important aspect of

Akbar's reign in encouraging religious equality, however, had so strongly caught the imagination of the urban mind that even orthodox monarchs like Shah Jehan and Aurengzeb encouraged¹³⁶ some dissidents to preach.¹³⁷

The religious rapprochement and possibilities for mobility became more difficult after the death of Akbar. The return to orthodox beliefs in Islam, while aiding the villagers who were still in the process of change to Islam, raised barriers against greater assimilation between the Muslims and the Hindus. Hindus who were in the process of visibly rising out of one specific caste into another or into a quasi-caste under Islam, (because when Aurengzeb reimposed the jizya the income of higher bracket non-Muslims was taxed) either because they were the new median productive groups or newly converted (like the weavers), had now to hide both their income and their faith¹³⁸ Villagers and those groups within the cities who were the new working force in the Moghul sponsored workshops were not sought as converts. As the same time Hinduism, as a faith, was both encouraged (as a means to increased taxation) and discouraged. Under Aurengzeb, Peter Mundy reports that "his majesty, the defender of the faith, gave orders that in Benares and throughout his domains in every place, all temples that had been begun¹³⁹ should be cast down. It was now (1032 A H) reported from Allahabad that 76 temples had been destroyed in the district of Benares alone"¹⁴⁰ The injunction of Akbar that widow remarriage be encouraged among Hindus was revoked, as was the suggestion that marriage take place only after the age of puberty. It is obvious that those aspects of Hinduism which are socially negative and destructive were encouraged while the faith, as an instrument of life, was discouraged. When Aurengzeb found that his orders regarding the reinforcement of jizya were not being imple-

mented he ordered the removal of Hindu officers from positions where they could neutralize his orders. The injunction, however, could not be enforced and Hindus continued to be employed.¹⁴¹ In a quote from the contemporary Bakhtawor Khan's *Mir-at-I'alam* we note that "Hindu writers have been entirely excluded from holding public offices, and all the worshipping places of the infidels and the great temples of those infamous people have been thrown down and destroyed in a manner which excites astonishment at the successful completion of so difficult a task."¹⁴² This, however, is an exaggeration because Aurengzeb's administration was not so efficient

The pull toward conversion in the villages under Akbar, stemming from seeming conviction, was altered by the fluctuation of cesses which returned with less efficient government and continued under the later Moghuls.¹⁴³ Lack of stability in the knowledge of how much taxation would be due made conditions in the villages, conditions which had stabilized under Akbar, utterly chaotic.¹⁴⁴ The return to their old religion, or at least as much of it as was possible, became a need of a return to stability for a great many newly converted villagers. We note, therefore, that poorer converts return to necromancy, worship of relics, and ascetism while the month of Ramadan begins to resemble Hindu festival days.¹⁴⁵ The way back to orthodox Hinduism and with it the re-emergence of the old caste system is impossible, even were it now to have been consciously desired. Hinduism had itself been transformed and showed this markedly with the death of Sanskrit learning and the emergence, under Tulsī Das and Vaishnor, of a religious and secular literature in Hindu and Bengali.¹⁴⁶ The destruction of religious centers under the Moghuls under Aurangzeb, seems to have contributed toward vernacularizing and secularizing the ancient religions.¹⁴⁷ It becomes appar-

ent that, even before the reinstitution of discriminatory taxation on Hindus, the policies of Akbar plus the dynamism of the religious synthesis of the time had already altered Hinduism and Islam. Clearly any status system, whether dynamic or static, would have to alter to fit in with the new order of things. With the reintroduction of taxation based, to a large degree on religion, the status pattern was once again to feel new shocks.

Under Akbar taxes on religion, as I have noted, were remitted. Aurengzeg revived the poll tax. He stopped the taxes on bathing and pilgrimages.¹⁴⁸ Elliot and Dawson maintain that taxes were now collected according to Moslem law in accordance with which the Moslems were exempted from the payment of certain taxes. Fairs at times of Hindu holidays, a source of religious and secular satisfaction for a generally stultifying existence in the village, were banned.¹⁴⁹ Along with the ban on annual fairs, the ban on sacred pilgrimages to Muslim and Hindu saints' shrines was reintroduced. In 1669 Aurengzeb ordered all the provincial governors to destroy the new temples and schools of the Brahmins in the villages and in the cities, that had been built without permission while, in the edict of 1695, sumptuary laws were enacted to the effect "that all Hindus except Rajputs were forbidden to carry arms, ride elephants, palkis or Arab and Persian horses."¹⁵⁰ Customs duties on trade were doubled for Hindu merchants. The villages, which had enjoyed relative stability under Akbar, even while some were in a transitory religious stage, were once again caught in the vortex of forces that pushed toward conversion. The answer of the villages, however, was not the same as before. The synthesizing tolerance of an Akbar and a century of mild religious pressure had led villages and urban areas of Hindu strength to expect better treatment from the Crown. The reaction saw a stiffening of attitudes and a resurgence of

Hinduism as a religious force throughout the hinterland. Whole groups of depressed peoples, from whom the basic converts to Islam in the villages had stemmed, began to flee to the forests (which were so vast at the time that William Finch noted extensive tracts of jungle in his trips from Jaunpur to Allahabad).¹⁵¹ These groups began to reassemble as distinct entities which returned to Hinduism. In his history of the Sikhs,¹⁵² a group which represents the successful synthesis of the religious forces of the century, Cunningham notes that "among the forest tribes the influence of the Brahmins continues to increase and every Bhil or Ghond or Kholee who acquires a little money desires to be *thought a Hindu*."¹⁵³

The situation in villages so deteriorated that the two tarfs or sections could no longer live in amicable relations with one another.¹⁵⁴ Hindus remaining in a two-religion village who had turned Moslems were now despised by their former co-religionists.¹⁵⁵ Manucci stated that "the Hindus who turn Mohammedan are the worst of all. They are ordinarily the most insolent, the greatest talkers and held in no consideration."¹⁵⁶ In the light of this argument it was noted that even the incipient Hindu middle class in the urban centers oppressed the Hindu village. "The greatest oppressors under Musselman rule have been, not always the rulers, but the Hindu Bania Diwans and the petty officials they employed."¹⁵⁷ The situation deteriorated greatly during the period of anarchy, when the policies of rapacious governments forced the peasant into the hands of the equally rapacious moneylender and crop speculator. The status of the Hindu ryot, while the country was increasing in wealth¹⁵⁸ and in cultivable land, was deteriorating at such a rapid rate that the Indian peasantry sank into the gravest poverty of any era. European observers all seemed unanimous in noting poverty as the only thing discerni-

ble in Agra and Lahore (Salbank),¹⁵⁹ in the Deccan (Nikitin),¹⁶⁰ in Surat (Jourdain)¹⁶¹ and throughout the Ganges plains (Manucci and Bernier). The deterioration in stability of the whole fabric of human relations both on an intra-village level and between government and village was paralleled by a similar one in the Hindu cities. In Benares, Manucci observed, "eight thousand horses are kept as the peasantry of the region are much inclined to revolt."¹⁶² He went on to say that roads between cities and villages were completely unsafe to travel due to lawless *classes of people*. When the Crown granted land to new faujdars it made them compensate anyone who was robbed while traveling the areas under their supervision, a policy which only led to a further breakdown in existing human relations between villages and the Crown for "often these faujdars committed excessive acts of aggression and oppression *which caused rebellion*. Everyone is killed that is met with and wives and sons and daughters and cattle are carried off."¹⁶³ Revolts stemming from the peasantry and from lawless classes (forest aboriginals as well as fleeing peasantry) began in earnest. In 1669 Mathura and Agra broke out in simultaneous revolts and were crushed with ruthless efficiency. The Mundias, who had rioted near Narnol in 1672, were slaughtered almost in toto.¹⁶⁴ The revolts of peasantry, in themselves not completely new phenomena, led in their intensity to revolts among princely states, as well as among the hill tribes of lower Sind. These revolts were based upon religious grounds rather than secular ones¹⁶⁵ The deterioration of internal conditions reached their apogee during the anarchy, of the lesser Moghuls although during the time of Aurengzeb rumbles of discontent were to be heard in the chaotic social order in Rajputana and in Gujerat, areas which swarmed with peasantry, uprooted and turned bandit.¹⁶⁶

CHAPTER XIV

The Status of Women

WHAT emerges from an over-all view of the history of religion in Moslem-Moghul India is a period of fluctuations in conversion. Fluctuations that reflect the attitude of the Crown to the people and the attitude of the people toward their old institutions. The emergent pattern shows that, until the time of the later Moghuls, changes in villages and towns were often in direct proportion to the amount of emphasis put by the Muslims on conversion. The process was, perforce, both of push and of pull. It does not really matter, however, whether ryots pulled or were pushed toward conversion, for the very tendency meant a break with old institutions.

The period of conquest was preceded by some expeditions into Hindu areas. If institutional changes took place, whether

at the hands of individuals or by groups they were only the outward signs of an attempt to recreate some pattern of stability for future activity. With the coming of the Delhi Sultans, however, overt behavior received a tremendous impetus and the transition between some Indian and Moslem institutions became relatively easier. Some bigots doubted the sincerity of individuals who joined them and made it immeasurably difficult to live either as an opponent or as a co-religionist.¹ The early Moghuls returned to the liberal approach to conversion and augmented the pull of Islam with differential taxation and privilege law. It must be obvious, however, that religion alone could not play the sole role, or even religion coupled with economics, in the institutional behavior and change of the time. Religion, being the apparent means to differentiate between ruler and ruled, between mobility and immobility, was augmented by many factors. What has not been so striking is that religion, whether by the direct means of conversion or the indirect one of social proximity, caused a major revolution in the relationship between the sexes with a consequent tremendous downgrading of the whole status of women.² Loss of status and re-orientation of old caste concepts toward women was as great a phenomenon as the loss or gain in status between castes or classes. Whatever else happened to change the caste patterns of the village, whether in the direction of mobility or fixity, the relations of male to female, as well as the general attitude toward women, manifested a tremendous change. This change, reflecting the attitude of the Moslem urban classes toward women³ meant a loss in status that was pan-Indian, pan-caste and pan-class. It indicated, whether the family as a whole rose or dropped in the status pattern then emerging, that a female always lagged behind the male in climb, always fell faster in decline. This was a phenomenon completely new to

India and has been little commented upon. It was, perhaps by the impersonally diminishing status of a total group, one of the strongest factors operative in breaking down existing caste patterns.

In ancient India, as Professor Meyer and many others have pointed out,⁴ there were hard and fast rules covering the treatment that the sexes could expect from one another. These rules served to give women a status that was relatively high.⁵ In cities which served in ancient times as the centers for religious life the position of women was so important that in Vatsyanyanas Kamasutra we find references to Silpakarika (women practicing all the arts) and the idea that books were meant for women, "because it is especially they who receive a liberal education."⁶ In urban centers, particularly among upper caste women, we know that until the time of the coming of the Moslem and their institution of the Nahal (harem) and Purdah, women not only had social equality but wielded considerable political and dynastic authority.⁷ Among the Rajputs with their pattern of medieval chivalry, women were elevated in status to the point that perhaps was only paralleled in medieval France, with its romantic rondels and the conception of chivalric regard for women (nobility, that it).⁸

Within the villages of India the work pattern was so adjusted that the female not only had equality in the field but had domestic precedence in the home. Labor equality between the sexes in the villages was carried on until late in Moghul times and persists, in some forms, until today. Elphinstone reported that the "position of women among even the rudest tribes is such that they have a share in the work of the men out of doors but, in no part of the country are they employed as in India, where half the hired laborers in building are women and where there

is scarce any difference between the work done by the two sexes."⁹

Villagers shared in the common grain heap as a family unit, not as a unit composed of a dominant male who himself allotted grain to his females. A man was not considered complete until he had married. A girl's father had the "holy injunction" to see that she married and became the paramount woman in her own household.¹⁰ In certain areas of India, the status of women was so important that it took precedence over that of men.¹¹ Matla'u Sa'Dain¹² and Abd-er-Rezzak¹³ reported that parts of India were polyandrous and that descent, up to and including the ruling classes, was through the female line.

The coming of the Moslems into the urban centers had a more direct influence on the relations between the sexes in these areas of immediate contact than upon those in the villages. Urban Hindus of importance and rank began to emulate urban Moslems in their attitude toward women.¹⁴ This attitude, bolstered by the existence in urban Islam of the institution of Harem and Purdah, was a demeaning one to women.¹⁵ This does not imply that women did not wield considerable power in Moslem dynastic circles (as did the mother of Akbar and the wife of Shah Jehan) but that the attitude toward women in general had a sharp decline. Moslems not only brought with them the seclusion of women to be used as chattels and for pleasure, but introduced the concept of color in their choice of wives.¹⁶ The idea of choosing a lighter skinned female for a wife made a great impression on Hindu aristocracy and the emerging upper classes and persists, to a greater degree than is generally supposed, until today. Bernier noticed this attitude¹⁷ (as did Manucci):¹⁸ "it is from this country (Kashmir) that nearly every individual when first admitted to the court of the great Moghul selects wives or concubines so that his children can be *whiter* than the other Indians

and *pass* for genuine Moghul ”

Furthermore women were being impressed into harems from among non-Moslem groups. The harem, as an institution, depended upon the existence of a class of individuals opulent enough to support the expenses of such a menage. This limited the direct effect of the harem but the parallel institution, the *purdah*, did not need wealth and could be played with by anyone.¹⁹ The veiling and the societal exclusion that *purdah* forced upon females meant that their attempts to partake in any of the open activities they had heretofore enjoyed were now barred to them.²⁰ It is indicative of the state to which women in the upper-caste and upper class circles had sunk, when we find not a single female name among the entertainers listed by Abul Fazl in his chronicles. We need but contrast this list to the position of women, as individual enough to have won recognition,²¹ found at the courts of ancient India. The exclusion of women from the arts meant that the urban centers, instead of being a place where a female of talent could find expression, became towns in which females were being downgraded at the greatest possible rate.²²

Villages upon whom the *purdah* and harem institutions made less of an impress, because of lack of economic ability to keep these institutions alive,²³ nonetheless, reflected the total approach of their ruling classes to the value and worth of the female. Among the people being converted en masse (the Bhils, Gonds, Malis, Kharas), whether to Hinduism or Islam, the position of women diminished by the very act of conversion. Among individual converts within Hindu villages, the position of the female, if she followed her husband towards conversion, was precarious. It meant that she either had to give up her general family ties and to accept the creed of her husband or, else she

had to break up her family. Moreover, it is important to note that women decreased in importance in the new productive system brought on by the Moghuls. The state sponsored workshops were generally staffed by men as a labor force.²⁴ The diminishing idea of payment in kind also reflected this productive pattern.²⁵ Villages could not now take care of widows, unmarried older women and young unmarried women from the common grain heap.²⁶ Inasmuch as the Moghuls emphasized mass production (relative to seventeenth-century standards) in luxury industries, while demanding money payments by individuals instead of from the common grain heap, the unfamilied female had a most difficult time when she needed cash for any reason. The common village treasury inherent in one grain heap, which she had heretofore helped stock, no longer existed. With its decline the means for her sustenance also vanished. In this negative fashion, some women who had previously remained single in response to the demands of strict caste behavior, converted and attempted to marry again.²⁷ Risley attributes a good deal to this point in the growth of the number of Moslems in India. He indicates that, not only did widows remarry but that single girls who were pregnant, and who did want to abort (as Hindus wanted her to do) could change their religion and obtain from the ruling power, pressure on their lovers to marry them.²⁸ In either case, whether a female was thrown upon her own resources because of the non-existence of the grain heap or because she was forced by other circumstances to accept Islam, she found herself in a diminished position.

During the reigns of the Delhi Sultans, and continuing all through Moghul times, we remarked upon the flight to escape enslavement or taxation. Individuals or group who fled reflected unsettled conditions in the country that were chronic for

hundreds of years. We know that this flight was balanced by an emergence in which groups came out of the jungle. The unsettled conditions that caused this flight and return, affected the status of women as much, or perhaps more, than the other factors enumerated in this book. The laws that had been operative in settled conditions, based upon long recognized rights and obligations, had to give way to expediency in setting up new social units in the jungle or in the desert. The role of woman as the factor of stability and paramount member of her house, had to be graded downwards, for all relationship had to recognize the existence of a newly acquired physical mobility with social forms that this sort of mobility engendered. Even if the flight-emerge pattern lasted a relatively short period of time (in some groups it lasted for years) the status of the emergent women did not remain on a similar level vis-a-vis her emergent male counterpart. Once again, it was a case of diminishing status in which the whole group, having left their ancestral holdings, dropped in position with the female dropping much lower and much faster than the male.²⁹ The period of unsettled conditions and consequent effects upon status position and life can be summarized in Jahangir's own words³⁰. In his memoirs he noted

Gujerat (says Jahangir) is infested with thieves and vagabonds³¹. I have occasionally executed two or three hundred in one day, but I could not suppress the brigandage. From Gujerat I went to Agra, where I become reconciled to my eldest son Khuzru. I next went to Delhi, where I heard of a rebellion in Kanouj, and sent force to put it down. Thirty thousand rebels were slain, ten thousand heads sent to Delhi, ten thousand bodies were hung on trees with their heads downward along the several highways. Notwithstanding repeated massacres there are frequent rebellions in Hindustan. There is not a single province in the empire in which half a million people have not been slaught-

ered during my own reign and that of my father. Ever and anon some accursed miscreant springs up to unfurl the standard of rebellion. *In Hindustan there has never existed a period of complete repose.*

It is obvious that such large scale defections involved not only individual villages but whole tribal and caste populations. These defections served as but another facet in downgrading the female as a partner in the village and the urban scheme of things.

CHAPTER XV

Conclusions Applicable to Diachronic Research on Caste Instability

A CULTURAL anthropologist dealing with a highly complex society whose records of its past are fairly accessible and seemingly complete must, perforce, be aware of pitfalls that would not face him were he to deal with tribal population on a purely immediate level. Data that emerge from this study can be used in numerous ways, and may give numerous answers to former puzzles, but to me they must inevitably also raise three questions:

- 1 Do they bear out prior studies or do they invalidate empirically accepted data?¹
- 2 Do the concepts based on previously accepted data now still hold?²

3. Are any of the findings and conclusions from these finds useful, outside of the specific culture under research, in aiding possible formulation of social concepts and cultural dynamics applicable to other societies?³

We must also constantly be cognizant of the fact that, although these three questions are mutually compatible as ideals, each of them standing alone is of real value. Anyone of them may represent an attitude toward cultural dynamics, as well as be used by the scholar in ways he feels his particular science has best prepared him.

The gathering of empirical data, through the use of literature more than through field work, in the background of any complex society demands a different sort of an approach than was asked of the anthropologist in the past. He must be able to immerse himself, not only in the visible living dynamics of a culture but in a veritable sea of data, often nonsensical, erroneous and contradictory. He must be aware of the fact that any shallow diachronic approach, any forced comparisons based upon personal experience rather than historical imperative, may cause him to miss the one clue that gives substance to the whole. Finally, he must remember that he approaches data with a generally well defined idea of what he as an individual considers a philosophy of culture as well as methods of discerning culture processes.⁴

Although the search for empirical data is painstaking and long the task is almost ludicrously simple when compared to the use he must make of his findings. The anthropologist is now faced with the task of sorting, discarding and culling "facts" in order to arrive at the dynamism and interrelatedness of these elements, in terms of the light that they can cast on the internal workings of society. Here is where the break between him and

other inthropologists often takes place. "Facts" are many times used to validate previously constructed social laws⁵ The internal workings of society, the interrelatedness of its socio-cultural segments, the levels of integration of its disparate elements, the relative importance of its varying values; all tend to prove the orientation of the particular scholar was correct in its original assumptions. In so doing, the possibility emerges that the resultant study, while based upon such painstakingly gathered data, may just as easily be erroneous as correct. Popper, for example, in attacking cultural evolutionists, had this in mind. He asserted.

But we have already seen that the realm of facts is infinitely rich and that there must be a selection. . . They speak about a history of mankind, but what they mean and what we have learned about in school is the history of political power.

There is no history of mankind, there are only many histories of all kinds of aspects of human life⁶

Knowing, therefore, that our first two questions are fraught with dangers one would assume that the third of our questions would be approached cautiously with the restraint that we draw, perhaps, too many conclusions from similar data. We know, of course, that this does not happen. Not only do anthropologists, working with complex societies, begin to fit their findings into older philosophic dictums such as the Marxian, but they create new ones such as the culturological, the super-organic, the ideational and many more. All of these approaches are extrapolated from, and based upon, largely similar data. They generally tend to view culture as an impersonal historic process which makes or develops itself. Laws formulated or drawn from these philosophic stands tend to view complex societies as going through generally similar stages, although there is some room left for those socio-cultural

elements or patterns that are unique to one particular culture. Steward, while espousing this sort of an explanation (into cultural stages in his incipient agriculture, formative, fluorescent, cyclical conquest formulations),⁷ nonetheless, approaches the concept of "cultural law" with very great caution. Even while holding fast to his idea of stages he maintains:

By *proper* cross-cultural comparison it should be possible to formulate recurrent regularities in developmental processes and functional relationships. These regularities will rarely be universal social science laws. Instead, they will be *hypotheses* or formulations of cultural and social change which can be expected under precisely stipulated conditions.⁸

India, because of the complexity of its internal structure and the depth of its history, has tended to be used as a primary example for almost all of the formulations involved with social law. Furthermore, despite all the uses to which it has been put, all the authorities were struck with one characteristic that was unique and for which a place had to be found outside the realm of generalized social law: caste. In formulating developmental sequences for use on a worldwide basis, caste had, in the light of the three questions which I posed, either to be ignored or given a greater place in the scheme of things than it deserved. It is my contention, particularly in the light of this study, that the latter occurred.⁹ Indian social history (and the generalizations drawn from it), whether we are dealing with segments that are horizontal or vertical, while empirically correctly reported often tended to offer conclusions on the development of internal social order that were largely incorrect.¹⁰ It does not seem strange to me, therefore, that approaches to this complex culture resulted in the labeling of socio-cultural segments, by anthropologists as well as historians, as though they were the totality of the culture

Observers of Indian social structure, primarily European in orientation and origin, tended to see the relative staticity of specific village clusters as the reflection of an age-old caste immobility. They used the newly emergent coastal cities of European factory town origin as a means to contrast and compare dynamism on their own terms. They noted, given the blind spot¹¹ that some, otherwise objective, social historians seem to possess, that the already existent Bania trading classes or the Maharwari money-lenders were emerging as a new important middle class only as an addendum to the dynamism of European cities¹² They said that this was the first time in ages that anyone had a chance to advance on his own merit¹³ When these same historians were referred toward segments of Europe, whose own ethos had been change (certainly since the industrial revolution) and shown the relatively static peasant populations of Southern Italy, the Balkans, rural Poland, Norman France, rural Portugal and rural Spain, they answered that these represented parts of a whole rather than being a graphic presentation of the whole They could not somehow see, *and it is a disease that plagues observers of the Indian scene today*, that in labeling great groups of people like the Rajputs, the Bengalis, the Kashmiris, they were dealing with socio-cultural wholes, like the national states in Europe, made up of many segments They could not somehow see that in discussing great groups of people as distinctive, they were dealing, not with caste as a phenomenon, but with the history of quasi-national groups in which caste was but one part of the whole.¹⁴ Moreover, in dealing with caste, they failed to see that despite the continued existence of distinct quasi-national groupings, caste had changed in every group in ways that were different

There can be no doubt that Moghul India of the seventeenth century was in a much further advanced position, in terms of the emergence of a middle class, of the breakdown of caste-ties and

of an approach to large scale planned production than was the *aggregate* of the countries of Europe *at the same time*¹⁵ Its caste segments, as lasting factors,¹⁶ certainly existed in the villages as institutions of great importance but the ethos of the time, the physical conditions prevailing due to a change in emphasis of production, and the existence of Moghul urban administrative-religious-industrial centers, all were reflecting a new condition of things. These new conditions, revealing internal policies that affected the mass of rural and urban dwellers (often to their disadvantage) implied that a revolution of vast proportions had taken place in the totality of relationships between erstwhile caste segmented sections of the population. The tendency of Moghul power, even when its bigotry under Aurengzeb was eating at its very core, was to break down isolation between village and town, between caste and casteless, between Crown (central power) and province (local power). The attempt to level differences, not with any idea of amelioration or humanity but as a means to preserving power, is nowhere better illustrated than in the insistence of the Crown on free labor, a factor which the European powers, following the breakup of the Empire, returned to local Rajahs and Omrahs. This free labor served to employ, at any one time, over 13% of the total population in work assigned by the central power. The work placed the state directly in charge of the total life of the population for at least one-seventh of the year or percentages of this figure for the whole year. John Cooper estimated the contribution of the ryot to the state in this way. "It appears that the Indian ryot contributed an equivalent of 53 days labor yearly to the maintenance of institutions which so far as they afford him any security from oppression or in any way ameliorate his conditions might as well be swept deep into the Indian Ocean"¹⁷ Had the pattern of breakdown of old castes,

re-amalgamation into new groupings, only to break down again under further stress continued, the very dynamism of this sort of activity could have transformed not only socio-cultural segments or village groups but the whole fabric of life in India north of the Narbada River. Within the urban centers the existence of Moghul courts was attracting hundred of thousands of artisans who, added to the already existing core of urban trade guilds could have become the nucleus of a large middle class.¹⁸ This middle class, whose existence and growth in Europe has been paralleled by the break-up of quasi-caste and caste social structuring, could have continued to grow in power and in influence.

The coming of the European to the Moghul Empire,¹⁹ in the form of factory and new towns and cities was encouraged by the later Moghuls. Shah Jehan and his son Sultan Shuja (1652) allowed the British into Bengal in order to establish a factory town at Hooghly.²⁰ The growth to power of the British Raj is not the concern here but, as the economic positions of the Europeans (Dutch, Danes, French, Portuguese) increased, the economic position of the Moghuls and the court declined. The middle class that was already in existence, and the single industry villages that served the luxury needs of the courts at Lahore, Agra, Delhi and the other provincial capitals died as the need for their produce died. Jathar and Beri cite this fact as a cause for the beginnings of the return of whole urban populations to the villages of their origin, now to find themselves in diminished social positions as new serfs, often outside the pale of any form of the caste system. They stress the idea that the disappearance of the patronage of the courts and of the old nobility (due to the decline of Moghul urban centers) meant cessation of the main demand for products of handicrafts and hence the ruin of that industry too. For example, the prosperity of Bengal depended upon.

the existence of the great Moghul courts at Agra, Delhi and Lahore, "and with the break up of the Empire after the death of Aurengzeb the Bengal manufactures began to decline."²¹ This disappearance was paralleled in short order by the rise of the factory towns of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Ahmendabad, Nagpur and Jamshadpur—all non-Moghul—all with a new ethos.²²

Deterioration of the artisan and incipient middle classes meant an increase in the emergent pattern of serfdom. The loss of status that the word "serf" implies became common as the Empire broke up.²³ A great many of these serfs were shortly to leave the Zemindari estates to which they had flocked and to emerge as a completely new force; an urban proletariat without status and without any caste.²⁴ The force of old customs, rights and obligations, without meaning outside of their particular social and physical environments, began to give way to a life which tended to individualism and the breakdown of caste loyalties.

The movements of groups up and down (mostly down) on the ladder of urban social mobility found its parallel in development in great clusters of villages in the most rural parts of India. One striking difference is immediately apparent, the ability to rise in status by clearing virgin land was now gone. As serfdom increased the ideal of ownership in the first clearer of the land, that had been operative since ancient times, gave way to the concept that land was a possession of the Crown to be parcelled out to zemindari holders.²⁵ Zemindari holders themselves reflected a new social position. Again we must realize that mobility was working in two ways for newly emergent serfs completely downwards; for newly emergent land owners, an almost stratospheric rise in status. With the coming of the European this internal dynamic situation, subject to immediate change by the very nature of the process which had created it, was frozen in status quo.²⁶

Serfs flocking from the jungles, from the Moghul urban centers and from the bankrupt single industry villages, were now completely debased in social status. They were soon levelled to the point that caused Mukerjee to note, "The deterioration of the standard of living in the 19th century is especially marked by the reduction of use or even omission of cloths and blankets, butter, oil, salt and sugar" and to insist that "The economic condition of the common people in the 17th and 18th centuries was not depressed by overcrowding in agriculture."²⁷

The village, as an institution, despite the oft cited statement that it remained stable, completely changed and with it changed the individuals it had encompassed.²⁸ Corporate villages based upon an ancestral system of sharing, which had begun to become highly individualized from the time of Akbar, now tended to dissolution.²⁹ They were replaced by a physical heaping of individuals living in contiguous physical proximity rather than remaining social mechanisms with lives of their own. The growth of the moneylender during later Moghul times and his emergence, under the British, as the nucleus of a new type of middle class, reflects the breakdown of the restraints on individual action exercised by a vigorous village community.³⁰ Despite the fact that India remained predominantly a village-oriented society, the stability of the village and with it, the stability of the social relations of individuals within the caste-class pattern, was now precarious. The possibility, perhaps probability, of the destruction of social relations due to the increased emphasis on individual rural production was such that Benerjee could observe, "thus in spite of the residents, counsels and attempts to secure good government, the back of the state so to speak is broken. The spirit of indigenous political life is disrupted. The native community tends to dissolution."³¹ The forces operative in Moghul times, found

echoes in modern India during the worldwide depression of the 1930's. It is perhaps indicative of the trend that might have occurred, had not an extra-power force of non-Indian, non-Moghul origin impinged itself on the pattern of village life, when we note that the tempo of migration from village to city and the dissolution of independent village holders was attributed to three reasons.³²

1. Economic pressure on the villager to pay various cesses in cash.
2. The decay of village crafts.
3. The social disabilities of the outcasts. People who have lost status due to many reasons, the primary ones being the first two listed here.

The outcome has been, not the complete abandonment of the village, but the complete loss of vitality of the village as an institution in framing the social relationships of modern India.³³ This observable modern phenomenon parallels, except in the decay of village crafts,³⁴ almost exactly what occurred in the later Moghul period.

The urban centers of the Moghuls, by the very nature of their dynastic and productive aims, caused a new trading class to emerge as peripheral to the state's own production. The Banias of Gujerat, for example, emerged as money-lenders and merchants with a consequent stratospheric rise in social status. Various other merchant groups rose likewise, but the rise to prominence of such merchants in Moghul urban centers, and the potentialities for future social change inherent in their rise, was cut short by the competition of the East India Company, which caused a great many of them to give up trade and to invest in land.³⁵ The influx of urban merchants to the land further reduced the area of vitality of the village community.³⁶ ,

The competition and protection of industries by the Europeans that were far behind those of Moghul India (such as the cotton industry of Paisley and Manchester) doomed the cloth industries (calicos) of India³⁷ These industries, the direct result of a Moghul state emphasis which had drawn to the urban centers workers from villages all over central India, went into a dramatic decline Their decline forced workers to return to their villages (if they still existed as physical and social entities) or to become landless serfs The growth of serfdom which had been scarce during the early Moghul period (because of the rule of first clearer) received, therefore, a tremendous push³⁸

Deterioration of the Moghul cities was paralleled by deterioration of the still existing Hindu urban centers which, because they were coastal, suffered from competition by European fleets Whole groups of people, such as the Gujeratis, Malabaris, Kalingas, Bengalis (nominally the transporters of the goods produced by the inland Moghul cities) deteriorated In so doing they augmented the numbers of individuals in the European factory towns, then beginning to spring up, who became proletariat, all lumped into a single socio-cultural segment. This economic decline of Moghul India and the accompanying general decline of the indigenous social structure, with different possibilities for status achievement, was the outcome of Shan Jehan's invitation to Europe to penetrate India Mukerjee attributes this decline, not to the superiority of European productive methods, but to privileges granted to the newcomers by the Crown He states that "One may reckon the beginning of this economic decline from the middle of the 17th century when the Dutch (1655) and the English (1652) obtained from Shah Jehan exemptions from all tolls from Surat to all inland centers and from Hooghly, Pipili to Agra and Delhi and reduction of customs duties (1664), along

with other privileges that the nationals did not enjoy ' . . . ' '39 The patent blindness of the Moghul Crown to the fact that European trade carried with it desires, not only for profits but for dynastic control, can only be explained by saying that this type of penetration had not occurred before and that the nature of European intentions, were not understood by the Moghul. There can be no doubt that, at the same time that the Moghul cities diminished in importance, as their village communities disintegrated and reamalgamated in other areas with a loss of customary rights and privileges; the cities of Europe emerged into the full bloom of their industrial revolution. The rise of northwestern Europe as the industrial giant out of the beginnings of its commercial infancy can be laid, in some measure, to the decline of India as the commercial giant and to its present industrial infancy. Under the impact of the European, the dynamically emergent class structure that had witnessed whole villages, towns and areas within cities that devoted themselves to state production; had no choice or chance to keep expanding or altering their structure. Under the impact of the European, the dynamically emergent middle class of Lahore, Agra, Fathepur, Ahmendabad, Burenpur, Kashmir, with their imperial monopolies and shared profit set up, were smashed. With the arrival of the European the possibility of a breakdown of caste, as the prime factor in the social scene of Moghul India was gone only, symptomatically enough, to be reawakened as a new independent India emerged.

However fascinating conjecture is, in attempting to discuss the possible outcome of a dynamic historical process, to me it seems futile ⁴⁰ The facts remain, however, that before the Moghul dynasty had run its course, the Europeans did arrive in India and brought with them not only their commercial and political systems but some of their social concepts as well. Europeans:

soldiers, traders, scholars, tended to see, because of a verbalized stereotyped pattern of behavior, differences that were later to be described as ascribed status. They believed, wrongly, that caste was unbridgeable and unalterable. Later social historians, even those as excellent as Vincent Smith, Moreland and Risley, tended to accept the statements of earlier contemporary writers and used them to bolster their own theories about India during British and pre-British times. Benoy Kumar Sarkar points this out very strikingly and bitterly.⁴¹ He maintains that "the abnormalities supposed to inhere in the system of social groups are but myths invented by the ignorant Portuguese settlers of the 16th century who were struck by the *superficial distinctions* between their own life and that of the Hindus and *subsequently perpetuated by Orientalists . . .*"

If there were just a semantic difference between the meanings of the words class and caste, as applied to any society, then the writers working on the theme of India would have had every right to assign relativities of mobility and staticity. We know, however, that caste and class have within their meaning a whole paraphernalia of values that characterize the potentialities within society. In a purely scientific sense these possibilities, and the values they imply, must be recognized no matter what type of cultural milieu the observer grew up in.⁴² The particular pattern of egocentricity, therefore, of practically all the observers working on caste had so clouded their judgment that the dynamism, the enormous dynamism, of total social change that was prevalent in Moghul India has been missed. What we must realize is that the whole period of Moghul rule in India, from Babur through Aurengzeb, lasted less than 200 years and that, in all reality, it only began with Akbar's accession to the throne. All the vast changes in the Empire, stretching from Sind to Bengal, from

Kashmir to Hyderabad, took place in less than 165 years. These changes saw India emerging, at the time of Akbar, as the producer of goods for all of Asia. They saw her as the commercial colossus that absorbed all the gold from countries as far away as Japan. These changes bore witness to an India that was producing an ever increasing volume of food and cash crops that found their way all over southern and southeastern Asia. Moghul times beheld the emergence of a new type of city, as well as the construction of many new cities, with an ever increasing middle merchant class dependent on the Crown. It also saw the emergence of an artisan class that was different from the petty artisan-merchant in the cities of Hindu times or of the landless, rootless, proletariat that was to follow in the cities of the Raj.

From the time of Akbar to that of Aurengzeb, a period of only 164 years, village structure changed more than in the preceding 1,000 years. Villages, whether they lost their ryot individual holders, became absorbed as a part of a Zemindari estate or were destroyed and reamalgamated elsewhere, were nowhere similar to the basic village type that had existed prior to the coming of the Moghuls. The tremendous amount of emphasis placed by the Crown on individual worth had its echoes in the town but found its deepest soundings in the village. The corporate tendencies of the village bound by caste ties, itself a corporate entity, were rudely shaken and often shattered. The emergence of a money economy, from an age-old barter and payment-in-kind one, served to raise and depress vast numbers of people in the Empire. The emergence of this same sort of emphasis on individual action and effort, with rewards for success, was to serve as the fulcrum by which urban Europe (because there it was basically unchecked) threw off the shackles of medieval feudalism and its own tradition-bound social structure to emerge as

the colossus of the world. Individual emphasis allowed, although the force of long institutional behavior and usage mitigated against it, any ryot the chance to leave his station for a higher status. Emphasis on individual worth served to depress millions as new serfs and elevate thousands as new landlords. Whatever the outcome, whatever value judgment we place on the outcome, the principle of mobility, upward or drastically downward, was operative. Bengal and Bihar emerged, reflecting this tendency, as the home of the new vernacular languages, implying an increased recognition of the importance of local usage against religious, hence caste-bound, usage. Barber observed this major phenomenon in modern India, seemingly unaware of the fact that it had previously occurred during Moghul times. He maintains that, "because localism is an essential element of the Indian stratification system, *as it must be in any system where movement between the social classes is at a minimum*, (he seems to be equating class and caste here), *the decline of localism and the decline of the caste system have been occurring simultaneously in contemporary India.*"⁴³

The activity of the Moghul state as the industrial producer with its monopoly on some important parts of the productive mechanism, as well as the lure it held out for the villager, served to break down both the physical and social isolation that only urban living entails. A physical isolation and to a great extent a social one also, that seems to have been a product of medieval rather than of ancient India. The breakdown of the relative isolation between castes, and attempts at societal rapprochement among individuals, was effected in a dramatic way in religious life. Not since the time of the religious fervor. For all other changes, whether differences, as well

differences between religions. Moreover, the bridge was meant to span not only the gaps between dissimilar faiths but the gaps within faiths. Akbar epitomized the attempts at rapprochement by founding his own faith to which all could belong by *individual choice*. One might even call this individual choice by that appellation of dynamic class usage: achieved status. The concept of the ability to make individual choices that cross wholly separated social segments and, the acceptance of these crosses within the new groups into which they have arrived, is tantamount to admitting class relationships.⁴¹ These relationships are not the rise or fall of groups or individuals within a prescribed framework, in which shifting takes place only in the hierarchical ranking of a fixed order, but a series of new relationships in which the very order is altered, as well as the individuals encompassed in this order. Nominal persistence of older ideas concerning the order *does not mean the whole hierarchical set of rankings have not been altered*. On the contrary, as this book has tried to point out, not only did different individuals fit themselves into older nominal categories but these very categories changed in both function (drastically) and in meaning. In so doing they emerged, still bearing the now vestigial older names (Brahmin, etc.), as something completely new in function, in ideal, and in idea. The verbalized ideal behavior patterns as well as status patterns, were becoming dissimilar, during Moghul times, to the actualized "real" behavior and status patterns. These dichotomies of reals and ideals involved not only groups (an older form of mobility) changing from greater or lesser ritual purity, but *individuals* who left their caste to become "casteless" non-Hindus, and individuals who stayed in the caste system nominally "lower caste", but actually and functionally upper caste. Breakdowns in the very physical isolation of vast areas of the sub-continent,

an isolation which always serves to intensify and ingrain local differences of class and caste, were encouraged by the Moghuls. The area which they controlled was more vast and more uniformly governed than anything to be found in the sub-continent since 200 B C.⁴⁵

It is apparent that before Europe had shaken off the shackles which bound her urban population and which, in some measure still hold her rural population, India was already in the process of so doing. It is apparent that although the vast totality of societal relationships had not altered in Moghul times (the cultural lag between urban stimulus and rural acceptance was present here as elsewhere); the ethos behind these relationships had altered. An ethos which, had it been allowed to permeate the total social fabric, could have so altered the image of Indian life that, even those members of the caste system who most verbalized old patterns of belief would have recognized the new patterns of their actual behavior.

With the records of Moghul life so clear (even if not always easily obtainable), with the constant shifting of whole clusters of villages to different physical areas, with the emergence of new attitudes toward at least 50 per cent of the population (women), with the rise of new middle classes, with the suppression of whole groups of people, with the emphasis on individual achievement and individual production; it seems strange, indeed, that any scientist studying social structure in Moghul India should speak of human relations as primarily bound by caste. Perhaps the total concept involved with caste and class has no real application outside of a very particular frame of reference without being trapped by ethnocentric and long, wrongly-held concepts, involved with dynamism in society.⁴⁶

Indian social relations during Moghul times, between in-

dividuals and between groups of individuals, must be restudied and reinterpreted. They should give clues to the functioning of caste that would invalidate a great many studies on caste structure, in general, in India. They should give a great many clues to the validity, or lack of it, of caste concepts as they are used in sociological and anthropological studies, dealing with social structure and mobility, elsewhere!

Indian social relations during Moghul times were not in the doldrums of societal inertia but, were caught in a whirlwind of social change, a whirlwind never allowed, by one of the processes of history, to reap its due—good or bad!

Footnotes

CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION

1. Alfred L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (new edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1948), p. 750

2. Carleton S. Coon, *Reader in General Anthropology* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), p. 379

3. J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India* (Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press, 1946), p. 40. Italics my own

4. Pramathanath Banerjea, *A Study of Indian Economics* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1916), p. 50

5. Mountstuart Elphinstone, *The History of India* (London: John Murray, 1843), I, 123. Italics my own

6. Stanley Lane-Poole, *Medieval India under Mohammedan Rule* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903), pp. iv-v. Karl Marx held this same opinion, for he stated ". . . all the civil wars,

invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines, strongly complex, rapid and destructive as their successive action on Hindustan may appear, did not go deeper than its surface . . . Indian Society has no history at all—at least no known history” Karl Marx, *British Rule in India* (Sydney Modern Publishers, 1930), p 4.

7. For example: John Cooper, *The Three Presidencies of India* (London. Ingram Cooke & Co, 1853): “. . . throughout all the convolutions of India, the townships remained still the same.” W. H. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd, 1920), p 23, Banerjea, *op cit.*, p. 50; B H. Baden-Powell, *The Land Systems of British India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), I, 172. “Moghuls and Sikhs, we are told, are masters in turn, but the village remains the same” E. B. Havell, *The History of Aryan Rule in India* (London. George Harrap & Company, Ltd, 1918), p. 261.

8 Vincent A. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul* (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1917), p 385.

9. *Ibid*, p. 385.

10 Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, ed Joseph Campbell (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 28-31.

11. *Ibid.*, p 162.

12. B. H. Baden-Powell, *The Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India* (London. Swan Sonnenschein & Co, Ltd., 1899), p. 2, maintains that Sir Henry Maine, in postulating a single origin for villages, made just this sort of error

13 Coon, *op. cit.*, p 459. Coon holds that “the four main groups of caste divisions still obtain.”

14. Sir Herbert Risley, *The People of India* (2nd ed., Lon-

don. W Thacker & Co , 1915).

15 P. Senart, *Les Castes dans l'Inde* (Paris Ernest Lerous Publishers, 1896).

16 A M Hocart, *Caste* (London Methuen & Co , Ltd , 1950)

17 G S Ghurye, *Caste and Race in India* (London Kegan Paul & Co , 1932).

18 Oliver Cromwell Cox, *Caste, Class and Race* (Garden City Doubleday & Co , 1948).

19 Cox is directly contradicted by Benoy Kumar Sarker, *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes* (Shanghai The Commercial Press, Ltd , 1916), pp 205-206. ,

20 Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc , 1936), p 131

21. Karl A Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 8-9, holds this view He contends that Oriental civilizations, India included, saw no basic change in their social structure even after the advent of the European and industrial revolutions

22. Bernard Barber, *Social Stratification* (New York Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1957), p. 80.

23. Warner's classification is diagrammed in *Deep South*, Allison Davis, Burleigh B Gardner and Mary R Gardner (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1947), p 10.

24. The physical differences are, of course, the contrast between Negroid and Caucasoid types in the American South This

sort of difference did not seem to exist, except under very specific circumstances (see Chapter XIV, this paper) in India. It is obvious that the bar to mobility in having a physical characteristic which is considered inferior is always more stringent than having one that is considered culturally inferior (however deeply ingrained the cultural idea may be). In the former case change is impossible within the lifetime of the physical individual under consideration, in the latter case culture change is not only possible but highly probable.

25. Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 751; Linton, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

26. Nominal persistence of institutions long after they have lost any semblance of functional power can be seen elsewhere. Among Jews, for example, certain types of individuals, because they bear a specific name (equivalent to Brahmin) were given lip service and respect during holy days and rituals. Even among these groups, however, the name and the role were never the same. See also Margaret Mead, *Male and Female* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1949), pp. 90-91.

27. Hutton, *op. cit.*, p. 81. Italics my own.

28. Sarker, *op. cit.*, p. 205. Sarkar maintains that "such terms as Ksatriya, Brahmin have not meant the same thing in all ages." He also maintains that the bearers of these names in any age could be "the leading caste of one generation and the depressed caste of the next." See also, T.C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Society* (Calcutta. University of Calcutta Press, 1935), p. 77.

29. The poetry of Mukundaram is treated fully in D. C. Sen, *The History of Bengali Language and Literature* (Calcutta. University of Calcutta Press, 1911).

30. Zimmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 494-506, E. B. Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-198.

31. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, *The Folk Element in Hindu Culture* (London Longmans, Green & Co, 1917), pp 164-170.

32 Das Gupta, *op. cit*, p 200, H. G Rawlinson, *India, A Short Cultural History*, ed. C. G. Seligman (London. D. Appleton, Century Co, Inc., 1938), pp. 95-104; William Boulting, *Four Pilgrimages* (London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, Ltd. 1921), p. 27.

33. Das Gupta, *op cit*, p. 200.

34. McKim Marriot, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization," in *Village India*, ed. McKim Marriot (Menasha, Wis. The American Anthropological Association, June 1955), pp. 172-173. Italics my own.

35. *Ibid.* Italics my own. pp. 172-173

36 Marriot, *op cit.*, p 189. Italics my own

37. *Ibid*, p 189. Italics my own

38. *Ibid*, p. 188. Italics my own

39. *Ibid*, p. 187. Italics my own.

40. *Ibid*, p 173 Italics my own

41. Havell, *op cit.*, pp. 89-103.

42 Albert A. Trever, *History of Ancient Civilization* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), I, 65-68.

43 Rawlinson, *op. cit*, p 221.

44. Zimmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-29.

CHAPTER II — HISTORIC

1. References to South Indian-Arab trade are numerous. See Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1921), p. 11, E. J. Rapson, ed., *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, *Ancient India* (New York. The Macmillan Co., 1922), Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-179.

2. Tara Chand, *The Influence of Islam on Indian Culture* (Allahabad The Indian Press, Ltd., 1946), p. 30 Agathacides lived in the second century A.D.

3. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-38, 43. See also Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, pp 198-200; W. H. Moreland and A. Chandra Chatterjee, *A Short History of India* (4th ed.; London Longmans, Green & Company, 1957), p. 134.

5. Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, p 4.

6. Richard Henry Major, *India in the Fifteenth Century* (London. The Hakluyt Society, 1857), pp. xiv, xxvii, xv Also see Boulting, "The Narrative of Ibn Batuta," *op cit.*

7. The attitudes of the Hindu Rajahs towards the merchants may not have been reported without bias since our main sources are the writings of Masudi and Ibn Haukal. Major, *op. cit.*, pp 3-7

8. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 44, Sir Henry M. Elliot, *The Mohammedan Period*, Vol. V. *The History of India* (London. The Grolier Society Pub, 1903), V, 88, Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

9. Northern India is to be delineated, for purposes of this study, as that area which is bounded on the south by the Narbada,

on the east by Assam, on the west by Baluchistan and on the north by Kashmir (not to include Kashmir).

10 David Price, *Mohammedan History from Persian Sources* (London, 1821), II, 224-277.

11. Mohammed Ibn Kasim was sent to India during the time of Caliph Walid and the date is again open to conjecture. The 708 A.D. date is after Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, and R. C. Majumdar, *The Arab Invasion of India*, Dacca University Supplement, Bulletin XV (Madras, 1931).

12 The Buddhists who had enjoyed paramountcy in India during the time reported in the travels of I-Tsing in the seventh century were completely on the way out as the dominant faith by the eighth century. When Al-Baruni visited in the eleventh century, Buddhism was almost completely gone from the sub-continent (with the notable exception of Bengal). Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-124. Also see B. K. Sarkar, *Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes*, pp. 164-166.

13. Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. Poole also maintained that an Arab army had pillaged Tana (near modern Bombay) as early as 637 A.D. but that this was not an army imbued with the religious zeal of Ibn Kasim's army.

14 There are many accounts concerning Ibn Kasim's death. See E. J. Rapson, ed., *The Cambridge History of India*, III, 7, Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, II, 517.

15 The Empire of the Omayyads. Price, *op. cit.*, II, has a particularly good chronological sequence of the step-by-step conquest of Sindh and Multan.

16. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

17 I am of the opinion that what the word *Rajput* came to

mean and what it has meant throughout history is completely different. The Rajput clans of the eighth century referred to by most historians are certainly not the same as those who met the Gupta invaders nor those which are so prevalent in the historico-religious legends and literature of India. This would be an example of a persisting nomenclature without any real reference to the individuals or groups who filtered in and out of the nomenclature designation. These new people were undoubtedly related to invaders that, since early times, had been filtering in from Central Asia. One such group, added to the Rajput tribal confederacy were the White Huns. The accretion of conquering groups, large and small, seems to have been a constant process—all attaining, because they were warriors, Rajput status and Rajput nobility. See James Tod, *The Annals and Antiquities of Rajastan* (London. G. Routledge & Sons, Ltd, 1914); Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 130, Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101, Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 9; Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 440-446, Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 176, Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-201.

18 Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

19. Hasmukh D. Sankalia, *The University of Nalanda* (Madras B G Paul & Co, 1934), p. 207.

20. Rawlinsonson, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

21 Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 127

22. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 212.

23. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

24 Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 214 (between 800 A.D. and 1300 A.D.).

25. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 186

produced some other, less abhorrent (religiously) product even though they were relatively unskilled at its production. The specific item itself had to be of such a type that it carried intrinsic prestige. Then gradation of skill would enter into the picture. Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.

35. According to Redfield, comparisons between attitudes toward basic items of production is valid. He feels that a change in status of an individual or of a group may occur when the item of production is changed or when it remains the same but is produced for a more important consuming group. As such, it gives clues to alterations in status of the group involved with its use. Robert Redfield, *The Folk Cultures of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 361.

36. Professor Kroeber has often stated that this is generally true of most culture phenomenon. He maintains that the size of the participating unit has a direct bearing on the richness of the culture and the possibilities for change and further growth. Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

37. Radhakumud Mookerji, *Harsha*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 173.

38. Sethi, R. R., Saran, P. and Bhandar, D R. *The March of Indian History* (Chandni Chowk, Delhi: Ranjit Printers and Publishers, 1951), p. 296.

39. Mookerji, *op. cit.*, Preface. Mookerji speaks of Bana's reporting of the life and times of Harsha thus: "His early life and career from the subject matter of the Harsha-charita of Bana, a writer of great repute in the history of classical Sanskrit, who wrote on Harsha as his court poet from his personal and intimate knowledge of his life and rule, and has given to Sanskrit liter-

4. Sankalia, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

5. Rapson, ed., *Cambridge History of India*, III, 164.

6. Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 408-409.

7. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

8. The Hindu idea of monarchy, based on the Mahabharata and the Laws of Manu, was essentially that it is a world of little fish (kings) being swallowed up by greater ones. The idea was similar in type to the one of the Moslems, which held that there is no equality with monarchy but that one central power or head rules a group of kings or kingdoms of subordinates.

9. An institution in which the king showed himself to the people at daybreak at which time he was enjoined to listen to grievances of all types of people. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 383.

10. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

11. Qureshi, I. H., *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, (4th Edition, Karachi 1958, Chapter XI).

12. Barani, *Fatawa-i-Tahandari*, India Office Library, London ms. 1.0.1149, f. 120.

13. Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi*, Calcutta 1862, p. 216.

14. Professor Qureshi noted, "by the reign of Mohammed ibn Tughlaq the Hindu gentry had again attained a status which excited jealousy." Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi* (Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. Sh. Mohammed Ashraf, 1942), p. 195. Italics my own.

15. Price, *op. cit.*, III, 251.

16. W. H. Moreland *The Agrarian System of Moslem India* (London W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd, 1929), p. 48. "Not long afterwards, the King carried out his plan of transferring the capital to Deogarh in the Deccan, and in the year 1329 Delhi was evacuated by practically the entire population. The economic effect of this measure on the peasants in the River Country can be readily understood from a study of Alauddin's (sic) regulations. Delhi was the one large market for the surplus produce of the country, and when that market was summarily abolished, there would be no object in raising produce which could not be sold, in other words, cultivation must have been curtailed, and the revenue correspondingly reduced." Also, see Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

17. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

18. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

19. Sir H. M. Elliot and John Dawson, *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians* (London Trubner & Co., 1873), VI, 239

20. Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, chap. v. Poole deals with this phase at great length in order to show that the struggle for power in the Central Provinces was most always between Moslems rather than between Hindus and Moslems. See also Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 233

21. T. C. Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

22. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 308

23. The sentimental ties are emphasized by all of those who have written about Rajput clans. Tod, *op. cit.*, has stories about

sons of old Rajahs as carrying on the traditional behavior, in regard to the grain heap, as their fathers.

24. Rapson, ed., *Cambridge History of India*, III, 107; Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-229.

25. Lanc-Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

26. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 185. "There can be little doubt that there was a natural desire on the part of the Sultans to increase their power even *in the outlying provinces*; in spite of the setbacks received owing to the weakness of the successors of Iltutmish and to dynastic revolutions, centralization steadily increased until it reached its climax in the earlier part of Muhammed bin Tughlaq's reign." Italics my own.

27. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 47.

28. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, 140.

29. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 47. Note also Professor Kroeber's idea that the introduction of economic relationships as paramount over personal ones marks the break between a monoclasse or caste village and another type. Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

30. Edward Thomas, *The Pathan Kings of Delhi* (London, 1871), p. 12.

31. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 346: ". . . the province of Candesh has 3837 villages of which 1079 are now uninhabited because of fleeing peasantry."

32. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 157; O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

33. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 5. Also see the Edict of Sher Shah, p. 75.

34 *Ibid.*

35. As quoted by Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p 236

36 L F. Rushbrook, *An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century* (Allahabad Williams, Longmans, Green & Co , 1918), p 10.

37. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp 55-65; Rapson, ed., *Cambridge History of India*, III, 174, Lane-Poole, *op cit* , p. 149.

38 Assignments, called *iqta* by earlier Muslim rulers and *jagirs* by the Moghuls were a form of payment to government officials in lieu of their salary. They were increased with promotions, changed on transfers from one locality to another on the dismissal, retirement or death of the officer. For a full discussion of the system, see (among others) Price, *op. cit* , Vols. I, II, III.

39 Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 56

40 Most of the troops used by the Delhi Sultans and the Moghuls were Indians Jadunath Sarkar, *Studies in Moghul India* (London Longmans, Green & Co , 1920), p 20.

41 Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p 72, Rapson, ed , *Cambridge History of India*, III, 77.

42 Rapson, ed , *Cambridge History of India*, III, 90, Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p 28

43 The Jagirdar served as the link in the horizontal series of ties between rural and urban areas He belonged to none of the vertical parts of any community outside of the urban area and

most often was represented by a village member, directly within the vertical structure of the village, in his dealing with any village. Concepts after Julian H. Steward, "Levels of Sociocultural Integration: An Operational Concept," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* (1951), No. 7, pp. 374-390

44. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 65 "The Monarch arrived in India in 1399 and may be said to have found Hindustan a garden and left it a desert."

45. Mohammedan cities were warring upon one another and Hindu princes were beginning to come back to power. "Tarikh-I-Hafiz Abru," In Elliot and Dawson, ed., *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, IV, 22 (hereafter cited as "Tarikh-I-Hafiz Abru") "In consequence of the contention among the Musulman for the throne, the Hindu infidels gathered strength and gave up paying the poll tax and tribute. They moreover threatened the Mohammedan towns."

46. As quoted by Rushbrook, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

CHAPTER IV — THE MOGHULS

1. Babur was a descendant of Taimur through Chaghata'i Khan who had settled down among Turks. His descendants had become Turks in almost every respect and looked upon themselves as Turks. Babur called himself a Turk, however, his mother was a Mongol noblewoman. See *The Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge Eng The University Press, 1937), IV (ed. Sir Richard Burn), 1; Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

2 The Moghul dynasty is generally said to begin with

Babur and end with Aurengzeb. Although Aurengzeb was followed by other Moghuls, the central state was already dismembered. The Moghuls following Aurengzeb are referred to as "lesser Moghuls." The succession was as follows:

- | | | |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 1 | Babur | (1526-1530). |
| 2 | Humayan | (1530-1556). |
| 3. | Akbar | (1555-1605). |
| 4. | Jehangir | (1605-1627). |
| 5. | Shah Jehan | (1627-1658). |
| 6. | Aurengzeb | (1658-1707). |

3. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 10.

4. Rawlinson, *op. cit.* pp. 206-209.

5. "Tuzak-I-Barbari," in Elliot and Dawson, ed., *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, IV (hereafter cited as "Tuzak-I-Barbari").

6. Quoted by Vincent A. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

7. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 425. This is only one instance of the high status of females in Rajput clans. The Rani commanded troops after her husband refused to do so. See Tod, *op. cit.*, for the particular circumstances involved with the battle of Chitor. Also see E. Denison Ross, "Babur," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 10.

8. Price, *op. cit.*, p. 694. Secondar Lodi so detested the Moghuls that he fought on the side of the Hindus against his co-religionists.

9. "Tuzak-I-Barbari," p. 221.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

11. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, 157; Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 190; B.K. Sarkar, *Chinese Religion Through Indian Eyes*, p. 205; Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 308.

12. Reports from Delact, Bernier, Manucci, Fitch, Purchas, Terry, Roe, Manrique, Herbert, Mandelslo, Nikitin.

13. Elliot and Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

14. Ross, "Babur," *op. cit.*, IV, 14.

15. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

16. The distinction is made deliberately because it is my contention that as early as Babur's time a *new class of Hindus* were arising who also owed their present status to imperial favor. This class, as distinct from older upper caste Hindus, had arrived at their status by a process of uniting their armies with those of the conqueror rather than as the recipient of respect by the conqueror because they had previously been upper caste, now defeated. See Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, 151.

17. W. H. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 459.

18. Jadunath Sarkar, "Aurengzig," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 240-242. Also see Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 344 and Elliot and Dawson, *op. cit.*, VII, 296.

19 D Pant, *The Commercial policy of the Moghuls* (Bombay D B. Taraparevala & Sons, 1930), p. 95.

20 According to the laws of Manu. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 447, and O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p. 10, maintain that the classic pattern never existed. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 34, talks about *class mixture* in early times and B. K. Sarkar, *Chinese Re-*

ligion Through Hindu Eyes, p. 205 says that groups were formally elastic.

21 Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, figured on the basis of 1914 French estimates for draft purposes. Using proportion of 1 soldier for every 32 draftable males, Moreland notes that Deccan and Vijayanagar put 1,000,000 men in the field. Population of these two areas approximately 35,000,000. The population of the west Ganges plain was like that of today. South and west Punjab were sparsely populated as were the east Ganges plains but the western portion of U.P. during Moghul times contained 3/4 of the amount of people found there in the census of 1920. In Doab there existed 8/10 of the population of 1920 and in Rohilkhand 7/10 of the population of 1920 (pp 12-14, 21). See also Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1951).

22. Banerjea, *op. cit*, p. 29. "The population for the most part lived in villages. Even now (1916) only 9.5% of the people are found in towns of 5000 persons each" See also Edward Thomas, *Revenue Sources of the Moghul Empire* (London. Trubner, 1871), p 7, estimates the population in this way. "At present time (1593 A.D.) Hindustan contains 3,200 towns including 120 large cities and 500,000 villages."

23 B H Baden-Powell, *The Indian Village Community* (Oxford Longmans, Green & Co, 1896,) p 348. In reality there were eight distinct types in special combinations of these basic types. See also Banerjea, *op cit*, pp. 50-103, and Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp 162-172.

24 This is a general term which has no connotation as to the utility or fertility of the land in question but refers to its

ownership. Waste implied that ownership had not, as yet, been directly invested in anyone individual or any group. This concept of waste differs diametrically from fallow land not used at the present moment but held in reserve by the community in the past and which has, at one time or another, been in use. Waste land generally meant that the jungle that surrounded the village was included. This jungle might house people who used this waste as a means of sustaining life. The implication of the term, then, had absolutely nothing to do with the fact of occupancy of the land, since depressed groups might in fact be using it.

25 The proper authorities always seemed to be the people in power. See Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 12, n. 1.

26. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 273, and O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

27. O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

28. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, quotes Thevenot on migratory workers near Ahmadabad.

29. Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

30. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 21.

31 Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

32. The headman had many names all, however, implying the same function. Some are Patwari, Patel, Mandel, Peddi.

33. O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p. 108, claims that the Panchayat can also be found in some Ryotwari villages.

34 Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 299.

35 H. S. Chatterji, *An Introduction to Indian Economics*

(Calcutta: S. K. Lahiri & Co., 1917), p. 116.

36. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, 337.

37. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53.

38. The general tendency was to allow the old landlord to keep his old house, part of the land previously assigned to it, and his old titles. The casual observer was often led to believe that the status of this man had not changed. This was only true in terms of his visible status but was completely false in terms of his actual status. The family of a dispossessed landlord would almost certainly revert to the level of the general peasant in the estate with the death of the individual in whom headmanship had been vested. B. H. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 207.

39. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 22.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 22. It is important to note here that in a situation such as this, two physically exact villages would be completely different in their social structure. One, the landlord-absentee village, would have all its members in a secondary social role, while in the other, all the new cultivators would have a paramount place in the village.

41. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 137, and Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 144.

42. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 204.

43. Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-15.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35, 37. This is a disputed point, for Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 69, quotes Megasthenes as saying that all

land belonged to the Rajah. He therefore disagrees with all of those who say that land was the Ryots and only taxation on land was the Rajah's.

45 Commonly assessed at 1/6 of the grain heap. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 453.

46 Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

47. Quoted by Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 204.

48. O'Malley contradicts this contention See above, p. 62,
n 4

49. *Ibid*, p. 201. "It may not be out of place to add that in the movements and turmoils of the Rajput disruption occasioned by the Moslem invasions—and probably it has been so at all times—a great number of local chieftainships have been established *in a very informal way*, and ruled without any attempt to adopt what I have described as the more regular features of the Hindu monarchy. We find small parties of Rajputs settling down in a place and establishing a rude kind of 'barony'." Italics my own

50. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 64-65.

51. Jean Baptiste Tavernier, *Travels in India*, trans. V. Ball (London Macmillan and Company, 1889), I and II. Thomas Twining, as reported by L. S. S O'Malley, *Modern India and the West* (London Oxford University Press, 1941), p 29, describes Delhi in 1794 as a "desert amidst forest filled with wild animals."

52. Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Moghul Empire*, trans. Irving Brock (London: William Pickering, 1846), and *ibid.*, Constable trans.

53. Niccolao Manucci (1653), *Storia do Megoi*, trans William Irvin (London: John Murray, 1906) (hereafter cited as Manucci, Irvine trans.), and Niccolae Manouchi, *History of the Mogul Dynasty*, trans. Francois Catrou (London: J. M. Richardson, 1916) (hereafter cited as Manouchi, Catrou trans.).

54 De Laet, *De imperio magni mogolis*, 1631, trans for Haklyut (Leydon: Elzevir, 1631).

55. One such mention, among numerous others, is in the hunting taking place in the "Tarik-I-Hafiz Abru," p. 14.

56. Jadunath Sarkar, *Moghul Administration* (Patna: Patna University Press, 1920), p 79.

57. Moreland and Chattarjee, *op cit.*, p 180

58 Tavernier, *op. cit.*, I, 391.

59. Bernier, Constable trans , pp 204-205.

60. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp 114-148, maintains, quoting from Bernier, that it was not natural disasters but severe administration that caused the peasants to abscond. Even under the best administrators of the Moghul period, natural disasters like droughts, floods and famines resulted in large scale migrations of the peasantry as well as town dwellers This movement of the peasantry was noticed by European travelers

61 Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 4.

62. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 207.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 223-225.

64. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 463.

65. W. H. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb* (London Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1923), p. 253.

66. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 456.

67. For example, the Agarwals, the Mahalwar groups, including the Singhanias. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A.D.* (Calcutta. The University of Calcutta 1914), pp. 74-75.

68. Coinage was played with considerably and it fluctuated, usually to the impoverishment of borrowers, at a fixed rate of interest. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 388, and Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234

69. Tavernier, *op. cit.*, I, 25.

70. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 178.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

72. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

73. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 136.

74. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 457.

75. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, pp. 108-109.

76. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

77. Radhakamal Mukerjee, *The Economic History of India*

(Allahabad: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd.), pp. 32-35 See also Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 190

78 This attempt at optimum land production is graphically illustrated in the "Tarik-I-Badauni," in Elliot and Dawson, ed, *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, V, 513 (hereafter cited as 'Munt'akak-Fawarikh') We note: " . all the paraganas of the country, whether dry or irrigated, whether in the towns or the hills, in deserts or in jungles, by rivers, reservoirs or wells, were all to be measured and every such piece of land as, upon cultivation, would produce of Krori or of Tankas was to be divided off, and placed under the charge of an officer to be called Krori, who was to be selected for his trustworthiness, whether known or unknown to revenue clerk or treasurers . . . so that in the course of three years *all the uncultivated land* might be brought into cultivation and the public treasury might be replenished." Italics my own. The policy of the Delhi Sultanate was, in this respect, similar to the one perpetuated by the Moghuls for, "the whole agrarian policy of the Sultanate was directed toward increasing the cultivation, peasants were a precious *possession* who could, if oppressed, find new homes in neighborhoods territories or tributary states where they would be welcomed." Qureshi, *op cit*, p 193 Italics my own

79 Mukerjee, *op cit*, p 11, and Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed Burn), 469.

80 Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p 233, and Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed Burn), 466.

81 Mukerjee, *op cit*, p 10.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

83. Smith, *Akbar the Great Moghul*, pp. 400-401.

84. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 144.

85. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

86. Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 1, Tables II, III.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

88. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 99.

89. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 99; Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 469; Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 60, Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp. xii, 17; Rapson, ed, *Cambridge History of India*, III, 107, and Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

90. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 100.

91. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Bernier, Constable trans., p. 225.

92. Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-276.

93. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 223.

94. During the Sayyad Dynasty (Lodis) officers tried to inherit their Jagirs. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 68.

95. J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p. 165.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 175; Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*,

p. 257.

97. Manucci, Irvine trans , III, 46-47.

98. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p 257.

99. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 472.

100. Kashinath G Warty, *Under the Great Moghuls* (Madras: G. Natesant & Co , 1928), p. 16; Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 449.

101. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 471-472.

102. J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p 84.

CHAPTER V — PEASANT RELATIONS TO LAND

1. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p 400; Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 8.

2. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 295; Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, 128-129.

3. Lane-Poole, *Medieval India under Mohammedan Rule*, p 111, Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p 190.

4. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit* , p. 228.

5. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p 10.

6. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 451.

7. Vincent A. Smith, *The Early History of India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), p 287. The share was generally 1/6 of the grain heap. Also see Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p 426

8. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 15.

9 *Ibid* , p. 82.

10 Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 207.

11. B. H. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India* (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 138.

12 The circumstances were always determined by the waste-lands available "Tarik-I-Badauni," p. 522

13. Marriot, working on a synchronic level while assuming diachronic facts, seems to have come to the same conclusions. He postulates that "The contrasts and changes that are evident in the relations of village and state in modern India raise the suspicion that even older 'orthogenetic' land administration in northern India may have been a result of deliberate governmental policy *coming down from the top*, as much as it was a result of indigenous growth upward from little communities." Marriot, *op cit.*, p 183. Italics my own.

14 Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 12. This particularly noxious system disregarded completely the human element involved in crop production and concentrated solely on the use of land. It could, and did, deteriorate to the point where the same piece

of land was owned in gradation by five or more pledgees, each pledged to recover a greater yield from the soil. At the base of this superficial productive structure was the actual peasant producer. The value of expected yield had, therefore, no relationship to the productive capacity of the land. Some individuals had to be crushed and diminished in status when it came time to pay off in coin on the expected yield which had been contracted for. See also Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 139

15 Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 94.

16. "Tarik-I-Badauni," p. 522. See also Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 129

17. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 104

18 Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. xii. "The fact that in the Moghul period the State disposed of from a third to a half of the gross produce of the land constituted it by the most potent factor in the distribution of the national income, . . . next only to the weather, the administration was the dominant fact in the economic life of the country." Italics my own.

19 Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 73

20 Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 137

21 Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 467.

22 Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 99.

23. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, I, 140.

24. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurengzeb*, p. 253

25. J. N. Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

26. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 25.

27. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 203.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

29. "Bandits" is an all-inclusive term and refers to different groups by different writers. Bernier, Brock trans. and Irvine trans., and Edward Terry, *A Voyage to the East Indies* (2nd ed. 1777), generally refer to peasants living in the forest as "Banditti" while in "Tarikh-I-Khan Jahan Lodi," in Elliot and Dawson, ed., *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, V, 100, infidels and bandits are equated. Manouchi, Catrou trans., p. 96, calls them rebellious peasants. There undoubtedly existed bandits in the true sense of the word but their numbers were small when compared to fleeing peasantry and fluctuated with the power of the central government and its ability to keep order. See also J Sarkar. "Aurangzib," *op. cit.*, p. 236.

30. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 191.

31. *Ibid.*, I, 190.

32. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 108.

33. For example, Akbar built water works for peasant use, not for adornment. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 219. Firoz Shah, used peasant labor to build dams and culverts to conduct water to the city for use in gardens and in parks. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 129, and *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 59. See also Percy Brown, "Monuments of the Moghul Period," in *Cambridge History of India* IV (ed. Burn). 523-576

34 Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed Burn), 471.

35. Mukerjee, *op cit.*, p. 62.

36. J. N. Das Gupta, *op. cit* , p 75. "In consequence of the Mohammedan conquest the shares really enjoyed by the Ryots were often reduced to a sixth but seldom exceeded a fifth. The effects of this unjust system were considerably augmented by the custom of subrenting the land to farmers, whom they armed with unrestricted power of collection, who were thus enabled to disregard the agreements entered into with the Ryots."

37. Under Sher Shah's reorganization methods (taken over by Akbar) land was classified as "fine," middling or "inferior". Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 457; Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 374

38. J. N Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

39. Francisco Palsaert, *Jahangir's Remonstratie*, trans. W. H. Moreland and P. Geyl (Cambridge, Eng: W Heffner & Sons, Ltd., 1925), p. 47.

40 In attempting to derive general patterns applicable to cultures with a long social history, Julian Steward makes the point that "the importance of population shifts in Asia has been stated by the committee in Asia anthropology as follows: changes in size and/or location of population groups may be the KEY to other culture changes" *Area Research*, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 63 (1950), p. 92.

CHAPTER VI — MOBILITY

1. For a general discussion of this concept and its relatedness to villages in India, see Radhakamel Mukerjee, *Man and His Habitation* (London. Longmans, Green and Co, 1940), pp. 42-44

2. Wittfogel, *op cit*, p. 324.

3. I maintain that rigidly structured social entities do not become fluid when they are imposed upon another rigidly structured entity. Parts of a group may become fluid, by intermarriage, for example, but the groups remain basically unaltered vis-a-vis each other. For specific instances of this sort, see Sir H. M. Elliot, *Memoirs of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, ed. John Beames, (London Trubner & Co, 1946), I, 292, 309, 318. Also O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 28. See the general discussion on mobility in Pitrim Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York. Harper and Brothers, 1927).

4. Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-14. See also Smith, *Early History of India*

5. Havell, *op. cit*, p. 15.

6. Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (London. Longmans, Hurst, Reese, Orme & Brown, 1815), p 203.

7. In Bengal this process would seem to have happened very late for at an early time Brahmins were incorporating Kols. T. C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Society*, p. 221.

8. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 430.

a drift from the village to the urban center at those times when village production was curtailed.

17. See also Tavernier, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

18. Bernier, Brock trans., p. 229.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

20. Creagh, *op. cit.*, p. 43, Palsaert, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

21. See "The Narrative of Nikitin," in Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 283; also in Major, *op. cit.*, which includes the narrative of "Nicholas Conti."

22. Bernier, Constable trans., p. 205.

23. Since contiguous holdings of Moslem and Hindu were not the general rule outside of Bengal, it meant that migration was taking place over a large physical area.

24. Manouchi, Catrou trans., p. 312.

25. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 75. The very important point made here is that this was a case of not only single village displacement being involved but whole population groups of relatively similar status. Their displacement meant that while one whole population segment was falling another whole group was rising. The rate of fall of segments within the deposed group would, however, vary with erstwhile independent ryots falling fastest down to serfdom and slavery. In a report on modern villages, Dr. Cohn noted: "These Thakurs, Rajputs of the Raghubansi clan, have held predominant economic and political power in Madhopur since the conquest of the village and the region by their ancestors in the sixteenth century." Ber-

nard S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste," in *Village India*, ed. Marriot p. 54. See also Elliot, *Memoirs of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, I, 301, and the discussion concerning the settlement pattern of the group known as the Garhwals.

26. Robert Montgomery Martin, *The Indian Empire: Eastern and Western India* (London. The London Publishing Co., Ltd.), III, 382. Here a group of people has run the gamut, within 150 years, from being *considered* upper caste to being *accepted* as depressed. Italics my own.

27. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 371.

28. Abul Fazl, "Akbar-Nama," in *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, ed. Elliot and Dawson, VI, 61.

29. Statistics vary enormously. See Sir George Braidwood, *Report on the Old Records of the India Office* (London, 1891).

30. Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 156-157.

31. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, pp. 8-12; O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, pp. 106-108.

32. The importance of this relationship in determining the social structure of any village has not been fully explored. It was, and still is, important to note the position of the individual vis-a-vis the plow and the neighbor with whom one plowed. Since handling the plow implied a diminution in status, the position in this handling process gives clues to the rise and fall in status of individuals within any given village. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 20.

33. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 473.

34. Although there were members of varying castes on social levels of differing importance, they were all on a similar level in an economic sense. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 91.

35. Brij Narain, *Indian Economic Life* (Lahore: Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons, 1929), p. 32.

36. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 61.

37. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 295.

38. *Ibid*, Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 474.

39. Particularly in Bengal. Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

40. Representative of a group of landlord holders, usually the most powerful landlord himself.

41. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 116.

42. Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Smith, *Albar, the Great Moghul*, pp. 375-376.

43. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 76.

44. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 301.

45. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 60.

46. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 15, Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 99.

47. Sir Henry Maine, *The Early History of Institutions* (London John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1890), p. 245.

48. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 307.

49. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 74.

50. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 28.

51. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 92

52. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 121, Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 77.

53. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 94.

54. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 90.

55. This was particularly true of the Jat villages in the Punjab, in which family holding was regarded as joint property. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 277.

56. *Ibid*, pp. 77-80.

57. It is important to point out that even the census, as rough as it was under Akbar, was only taken on the basis of *total* population and not on population type or class. The status type or given amount of individuals within a status type of any village is, therefore, pure conjecture. For reference to the census, see Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 372

58. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 123.

59. Pattidari type are held in an ancestral or family share system. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 82.

60. Bhiachara type of villages are ones in which customary lots were shared on the basis of equality of holding.

61. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 10.

62. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 99.

CHAPTER VII — LANDLORDISM

1. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 106. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 103. The purely communal village existed only among the aboriginal tribes in the north. In all other cases there was some inequality, based on differing criteria, in the sharing.

2. Defined here as absentee-urban-non-indigenous holders.

3. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 376; Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 163.

4. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 94; Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 31.

5. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 223.

6 Cooper, *op. cit*, pp. 260-261, Warty, *op. cit*, p. 17.

7. Elliott, *Memoirs of the Races of the North West Frontier Provinces*, I, 23.

8. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 144.

9. J. N. Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

10 Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 474

11 J. N. Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

12 The law of impermanent holdings, i.e., the land belonged to the Crown and reverted to the Crown upon the death of the Jagir and his personally held tenure. Warty, *op. cit.*, p. 16, C S. K. Sao Sahib, "Some Notes on Monghul Mansabs," *Journal of Indian History* (Madras), XIII (1935), and C S K Sao Sahib, "Akbar's Revenue System," *ibid.*, XVI (1931), 205

13 In the Zemindari holding we find a tendency toward less tyrannical behavior and toward a great deal more capital improvement of the property (tanks, wells) Chatterji, *op. cit.*, p. 115; Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Bihar and Orissa during the Fall of the Moghul Empire*, (Patna Patna University Press, 1932)

14. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 50. Famine as a means to *total mobility* is generally overlooked because the movements of classes or castes is always one directional, downward to the grave. We know, however, that famines raged uncontrolled at various times during the Moslem and Moghul periods and whole provinces moved, leaving their ancestral holdings and with them their specific caste positions and specific statuses. A very quick survey of populations on the move during famine years shows that in

1595-98 The whole of India in a condition of famine

1614-15 Punjab as far as Delhi in a condition of famine.

- 1618-19 Coromandel Coast and Vijayanager in a condition of famine.
- 1630-32 Vijayanager, Deccan, Gujerat and Sind in a condition of famine.
- 1633-34 Deccan and Gujerat in a condition of famine.
- 1635 Surat and Galconda in a condition of famine.
- 1642-43 Orissa and Bihar and Bengal in a condition of famine.
- 1645-46 Coromandel Coast in a condition of famine.
- 1647 The whole of Rajputana starving.
- 1648 Coromandel Coast starving.
- 1650 Whole of India in a condition of famine.
- 1661 Whole of India in a condition of famine.
- 1670-71 Bihar starving.
- 1705-08 The Deccan starving.
- 1709-11 Madras and Bengal starving.

Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88, disputes Moreland on both the severity of the famines and some of the dates attributed to them.

15. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 144-145. Moreland does not feel that, according to the records it was famine that caused the shifting of population but "there is definite and credible evidence that the scarcity of peasants was due to flight, not death."

16. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, pp. 303-304

17. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, II, 117, and Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 303.

18. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 172
In a rather long passage, quoted here in full, Baden-Powell gives one of the clearest answers to the concept of stability as one of the attributes of caste. He maintains "Mughols and Sikhs, we are told, are masters in turn, but the village remains the same. Does

it? *The village changes as much as, in the nature of things, a group of lands and or an aggregate of houses, can change* Let us picture to ourselves an easily recognizable case. At first the village was a settlement founded in the virgin waste. Here a leader or headman directed the cultivation. Each cultivator brought his own plough and oxen, and *felt* that the plot he cleared would be his own, he had no connections with other holdings save that he obeyed the common headman, availed himself of the village artisan's services, and had to share his grain-heap with them and with the Raja and to unite with his fellows whenever common defense was necessary. Then let us suppose the Raja's cousin receives a grant of the village and becomes landlord, taking most of the waste to himself; as his family multiplies, they form a joint body and soon get the lion's share of the land, *the old 'cleavers' becoming tenants*. Next the landlord family quarrel, or otherwise determine to divide the land, in this stage the village will be called in the revenue books a Pattidari village. Next, *the proprietors go into debt and sell shares*. *Strangers thus get in*, and a new order of things commences; for the purchasers are very likely of a non-agricultural caste and must employ tenants: some perhaps prefer the old landowners, others take *new men who will offer better terms*. The remnants of both the older family groups run a good chance of going to the wall altogether." Italics my own.

19. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 53.

20. The seeming inconsistency of this position is rectified when it is realized that the Zemindar holder could grow in power and size even while its member-inhabitants were being debased to serfs or poverty. A process of syphoning-off wealth went on in both the Jagirdar's holdings and the Zemindar's. The Zemindar could hold his wealth, use it for personal gain, reinvest in

new property or improve his lands in order to produce more. The Jagirdar could not normally reinvest surplus because of his own ostentatious life and gift-exchange with the monarch. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 69.

21. The Jagirdar could only expand his holdings by royal favor. This had absolutely nothing to do with efficiency of land management. J. Sarkar, "Aurangzib," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 300.

22. Early competition for laborers served to ease their situation and tended to give them a position from which they could bargain. This changed, however, as more and more peasant labor became available. Pelsaert, *op. cit.*, p. 47, Price, *op. cit.*, III, 768, Manucci, Irvine trans., II, 444.

23. Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 203.

24. Joseph Davey Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs* (London. John Murray, 1849), p. 14.

25. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 184. Italics my own

26. These instances are during the reign of Aurengzeb when the Empire was on the way to dissolution. For instances of this sort, see J. Sarkar, *Bihar and Orissa during the Fall of the Moghul Empire*

27. J. Sarkar, "Aurangzib," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 292.

28. In the *Illustrated Weekly of India*, Nov 11, 1945, Mohammed Masud, uplift officer for a frontier people, expressed the generally accepted modern view of the money-lender in Indian social life. The Bania money lenders referred to in this article had their origin in the period under consideration in this

work "Eating into the very core of the community and fattening on its blood, were the money-lenders, hundreds of whom had *settled from elsewhere* in Bhilland. Over 90% of the Bhils were under inextinguishable debts to the Banias. The Banias encouraged the wasteful habits among the Bhils who, unable to make both ends meet, had no *alternative but borrow* on rates and terms fixed by the money-lenders. The latter took thumb impressions on documents who were manipulated as they liked, and it was not uncommon for a Bhil debtor to be held liable for amounts he had never received." Italics my own Refer also to Bruno Laskar, *Human Bondage in Southeast Asia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950), p. 155. "The tiller of the soil is in debt because he is a serf, not a serf because he is in debt."

CHAPTER VIII — MONEY LENDERS

1 They were the Headman, the Recorder, the Watchman Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 451

2. Cash was advanced for these purposes: (1) marriage, (2) "bangels," (3) death, (4) special religious ceremonies, (5) birth festivals, (6) festivals during the Rites of Passage See T C Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Life*, p. 311.

3 Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 337.

4 During Moghul times villagers were given loans as an inducement to farm How they went about paying these back is not at all clear Narain, *op cit*, p 31

5. There were some previous Moslem changes. For example, during the reign of Balban, money lenders became wealthy because troopers were *borrowing in the villages*. Rapson, ed., *Cambridge History of India*, III, 90.

6. Elliot, *Memours of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, I, 43, discusses the growth to power of the Bohra groups, converted money lenders.

7. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 369. Medieval villages were paying Rajahs only a share in grain. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 62.

8 Moreland, *Agriarian System in Moslem India*, p. 114, however, maintains that, "There are no orders (during the reign of Akbar) requesting the disposal of grain collected as revenue, and it may be inferred that the practice was too rare to require general rules."

9. Tavernier, *op. cit.*, I, 28. "In India a village must be very small if it had not a money-lender, whom they call shroff All the Jews who occupy themselves with money and exchange in the empire of the Grand Seigneur pass for being very sharp but in India they would scarcely be apprentices to these changers."

10. It is highly significant to keep in mind that the Moghul was the sole banker and that institutions which loaned money on credit in order to pay taxes were rare—very rare. Loans were made in villages based on Khuts (handnotes), on jewelry or mortgages on land. Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 105, Aziz, *op cit*, p 54.

11. Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

12. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. 32-35.

13. Tampering with coinage was a particularly favorite way of raising money. It was practiced extensively as far back as the time of Mohammed Tughlaq. See Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 63. Refer also to Edward Thomas, *Revenue Sources of the Moghul Empire*, p. 114. Akbar also reassessed and manipulated payment of the *dan*, the gold *mohur* and the silver *rupee*. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, pp. 157 and 388.

14. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 64

15. Particularly the Mahawari families and the Banias of Gujarat. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 77

16. *Ibid.*, p. 75. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century, A.D.*, poetry of Mukundaram.

17. Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

18. Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55; Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

19. Jather and Bari, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

20. In numerous volumes we have stories of villagers who, going into an urban center to earn a few silver pieces, return to set themselves up as money-lenders in the villages of their origin. By charging exorbitant rates of interest these individuals began to rise dramatically in the status pattern of important villages, and after a while, tended to dominate them.

21. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 137. The exception to this downward mobility is always those who are newly converted to Islam. Refer to Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul*, pp. 183, 244, and H. Hoston, S. J. *Father Monseinate's Description of Delhi (1582)*, p. 111. See also J. S. Bogland and S. N. Banerjee, *The Commentary of Father*

Monseigneur (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1922), as well as Rev. Hoston's work in the *Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, VIII, No 1 (January, 1911)

22. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 92; Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p 144.

CHAPTER IX — RURAL NOBILITY

1. An independent aristocracy means, to me, that the right to own property and titles and rank carries with it the parallel right to dispose of these, through inheritance, as the individual saw fit. This was not, legally, the case among Moghul rural aristocracy. Rapson, ed., *Cambridge History of India*, III, 45, Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 24. Also see J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration* and the discussion on "Hereditary Peerage in Islam." This was also the case during the time of the Delhi Sultanate. "The governors were officers posted to their charges by the King and transferred, removed or punished at his pleasure, administering their charges under his orders, and subjected to the strict financial control of the revenue ministry. Moreland rightly argues that such officers could in no sense be feudal, they were bureaucrats pure and simple." Qureshi, *op cit*, p 188.

2. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century, A.D.*, p 46.

3. J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p. 20.

4. The army as a leveler of prior social status, by imposing its own special status based on different ideals, has been much

noted and commented upon

5. "Under Islam slavery is not considered a stigma but a status" Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

6 Manouchi, Catrou trans, p. 96

7. Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, pp. 191-195.

8 Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 112

9 Finch talks about Fatepur Skri and Biona in this vein. J. H. Riley, Ralph Fitch, *England's Pioneer to India and Burma* (London: Unwin, 1909), pp. 92-100.

10. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 12.

11. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 234. In the sense that each villager was now, as an individual without recourse to the headman of the central village, responsible for his own grain heap.

12 Marwar as a state and the Rathors as a people, nobility and peasantry alike, fought Aurengzeb in what amounts to a national war. J. Sarkar, "Aurangzib," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 248-251, 302-303.

13. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, pp. 306-307.

CHAPTER X — SLAVERY. DEBT AND CAPTIVE

1 Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 69. J. N. Das Gupta, *India in the Seventeenth Century*, (Calcutta: University of

Calcutta, 1916), p. 124.

2. Aboriginal groups such as the Bhils, Gonds, etc.

3. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 92. Of course such raids could be possible only when the central authority was weak.

4 Della Valle, "Travels," cited in Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 88.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 114.

6. Manouchi, Catrou trans., p. 96. "This constant war against rebellious peasants gave Akbar more trouble than all his successes over the Ranas. These unfortunate beings were entrenched in inaccessible forests. . ."

7. Abul Fazl, "Akbar-Nama," pp. 24-25. Fazl, however contradicts himself later in this same work when he states that "prisoners of war are not to be enslaved."

8. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

9. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, pp. 8-23. Refer also to S. A. Khan, *John Marshall in India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1927.)

10. Portuguese were capturing slaves from the Arakan coast and from Bengal. There were sales, by the Moghuls, of non-Mohammedan debtors in Bihar and Bengal as well as in other parts of the Empire. See Martin, *op. cit.*, III, 289.

11. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 124. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 457.

12. The weather in India has been, and still is, the determining factor in crop production. It was possible for a ryot, given a good weather year, to do well.

13. Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 126.

14. Temporary only in the nominal sense since a ryot never could raise the money to bail his family out of their debtor slave position. Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

15. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. 69-70.

16. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century, A.D.*, p. 72. It is important that a name like Ramchandra Khan should occur, because Muslims would not normally take the name of Ramchandra and Hindus would not normally adopt the title of khan.

17. There were many cesses particularly the Jizya. Akbar remitted this tax but it was later reinstated. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 63. Firoz Shah also remitted some 25 levies, later reinstated. Rapson, ed., *Cambridge History of India*, III, 175.

18. Related by Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 112.

19. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

20. "Tarikh-I-Badauni," p. 514.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 515. "The treasures, the collections and the expenditure of the mansabdars remain unaltered but in every way dirt fell into the plate of the poor . . . Tradesmen such as weavers, cotton-dressers, carpenters and *Hindu and Moslem* grocers would

hire a horse or charger and bringing it up for the Dogh would obtain a Mansab and would become a Krori . . . guardsman or substitute of someone very important."

CHAPTER XI — THE URBAN CENTERS: CITIES AND TOWNS

1 J Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p. 55.

2. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India, Introduction*. I This statement continues: "the end of the eighteenth century witnessed the rapid decline of Indian industries, the complete ruin of Indian trade and shipping, and the loss of her political sovereignty." Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 414, disputes this point and maintains that factory production only came in with the British. Wittfogel, *op. cit.*, p. 432, agrees with him. Narain, *op. cit.*, pp 51-53, Manucci, Irvine trans. II, 420, Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, pp. 188 and 195, and Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p 410, however, among many others, agree with Mukerjee.

3. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

4. Particularly Bernier and Manucci.

5. Jathar and Beri, *op. cit.*, II, 80.

6. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. 81-83, Sri Ramsharma, "A Neglected Aspect of Moghul History," *New Review* (Calcutta), X (October 1939), 3, Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 411; Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

7. The original strike or boycott. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. 62-63.

8. Palseart, *op. cit*, pp. 63-64

9 Essentially holy cities, whose *raison d'être* was religion coupled with trade fairs. Chakladar, *op cit*. pp. 47-48

10. Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

11 Mukundaram's poetry strongly resembles Chaucer's in the clues it gives to the life of the people when everyone else was writing about dynastic history. J. N Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A D.*, pp 89-90 and Sen, *op. cit.*

12. The city had four classes, based on time in the area and on religion These were:

1. The older Moslems living in cities from the time of the Delhi Sultans.
2. The first Moghul conquerors
3. The newly converted Hindu Moslems.
4. The older Hindu groups divided into four categories
 - a. Old aristocracy still in power.
 - b. Old aristocracy without power
 - c. The median classes.
 - d. Depressed Hindus

Classification my own.

13. This is a vitally important point because it *reversed* the procedure customarily attributed to caste or to quasi-caste positions in which one is born into a profession and by it (as well as other characteristics) has his caste delineated. Here we see individuals *accepting* first the profession and *afterwards* the caste position it entailed The difference is vital, for it tends to

give the acceptor the achieved status of class rather than the ascribed status of caste.

14. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century, A.D.*, pp. 90-92.

15. Margaret Read, *The Indian Peasant Uprooted* (Bombay: D. B. Taraporevala & Sons and Co., 1930), p. 3.

16. Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

17. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A. D.*, p. 93. Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 20, disputes this idea and maintains that "judged by present standards wages in the time of Jahangir were high. . . ." It is obvious that "the mass of Muslims (generally converted Hindus)" were not Shiites.

18. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A. D.*, p. 155.

19 O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 9. Similar cases are reported by Elliot, *Memoirs of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, I, 23. Refer especially to the Bhuinar groups.

20 J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A. D.*, p. 158.

21. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 188

22. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. 59-64.

23. In another description in Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. 58-60, these groups are listed

1. Lower class Brahmins, priests of temples dependent on contributions by villagers of milk and oil.

These Brahmins had constant contact with the Hindu

and Moslem populace.

2. Village astrologers, offerings gotten from house to house.
3. Vaisyas, traders, tillers, cow-tenders.
4. Agricultural castes and betel-cultivators.
5. Artisan castes; goldsmiths, blacksmiths, braziers, potters, carpenters, dyers, oilmen, confectioners, spice-men, cotton-weavers and silk-weavers.
6. Low castes, forest dwellers. People who have fled and/or returned.
7. Depressed castes, those who lived around the edges of the city.

24 Hasan, *op. cit* , p. 251.

25. Bernier, Constable trans., p. 252.

26. Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-65.

27. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 264.

28. Narain, *op. cit* , p. 30, Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 411.

29. Palsaert, *op. cit.*, p. 61. “. . . subject to trumped up charges and legal confiscation of wealth if seen.” Italics my own.

30. There were a few rare references to trade before the court of the Moghul. See “Tarikh-I-Khan Jahan Lodi,” pp. 72-73. “It is said in certain histories that Malik Bahlol traded, but the truth or falsehood of this has never been clearly shown. It is known that his father and grandfather were merchants . . . trading in horses.”

31. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 177.

32. Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

33. Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

34. Brown, "Monuments of the Moghul Period," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 562

35. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, pp. 430-433.

36. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 178; Jathar and Beri, *op. cit.*, II, 81-82

37. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 61.

38. Jathar and Beri, *op. cit.*, II, 139.

39. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 134.

40. Palsaert, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

41. Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

42. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 473-474.

43. Jathar and Beri, *op. cit.*, II, 235.

44. J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p. 175.

45. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. v, vi.

46. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 141.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

48. Pant, *op. cit.*, p. 144. "Throughout the realm stone masons, sculptors, carpenters, stone-cutters. . . *by mandate* . . . *all gathered together in urban centers* under state patronage" Italics my own. Rushbrook, *op. cit.*, p. 40. "The Kingdom of

Kandesh, in the 15th and 16th centuries, was like Italy at the same time Manufacture of gold and silver cloth as well as the making of fine muslins *introduced under state* encouragement." Italics my own. See also Narain, *op cit.*, p 65.

CHAPTER XII — WAGE AND SERVILE LABOR

1. Pant, *op cit* , p 64.

2. Bernier, Constable trans , p 252 Manucci, however, said that in Delhi all Hindus were also rich and that there were many manufacturers who were wealthy Manucci, Irvine trans , II, 420.

3 Palsaert, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

4. Narain, *op cit* , pp 13-20, using other contemporary source material, maintains that Palsaert, Bernier and Manucci, as well as Moreland, who uses these three for his basic source material, were all wrong. Labor, he maintains, was in a very strong position and not depressed

5 Palsaert, *op. cit* , p. 61.

6. Narain, *op. cit* , p 2, says Palsaert was mistaken about wages and that at that time labor was reimbursed better even than in modern days.

7 Basanta C Bose, *Hindu Customs in Bengal* (Calcutta The Book Company Ltd., 1875), p 46 Bose discusses a whole group of people, the Nafars, who were caught in this free-slavery.

8 Palsaert, *op cit* , p 62.

9 Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 87.

10 Palsaert, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63. Italics my own Narain, *op. cit.*, pp 7-11, gives another version of servant behavior from that of Palsaert.

11. Pant, *op. cit.*, p 64.

12. Bernier, Constable trans , p. 205.

13. Moreland, *Agriarian System of Moslem India*, p. 144

14. Bernier, Constable trans., p 207. "I am acquainted with few wealthy Omrahs. Most are in debt because of costly presents they must make to the king and because of their large establishments "

15. As actually happened later under the British Moreland. "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed Burn), 474-475.

16. Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

CHAPTER XIII — RELIGION

1 Risley, *op. cit* , p. 120.

2. The concept of zero, which came to be known in the Western world as an Arabic numeral, was an Hindu invention, as was the mathematically abstract game of chess. Kroeber, *op. cit* , p 468.

3. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p 138, Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295.

4. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

5. Tara Chand, *op cit* , p. 136

6 It is highly significant to note that Brahmmins were sought as converts and not members of the lower castes or of the Harijan. See Amil Chandra Banerjee, "Kingship and Mobility in Mewar, *Journal of Bihar Research Society*, XII (1945), and Mohammed Kasim Ferishta, *Rise of the Mohammedan Power in India*, trans. John Biggs (London: Longmans, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green), 1829.

7 I do not discuss south India in this work, but it is important to point out that the indigenous Hindu Kingdoms survived in this area even through the time of the Moghuls. The Hinduism of the south of India had a completely different orientation from that of the north with much older roots still alive in the area. For an excellent study of the rise of south India and the impact that the revolts of Vijaya had on the Moghul Empire, see Duff, *op. cit.*, and Mahader Govind Renade, *Rise of the Mharatta Power* (Bombay: Punaleker and Company, Gugarim, 1908), See also Rawlinson, *op cit* , chaps, xxi xiv, xv

8. Havell, *op cit* , pp 258-259.

9 B. K. Sarkar, *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes*, pp 164-166

10. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 102

11 From Mohammed of Ghazni to Babur of Kabul

12 Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit* , pp. 90-91

13. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, pp. 245-246. This factor was particularly operative in the northwest frontier

provinces and oftentimes ended with the tribes under protection using the fiction of a common ancestor with their protectors.

14. Risley, *op. cit.*, p. 124. Risley maintains that the institution did not mean conversion but that Hindus, particularly in Baluchistan, only called themselves by a common tribal name with the Moslems. This view seems to be a minority one. See Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 24.

15 Sir H. M. Elliot, *The History of India* (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, Ltd., 1869), p. 19.

16. Christianity and Judaism were in the sub-continent long before Mohammedanism, but they did not have the power of an organized state or an army behind their convertive efforts. There were, as among the Mohammedans of South India, individuals who by example and personal effort, made some conversions. Only the Portuguese Catholics made a serious effort, using Goa as their base, to convert India. They made the effort of sending missions to the Delhi Sultans and to the Moghuls. They were however, located in south India and their efforts were concentrated there. For this phase of religious activity in the area, See Rev. Alex J. D. D'Orsey, *Portuguese Discoveries, Dependencies and Missions in Asia and Africa* (London: W. H. Allen & Co., Ltd., 1893), p. 69. "The misfortunes of the Church of India approached their crises toward the end of the 16th century when the Mohammedans overran all India east of the Ganges. The furious Mohammed proclaimed Islamism and on both sides of his march leveled to the dust or committed to the flames the churches of the Christians and the Pagodas of the idolators. The victims had to choose between the acceptance of the Korean or the loss of property and of life itself." See also E. D. MacLagen, "The Jesuit

Mission to the Emperor Akbar" *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, LXV, pt. 1 (1896).

17. Havell, *op cit.*, p. 251.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

19. Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 588. See also Stanley Lane-Poole, *Medieval India*, Vol. III of *History of India*, ed, A V William Jackson (London: Grolier Society Publ, 1903). The first Muslim conqueror to invade the plains was interested only in establishing his rule over the dominions of the Hindu Shali dynasty. He led invasions into neighboring Hindu kingdoms and set up his nominees on the thrones. In the process he collected large booty from palaces and temples, but he was interested, so far as these areas were concerned, neither in establishing his government nor in conversion. See also Havell, *op cit*, pp. 280-289.

20 Sankalia, *op. cit.*, pp 48-50; Tara Chand, *op. cit*, p 97.

21. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op cit.*, p. 124.

22. Tara Chand, *op. cit*, p. 213.

23 R R. Sethi, P Saran, D R. Bhandari, *op. cit*, p 257.

24. *Ibid*, p 260.

25. Rawlinson, *op cit*, p. 200

26 Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 39, Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p 206, Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit*, p. 124

27. Rawlinson, *op. cit*, p. 204.

28 Havell, *op. cit*, p. 206

29 *Ibid.*, p. 221.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

31 Elliot, *History of India*, pp. 182-191.

32. Havell, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

33. See particularly the work of Johann Jacob Meyer, *Sexual Life in Ancient India* (New York Barnes & Noble, 1953), Book II, chaps xviii, xix, xx.

34. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, I, 96; Havell, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-285.

35. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-219.

36 Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 61, 196; Sankalia, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-212, Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

37. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p 226; Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 599.

38. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p 210; Havell, *op. cit.*, p 292.

39. Rushbrook, *op. cit.*, p. 13 The confederacy of Rajput clans was headed by Singram Singh, of whom Shaik Zain wrote: "There was not a single ruler of the first rank in all these great countries like Delhi, Gujerat and Mandu who was able to make head against him. The banners of the infidel floated over 200 cities inhabited by people of the faith."

40 Price, *op. cit.*, III, 694.

41 Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p 220, Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 211

42 Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p 212.

43. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, I, 100-101.

44. This marks the break between India as part of Afghanistan and India as an independent entity Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, Elliot and Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, 332

45. "The Ghaznavids soon realized that their Indian dominions required a military governor to make an impression on recalcitrant Hindu chiefs . . ." Quereshi, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

46. The name given the Moslem rulers of India from the slave dynasty beginning in 1206 A.D. to 1524 A.D. These included Afghans, Pathans and Turks.

47 Hasan, *op. cit.*, Introduction

48 *Ibid* , p. 308

49. "Gradually as native chiefs were reconciled or reduced the civil officers gained in power and authority." Qurehsi, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

50 *Ibid* , p. 49 Italics my own.

51. Rapson, ed , *Cambridge History of India*, III, 127, 169. For example, a rebellion in Gujerat was led by a low caste cobbler who had Rajput and Brahmin followers

52 Moreland, *Agarian System of Moslem India*, p 41. Chiefs and headman were elevated way above the peasant rank by Ghiyassudin Taghlaq.

53 Baden-Powell, *Land Systems of British India*, I, 132.

54 Tara Chand, *op. cit* , p. 102

55 Rawlinson, *op. cit* , p 236

56. Lane-Poole, *Medieval India under Mohammedan Rule* (Putnam ed), p. 4, Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

57. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 244; Havell, *op. cit.*, 308. The drive toward conversion in upper castes continued unabated but seems to have been fought by women in a steadily increasing fashion as the purdah and harem influences began to be felt.

58. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

59 Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabaul*, p. 203. Italics my own.

60. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p. 5.

61. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 219. The attitudes of these new converts is both anti-Hindu and anti-Moghul for it is pointed out that "From the land-holding point of view, the Mussulman element in India is represented first by a large number of colonies of early Moslems, the relics of the Pathan Empire; and these had very little sympathy with the later arrivals in the train of Humayan and his successors."

62. *Ibid.*, p 220. Italics my own.

63. Elliot and Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, 179.

64. This was in clearest evidence in the ratings given army commanders. See J. Sarkar, *Studies in Moghul India*, p 20, and Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, in the stories concerning Hakim Ali and Persran Khan

65. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, I, 108. Italics my own.

66. Havell, *op., cit.*, p. 302.

67. Moreland, *Agarian System of Moslem India*, pp. 40-46.

FOOTNOTES

68 Wheeler, *op cit.*, I, 109 "The new Sultan tried to improve his finances but only ruined the country."

69. Rawlinson *op. cit.*, p. 255.

70. Ross, "Babur," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 19.

71. Sen, *History of Bengali Language and Literature*, p 797; Tara Chand, *op. cit* , pp. 145, 163-165, 217.

72 In a recent study, based on an emergent depressed caste, Professor Cohn reports that Chamars trace their religion from Namananda This represents part of the tradition toward rapprochement inherited from Moghul days Namananda had among his disciples "a Camar, a Jat, a Lohar, a Muslim and a woman " The origin of the beliefs of this group represents an example of fluidity that has, with new circumstances become fairly static. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste," in *Village India* (ed Mariot), p. 59.

73 Burn, "Shah Jahan," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed Burn), 217

74. J. N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A D.*, p. 37.

75 Ramsharma, *op. cit* , X, No. 58.

76 Sen, *Chaitanya and His Age* (Calcutta. University of Calcutta Press, 1925), p. 410

77. J N. Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A D.*, p. 31. Italics my own

78 Worsley Haig, "Akbar, Mystic and Prophet," in *Cam-*

bridge History of India, IV (cd Burn), 120, Hasan, *op cit.*, p 356

79. Darma Bhanu, "The Raushania Movement and the Moghuls," *Journal of Indian History* (Madras), XXIX, Pt. 1 (April, 1951)

80. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p 5.

81. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 243. We have, however, another view of the impact of Urdu on the Hindu bureaucracy, by Elphinstone, who maintains that this was but another way to ease out from government circles all who were not originally Moslems. Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 106. "In parts of Hindustan where the great Moghul system was fully introduced, the use of the Persian language has thrown public business into the hands of the Musselman and the Cayests (a caste of Sudras). Even in the Nazim's domains in the Dekkan, the same cause has in some degree diminished *the employment of Brahmins.*" Italics my own. J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p. 227, feels that this creation helped Hindus

82 Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p 451.

83. Abul Fazl, *Akbar-Nama*, although rather bigoted, seems to have been the ablest chronicler of Akbar's reign

84 *Ibid* , p 29.

85. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p 65.

86. Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

87 *Ibid* , p 308

88. Elliot and Dawson, *op. cit* , III, 168-169.

89. Sethi, Saran and Bhandari, *op. cit.*, p 409.

90. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p 222.

91 Havell, *op cit* , p. 517.

92 Abul Fazl, "Akbar-Nama," p. 29.

93 *Ibid* , p 212.

94 Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 216.

95 There are very important parallels between Asoka and Akbar. Each spread his rule further in the sub-continent than anyone had before his time and each of them ended their reigns as religious kings rather than as secular monarchs. It is significant to note that the strength of caste was very weak in Asoka's time and in Akbar's. Rawlinson, *op. cit* , pp 75-81, B. K. Sarkar, *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes*, p. 64.

96 O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p 30.

97 Risley, *op cit* , p 80. Risley was writing, however, of India during the time of British rule when the forces of synthesis and transition were not desired and, in a great many ways, fought by the occupying power.

98. B. K. Sarkar, *Folk Element in Hindu Culture*, p 227; Havell, *op cit* , p 516, Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 391.

99 Risley, *op. cit.*, p 76.

100 Elliot, *Memons of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, I, 32, J. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p. 247; O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p 11.

101. Risley, *op. cit* , p. 85, Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p 292.

102 Palsaert, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

103. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

104. Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

105. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 87.

106. Sen, *History of Bengali Language and Literature*, p. 429.

107 Risley, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

109. Redfield makes the point that a peasant's value system rests on three tenets, two of which are: an intimate and reverent attitude toward the land—(and the work on the land) and an attitude that agricultural work is good while commerce is bad. Certainly, in Moghul times, even though we cannot be sure of the basic attitude toward land, we can be sure of the basic attitude toward ownership of land. Here a bifurcation in attitude had taken place with thousands (perhaps millions) of people now regarding land in a quasi-industrial way, as an area from which to make money by having others work it for them. Robert Redfield, *Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 112. See also Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-40.

110 These individuals were usually poor but invented an ancestor of some importance. Tara Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

111 Jololoha generally were weavers who had converted, en masse, to Islam. There were over 3,000,000 individuals. See Elliot, *Memoirs of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, I, 188.

112. Shekhhs were equivalents in status to that ascribed to the classic Ksatriya position

113 Saiyads were equivalent to Brahmins, claiming superiority based upon *individual* merit as holy men. A Saiyad would marry a Shekh's daughter but would not allow a daughter of his own to marry a Shekh. Risley, *op cit.*, p. 122

114 Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 13.

115. Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

116. T. C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Life*, pp. 99-104.

117. Major, *op. cit.*, p. 24

118 T. C. Das Gupta, *op cit.*, p. 89.

119. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 58.

120. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 215. Elliot and Dawson, *op cit.*, V, 482. The oath stated. "I, who am so and so, son of so and so, do voluntarily, and with sincere predilection and inclination, utterly and entirely renounce and repudiate the religion of Islam which I have seen and heard of my fathers, and do embrace the Divine religion of Akbar Shah, and do accept the four grades of entire religion, viz, sacrifice of property, life, honor and religion."

121. Smith, *Akbar, the Great Moghul*, p. 442.

122. This contrasts most strongly with the works on early India and participation of women in the activities of the court. See Meyer, *op cit.*, as well as Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law* (London John Murray, 1870). Also Chakladar, *op cit.*, pp. 105-116

123. Havell, *op cit.*, p. 473

124. "The Narrative of Athanasius Nikitin" (1470), trans. Major, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17.

125. Manucci, Irvine trans., II, 453.

126. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

128 Chatterji, *op. cit.*, gives many examples of this sort. See also Elliot, *Memoirs of the Races of the North West Provinces of India*, I, 32-43.

129 Elphinstone, *History of the Kingdom of Cabaul*, p. 203.

130. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 238.

131. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

132. Bernier, Brock trans. II, 253.

133. Moreland, "The Revenue System of the Moghul Empire," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 454-455.

134. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 250.

135. Burn, "Shah Jahan," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 250.

136 Shah Jahan was the patron of the greatest Hindu scholar in Benares, Kavindrachary. Sri Ramsharma, *op. cit.*

137. Burn, "Shah Jahan," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed. Burn), 221.

138 Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 298

139. This is a definite reference to the tolerance of Akbar's

reign and the beginnings of the reassertion of the upper-caste Hindu aristocracy in the life of the country

140. Quoted from "Travels of Peter Mundy," in Pant, *op. cit.*, pp 205-211

141. J Sarkar, "Aurangzib," in *Cambridge History of India* IV (ed Burn), 243

142 Bakhtawor Khan, "Mir-at-I'alam," in Elliot and Dawson, ed *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, VII, 156 (hereafter cited as "Mir-at-I'alam").

143 Pant, *op. cit* , p 81.

144 J Sarkar, "Aurangzib," in *Cambridge History of India*, IV (ed Burn), 244

145. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p. 391.

146. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, pp 374-375.

147 Pant, *op. cit* , p 75; J. Sarkar, *Studies in Moghul India*, p. 43.

148 Khwafi Khan, *Muntakhabul Luhah*, Calcutta, 1868.

149. Sarkar, *Moghul Administration*, p 43.

150 Pant, *op cit.*, p. 223.

151. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p 10

152 Cunningham, *op cit*

153 *Ibid* , p. 20. The psychological factors, in the adherence to age-old principles of caste, are clearly to be noted here Actual physical status or wealth was unimportant. What was im-

portant was publicly assumed status and wealth. It is indicative to me of the similarity of forces that were here at work when we note that McKim Marriot, in his foreward to *Village India*, ed. Marriot p. xii, observes the exact same phenomenon in modern India. "Social change in India is both a movement toward an urban and cosmopolitan mode of life and also a revival and penetration downward of ancient Hindu elements of culture and religion "

154. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, pp. 30 See also p. 122, n. 1. "When a pattidari village is divided and this may have occurred *many years or generations ago . . .* there are major and minor divisions. *Sometimes there will be a primary division into taraf, either because one whole section became Moslems and the rest remained Hindus . . .*" Italics my own.

155. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 79

156. Manucci, Irvine trans., II, 452

157 Creagh, *op. cit* , p. 43.

158. Warty, *op. cit.*, p. 114 The increase in revenue during Aurengzeb time, due to an increase in land use, rose from L35,000,000 to L90,000,000.

159 Cited by Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p 268

160 Cited by Major, *op cit.*, as well as Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p 268

161. John Jourdain, *Journals*, (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1950).

162. Manucci, Irvine trans., II, 428.

163. *Ibid* , p 451. Italics my own.

164. J. Sarkar, *Studies in Moghul India*, p. 45.

165. Pant, *op. cit*, p 182.

166. *Edwandes and Garrett, op. cit*, discuss the human hunting practices of the Crown toward these uprooted peasants.

CHAPTER XIV — THE STATUS OF WOMEN

1. Havell, *op cit.*, pp 314, 317.

2. The whole status of women is given exceptionally detailed coverage in T C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Society*, pp. 8-11. See also O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, pp. 448-470.

3 The fact that the Moslem dweller in India and the original conqueror became an urbanite is very much to the point, since the Bedouin attitude toward women is very different from the Levantine-harem orientation of the urbanite

4. Meyer, *op cit*; Chakladar, *op. cit*, Smith, *Early History of India*; and Zimmer, *op cit.*, pp 572-573, 589-590.

5. T C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Society*, p 8.

6 Chakladar, *op cit*, pp 1-4

7. T. C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Society*, p xxxvii.

8. See Tod's *Annals of Rajastan*

9 Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Cabaul*, p. 183

10 O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p. 450, J. N.

Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A.D.*, p. 178.

11. Major, *op. cit.*, p. lvi.

12. "Matla'u Sa'dain," in Elliot and Dawson, ed., *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, IV, 100 (hereafter cited as "Matla'u Sa'dain"). "In Calicut they call the king of the country Samuri and when he dies they place upon the throne *his sister's* son and do not bestow it upon his own, his brethern, or his other relatives. Among them is a tribe in which *one woman has several husbands* of which each one engages in a separate occupation." Italics my own.

13. "The Narrative of Abd-er-Rezzak," in Major, *op. cit.*, p. 17. Also note "The Narrative of Nicholas Conti," *ibid.*, p. lxxvii, concerning polyandry. Note also "The Narrative of Santo Stefano," *Ibid.*, p. lxxv.

14. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p. 160.

15. T. C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of Bengali Society*, p. 188, O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p. 449.

16. "The Narrative of Abd-er-Rezzak," in Major, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

17. Bernier, Brock trans., II, 144.

18. Manucci, Irvine trans., III, 36. Manucci goes even further than Bernier and describes *classes of blacks* whose lack of whiteness was considered the *most demeaning of all characteristics*. He stated "To these four kinds of classes (classic description of caste) they add one more which is held by them to be separated from the general body of men. They are called chandolor or blacks. They are divided into four kinds: (1) Vittiyar, (2)

Palis, (3) Pariahs and (4) Alparqueros. All these people that they call blacks are, and pass among the natives of the country as so low and infamous that it is an immediate disgrace even to behold them drink or eat. These blacks live outside the inhabited places and towns occupied by other castes." These are, of course, not only darker skinned peoples but evidently the majority of individuals who were casteless, the Harijan of Ghandi *Italics my own.*

19 O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p 166

20 O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p 470

21. The implication here is clear. Women, of course, danced and furnished the sensual excitement to all performances but they were nameless performers

22 In medieval Bengal, women and men had *equal* opportunities at educational, artistic, as well as commerical activities T C Das Gupta, *op cit*, pp. 187-199, Moreland and Chatterjee, *op cit*, p 127

23. Creagh, *op cit.*, p. 33.

24 Radhakamel Mukerjee, *The Indian Working Class* (Bombay Hind Kitab Ltd., 1951), p 1

25. T. C Das Gupta, *op cit*, p. 304.

26 T C. Das Gupta, *op cit*, p 275, Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 214.

27. There were movements of this sort as early as the twelfth century O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, p 9

28 Risley, *op cit*, and the whole discussion on fertility under differing religious systems

29. J. N. Das Gupta, *India in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 124 Contrast this with the position of women in Maine's *Early History of Institutions*, p. 332.

30. Quoted by Wheeler, *History of India*, I, 181-182.

31. A favorite term for displaced and fleeing former free peasant cultivators.

CHAPTER XV — CONCLUSIONS APPLICABLE TO DIACHRONIC RESEARCH ON CASTE INSTABILITY

1. Oscar Lewis, "Controls and Experiments in Field Work," in *Anthropology Today*, ed. A. L. Kroeber (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 466-467, points out "It seems to me that one type of control in field work has to do with the broad problem of testing the reliability of anthropological reporting. . . The need for restudies as methodological checks has been felt by many anthropologists and non-anthropologists alike."

2. Clause Levi Strauss, "Social Structure," in *Anthropology Today*, ed. Kroeber, pp. 526, 547-550, discusses this sort of use in terms of social structure and its characteristics as a system See also *ibid.*, p 524.

3. David Bidney, "The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology," in *Anthropology Today*, ed. Kroeber, pp. 691-698

4 Overton Taylor, "Philosophies and Economic Theories," in *Ideological Differences and World Order*, ed. F. C. S. Northrop (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 144-145

5. T. K Penniman, *A Hundred Years of Anthropology*

(London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1952), pp. 447-450. Penniman does a particularly effective job of showing divergencies that can arise in interpretation out of similar facts

6 K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1954), II, 256-257.

7. Steward, *Aiea Research*, p. 103.

8 *Ibid*, p. 156. Italics my own

9. For example, Robert H Lowie, *Social Organization* (New York: Rinehart & Co, 1948), p. 273, states "Rivers properly insisting that caste and class should not be treated as interchangeable terms *restricted the former to the Hindu* phenomenon." Italics my own. Lowie, however, did not think that caste should be restricted to India for "it seems best not to limit the word caste to the Hindu group." *Ibid.*, p. 274. See also Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, trans H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York. Oxford University Press), 1946, p 402. "Before anything else, without caste there is no Hindu "

10 Max Weber, *General Economic History* (Glencoe, Ill . The Free Press, 1950), p. 137. ". for it is a general feature of the caste system that every type of labor services is assigned to a special caste." T. C. Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, p 223, directly contradicts this as did Elphinstone, *History of India*, I, 110

11. This blind spot comes from an orientation which assumes certain *improved psychological characteristics* For example, the discussion on oriental and occidental thought in Francisco Romero, "Man and Culture," in *Ideological Differences and World Order*, ed. Northrop, pp 404-406. Also Max Weber's concept of "oriental deceit" as a specific and Wittfogel's answer

to his own question, "what happens to man's desire for autonomy under conditions of total power." *Oriental Despotism*, p. 151. "Feature for feature, the early education of the young feudal knight seems to have been as harsh, or harsher, than the education of the young son of an Oriental official. And the apprenticeship of the young European craftsman was no bed of roses either . . . Both groups (the European knight and the European craftsmen) matured under conditions that were built on contractual relations rather than on absolute authority, and *they took their early frustrations as the passing experience that it actually was* (a completely unproven assertion) "

12. Rawlinson, *op cit.*, p 409.

13 Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, p. 413-414. "Some of the great Hindu merchant castes, particularly, for instance, the Vania, have been called the Jews of India and in this negative sense, rightly so. They were in part virtuosos in unscrupulous profiteering . . . Modern Industrial Capitalism, in particular the factory, made its entry into India under British administration and with direct and strong incentive" Marx, *op cit.*, p 4 "However changing the political aspect of India's past must appear, its social conditions have *remained unaltered since its* remotest antiquity until the first decade of the 19th century" Lowie, *op cit.*, p. 270 ". . . a man's caste is immutable" Mandell Morton Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 45. Bober states that Marx's idea on Indian production was that it was characterized by "*communal property*" and "*directly associated labor*" and land "*tilled in common*" See Baden-Powell, *Origin and Growth of Village Communities in India*, p. 2, for a directly contradictory idea, "Ownership in common idea is not borne out by the facts."

14. B. K. Sarkar, *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes*, pp 205-206

15. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p 18

16 After Pitrim Sorokin, "Lasting and Dying Factors in the World's Cultures," in *Ideological Differences and World Order*, ed Northrop, p. 441.

17. Cooper, *op cit.*, p 280.

18. Moreland, *Akbar to Amengzeb*, pp. 192-193.

19 Mountstuart Elphinstone, *The Rise of the British Power in the East* (London John Murray, 1887), and Terry, *op. cit.*, cover this phase quite thoroughly See also *The Annals of the Early English Settlement in Bihar* (Calcutta Kamala Book Depot, 1927)

20 Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p 399

21. Jather and Beri, *op cit* , p 139.

22 J N Das Gupta, *India in the Seventeenth Century*, p 189.

23. Pant, *op. cit.*, pp 64-69.

24 Dealt with at great length in Mukerjee, *Indian Working Class*.

25. Pant, *op. cit.*, p 50, Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p 297.

26 This method of perpetuating rule by a power outside of its own territory has been frequently noticed. In order to assure stability it tends to freeze the social picture of the moment Rawlinson, *op cit.*, pp 401-402.

27. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, pp. V.

28. Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. xii. "Much sentimental nonsense, with little relation to actual facts, has been written about the *supposed indestructible* constitution of the Indo-Aryan village of the North." Italics my own. Baden-Powell, *Land Revenue in British India*, p. 67.

29. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. 14.

30. Pant, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

31. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

32. Read, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

33. Marriot, ed., *Village India*, pp. 25-26, 38-39. 41-42, 188-189.

34. Owing to the modern competition of cheaper machine produced goods plus a differential tariff favorable to the British plus the social concept of use, even though they were inferior, of those items which the conqueror uses. Jather and Beri, *op. cit.*, II, 80-92.

35. Narain, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 62.

36. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 235.

37. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India*, p. xx. "Labour-rchere (1841) Chancellor of the Exchequer in England observed: 'The British have utterly destroyed the manufactures of India by their manufactures.'"

38. Baden-Powell, *Indian Village Community*, p. 26, n. 2.

39. Mukerjee, *Economic History of India* p. xxi

40. I maintain that despite attempts to deal with history in huge and sweeping blocks, despite attempts to set up the dynamics of the historical process such as characterize the ideas of Toynbee, Spengler, Dilthey, Danilevsky, Sorokin, Northrup, it is almost impossible to predict specific culture change. David Bidney feels the same way. He asserts: "The superorganic approach views culture as a level of reality which is, as it were, a *causa sui*, a process which is conceived through itself alone and which molds the experience of man as a member of society. The humanistic personalistic approach . . . stresses human freedom and intelligence and the role of persons taken individually and collectively in determining their cultural destiny and in achieving a certain measure of rational progress . . . But it should not be forgotten, the humanists would add, that the thesis of cultural evolution is quite compatible with the admission of human freedom in the sense of self-determination and creativity, since human freedom is not something absolute but is limited by human power in relation to a given natural and social environment. Thus, the humanists would argue, the scientific study of human culture is in large part an historical critical study, which while it may reveal significant regularities and parallels, is nevertheless by its very nature precluded from attaining the status of a precise, predictive natural science . . . the basic issue is whether human thought is essentially culturally determined or whether notwithstanding the influence of the cultural environment, one may still acknowledge the mind's inherent capacity for freedom or self determination and creative invention." David Bidney, "The Concept of Meta-Anthropology and Its Significance for Contemporary Anthropological Science," in *Ideological Differences and World Order*, Northrup, pp 348-349

41 B K Sarkar, *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes* pp

204-205. Italics my own.

42. Lewis, "Controls and Experiments in Field Work," in *Anthropology Today*, ed., Kroeber, p. 457. "In addition, it has been pointed out that to achieve a high degree of objectivity the student must know himself well, be aware of his biases, his value systems, his weaknesses, and his strength" (Lombard, 1950)

43. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 81. Italics my own.

44. Robert K Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie" in *Sociological Analysis*, Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 771-780. See also: Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*, (New York: The Macmillan Company 1948), pp. 336-385. See also the very important article by W. Lloyd Warner, "A Comparative Study of American Caste" in *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, ed. Edgar T. Thompson (Durham: Duke University Press, 1939), pp. 219-229.

45. At the time of Asoka, caste patterns seem to be very weak and only faintly operative. J. N Das Gupta, *Bengal in the Sixteenth Century A. D.*, Conclusions

46 Lewis, "Controls and Experiments in Field Work," in *Anthropology Today*, ed Kroeber, p. 454 "Elija Jordan . . . an American philosopher of growing reputation, has suggested that the job of the philosopher is to develop systematically a *new set of categories* with which the anthropologist and other social scientists can study culture." Italics my own. Steward also maintains: "Many formulations may be valid for two or more areas, but the varieties of world cultures, past and present, differ so greatly because of both area tradition and socio-cultural level that it can hardly be expected that formulations will hold for all mankind" *Area Research*, p 120.

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